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Introduction
Shaffer: Our  principals  have  spoken  elsewhere,  and  published  recently,
on compelling modem questions  about community-a theme the Washington
and  Lee  University  Frances  Lewis  Law  Center  and  the  Law Review  have
addressed  in a series of lectures and colloquia.'  Stanley Hauerwas works from
a  vivid  theology  of  Israel  and  of the  church  as  a  formative  and  prophetic
community  within American  society.  Sanford  Levinson,  lawyer,  law teacher,
and student  of politics, notably  in his new  book,  Constitutional  Faith, writes
about an American,  perhaps  republican,  community.  Mark  Tushnet,  who  is
probably  the most lucid  and  penetrating  of the legal  scholars identified  with
the  Critical  Legal  Studies  Movement,  has  lately given particular  attention to
what  he has  called  the  law of religion.
Each  of these prolific  scholars has  noticed  and remarked  on the work  of
the  others.  Tushnet  and  Levinson  often  appear  together  in  symposia  and
panel  presentations.  Lewis  LaRue,  the  Director  of  the  Law  Center,  and  I
noticed last year that Levinson and Tushnet had  not yet addressed Hauerwas'
singular  political  theology,  and  Hauerwas  had  not  addressed  their  constitu-
tional jurisprudence.  We invited  them to  begin  doing  so at  Washington  and
Lee.  This conversation  is the result of their  generous  willingness  and interest
in such  a project.  It contains  no  formal,  central  "paper."  It is,  as it was,  a
lively, spontaneous  conversation.  Each of the principals  offered  to the others
recent,  focused  written  work  that  he  believed  spoke  to  a mutual  interest  in
*  Professor of Christian  Ethics,  Duke University.
**  Charles T.  McCormick  Professor of Law,  University of Texas.
Professor of Law,  Georgetown  University.
*  H.  Jefferson  Powell  of  the  law  faculties  of Duke  University  and  the  University  of
Iowa,  and  the  following  members  of  the  Washington  and  Lee  faculty:  Harlan  R.  Beckley
(Religion),  Lewis  H.  LaRue  (Law),  Ann  M.  Massie  (Law),  David  K.  Millon  (Law),  R.  Neville
Richardson  (Religion),  Thomas  L.  Shaffer  (Law),  and 0. Kendall  White  (Sociology).
1. Colloquium on Law, Metaphor, and Theology  (Milner  S.  Ball,  Frank  S.  Alexander,
Paul Lehmann,  Thomas L. Shaffer,  Buie Seawell,  and Roy  Brasfield  Herron),  3 J.  oF LAw AN)
REIGION  141  (1985);  Discretion in Making Legal Decisions (Keith  Hawkins,  David  R.  Novack,
Emory  Kimbrough,  Jr.,  John M.  Thomas,  and Peter  K. Manning),  43  WAsH.  & LEE  L.  REv.
1161  (1986);  Dred Scott and Brown  v.  Board of Education, (Robert  A.  Burt,  Milner  S.  Ball,
Thomas L.  Shaffer,  Peter R.  Teachout,  and L.  H.  LaRue),  42 WAsH.  & La  L.  Rnv.  1 (1985);
Michelman,  Property  As a Constitutional  Right, 38  WAsH.  & La  L.  REv.  1097  (1981);  Tensions
Between Religious or Ethnic Communities and the Larger Society (John A.  Hostetler,  John  J.
Bukowczyk,  and  Colin M.  Turnbull),  41  WAH.  & La  L.  REv.  31  (1984).WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  45:467
questions about community in modem America;2 and each is evidently familiar
with the scholarship of the others.  The conversation  was recorded in the Law
Center  on December  11,  1987. 3
Levinson: I  thought  I  might  start  by reading  two  pages  from  the man-
uscript  of my book,  Constitutional  Faith. You'll  see,  I think, that there is  a
point to beginning with this.  It is  from a discussion of loyalty oaths.  It's not
an argument so  much as a meditation on what we do with notions of loyalty.
I quite deliberately never conclude  with,  "Yes,  we should have loyalty oaths,"
or  "No,  we  shouldn't,"  though  I  suppose  that  most  people  who  read  my
meditations  don't  like  loyalty  oaths.  I  am  certainly  a  part  of  the  liberal
spectrum  that grew  up  in  an era where  the very notion  of loyalty oaths  was
extremely bothersome.
Of course,  I  am not really discussing the kinds of loyalty oaths that drew
the fire in the 50's  and 60's-anticommunist loyalty  oaths and stuff like that.
But  I  think  generally  loyalty  oaths  have  a bad  press,  so by  suggesting  that
there might be something to be  said for them,  I suppose I make an argument.
But there's  obviously a certain waffling  on  whether  they are a good thing  or
not.
I  also  try  to  raise  the  question  of  whether  there  is  something  about
political oaths  that  bothers  us.  Or  is  the  difficulty  with  loyalty  oaths  in
general?  That  brings  up things  like  credal  affirmations  in  religious  contexts,
or marriage vows.  Why is it that formal marriage ceremonies  remain popular,
even  among  people  who  would  quickly  denounce  political  loyalty  oaths?  In
any  case,  I  conclude by quoting  Michael Walzer,  which  I  almost always  do
in  discussions  of  pluralism,  on how  pluralism  creates  notions  of contingent
commitments,  not  hierarchical  commitments.  I believe  that loyalty  oaths are
an  attempt  to  hedge  against  the  Walzerian. kind  of  contingency:  the  state
wants  unconditional  loyalty,  a spouse  wants unconditional  loyalty,  and God
presumably wants unconditional  loyalty.4 There  is an obvious problem:  What
2.  Prof.  Hauerwas  offered  A  Christian Critique of  Christian America  (unpublished),
presented  to the Section  on  Law  and  Religion,  Association  of American  Law  Schools,  in  1986
[hereinafter  Hauerwas,  A  Christian Critique]; Freedom of Religion: A  Subtle  Temptation (un-
published),  presented in a symposium  at Loyola  University,  in Los  Angeles,  in  1986  [hereinafter
Hauerwas,  Freedom of Religion]; and  S.  Hauerwas  &  D.  Burrell,  From System  to Story:  An
Alternative Pattern  for Rationality in Ethics, in  TRuTHFuLNs  AND  TRAGEDY  (1977).
Prof. Levinson offered the manuscript of his then forthcoming book, CoN SmruioNAL FArm
(1988).
Prof.  Tushnet  offered  two  law  review  articles,  Community and Fairness in Democratic
Theory: A  Comment on  'Shaping and Sharing in Democratic Theory,'  15  FLA.  ST.  U.L. Rv.
417  (1987)  and  Religion and  Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 33  Loy.  L.  REv.  221
(1987)  [hereinafter  Tushnet, Religion and Theories].
3.  The  recording  was  made  by  Thomas  Williams  and  transcribed  and  copy-edited  by
Margaret  Williams and Kathryn  Edgell. Professors Tushnet  and  Shaffer edited  the transcript  for
publication.
4.  M.  WAi2ER,  Political  Alienation and Military Service in  OBuATONS  (1970).FAITH IN  THE REPUBLIC
if those loyalties conflict?  (I also discuss  in the book Justice Brennan's rather
offhand  comment that there  is  no  real  conflict between  his  legal  obligations
and  his  obligations  as  a  Roman  Catholic,  because  he  took  an  oath  thirty
years  ago  to  support  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  That  kind  of
settled  it. It seems to me there  are problems  here.)  These  are  the two  pages:
It is not only the family, or the lure of sensual pleasure,  that threatens
necessary  commitment  to the polity....  Religion  itself also  makes
obvious claims of sovereignty as against other social institltions.  The
Protestant  theologian  Stanley  Hauerwas  has  recently  criticized  an
overemphasis in American thought on the formal freedom of religion,
by arguing  that  this  freedom  has  in  significant  measure  been  pur-
chased  by  a  diminution  of  the  willingness  of  believers  to  present
"gospel  as  truth"  and  a concomitant  weakening  of "a  church  that
has a people capable  of saying no to  the state,  or indeed  capable of
challenging  the state."  This is  obviously not a vision of religion that
neatly  divides  the world  into the  unantagonistic  realms of God  and
Caesar  or,  even  better,  from the  perspective  of  Caesar  exhibits  the
willingness  to use religion  as an undergirding  of the legitimacy of the
state.  It  is  the  possibility  of potentially  radical  anti-statist  religion
that  draws  the  fire of a conservative  philosopher,  Nicholas  Capaldi,
who  apparently  supports  the  toleration  by  the  state  of  religious
"subcultures"  only  if  they  are  no  threat  to  the  legitimacy  of  the
tolerating  state.  "There  is  nothing  wrong  in  helping  to  subsidize
religious  schools  in  general,  especially  given  that  such  schools  have
produced  model citizens.  What is not acceptable  is tolerating religious
groups  who  refuse  to  recognize  the  moral  and  political  sovereignty
of  the  secular  community  by,  for  example,  refusing  to  salute  the
flag."  There  is  obviously  a  fundamental  gulf between  the views  of
Hauerwas  and  Capaldi,  a gulf  expressed,  among  other  ways,  in the
language of sovereignty and creedal affirmation.  A staple of political
theory following the development of the notion of political sovereignty
by Bodin is  that there cannot  be two  sovereigns  within  a polity.  By
definition  sovereignty  is  an  exclusive  status.  Yet the major  Western
religions  also celebrate  God  as  an alternative  sovereign  to  the claims
of the  State,  however  much  the  claims  are  dissipated  by  doctrines
like the Talmudic injunction to  follow the local  law or  by Christian
doctrines  about  God  and  Caesar.  Dissipation  does  not mean  elimi-
nation,  as  revealed by the theology of Hauerwas  or the  behavior  of
the Jehovah's  Witness  children  seemingly  condemned  by Capaldi.5
That seems  one thing that certainly  the three  of us  have  written about.
Mark  has  written  very  eloquently  about  religious  pluralism,  particularly  in
the piece that he gave at Loyola,6 which  is very personal  as well  as eloquent.
5.  S.  LVINSON,  CONSTITUTIONAL  FArm  118-19  (1988).
6.  Tushnet,  Religion and Theories, supra note 2.
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He  and  I  share the  same socio-cultural  identification,  whether  or not  it is  a
religious  identification.  I  certainly  not  only  thought  it  was  an  unusually
eloquent  piece,  but  I  also  shared  very  much  the  views  that  Mark  was
expressing.  I  assume  the  rest  of the  day  we  can  talk  about  lots  of  other
things,  including Protestant  and  Catholic constitutionalism  and  all  the  other
stuff that I'm interested  in,  but  I  thought this might be  a way  of getting  us
started.  It's  the  most  immediate  consequence  of  Tom's  bringing  me  into
contact  with  Stan.
Hauenvas: I'd like to hear  Mark respond  to Sandy.  In some ways I have
a sense that  Sandy  thinks  that these  issues  are  ultimately  resolvable  in some
way within  the constitutional  faith,  and Mark's  view  is that they  are  not.
Tushnet: In  framing  these  issues  there  are two  things  that  I  would  like
to  get  on  the  table.  One  is  that  it's  very  easy  to  have  an  image  of the
attractiveness  of  religious  diversity  when  the implicit  models  for the  diverse
religious communities  are  what  I'll  call  attractive  religious  communities-the
Jehovah's  Witnesses  or  the  Amish  in  Wisconsin,  and  the  like.  I  think  it's
important  to  keep in mind  that perhaps  one reason the image  is  attractive  is
that we  regard  these  people  as  so marginal  to  the  exercise  of power  in this
society that they  are not  threatening.  They  are  rendering  unto  Caesar  from
the  point  of view  of Caesar-sure,  so  long  as  they  don't do  anything,  it's
fine  to  have  them  around,  it's  nice  to  have  them  around;  you  feel  good
about  it.  But if  they  begin  to  do  something,  which  is  how  the  Jehovah's
Witnesses  were viewed  in the  1940s,  then it becomes  more troubling.  Part  of
my  problem  is  that  it  is  not  easy  for me,  given  my  socialization  into  nice
ideas  about  religious  pluralism,  to  come  up  with  unattractive  religions-
Moonies,  or the  Jews  for Jesus,  or something like that.  We've talked  about
Iran,  where  from  my  point  of  view,  an  unattractive  religion  is  powerful.
Maybe  that  becomes  an  interesting  way  to  frame  the  issue,  so  that we  can
then  see exactly  what's at  stake.
The  second  point  is  the  point  that  I  was  framing  in  the  Loyola  essay,
which is  that the stance  of Jews  in the United  States  is  of a minority facing
a  regular  routine-so  accepted  as  to  be  thoughtless,  not  in  any  invidious
sense but just something  that goes  on without thinking-of the exercise of  a
Christian religion of some sort. Now Stanley can get us into discussions  about
what  sort  of religion  that represents,  but,  from  our  point  of view,  it's  the
other exercising power on the basis of religion. In response to Stan's question,
it seems  to  me that  that  experience  leads  me  to  think that the  opposition  is
permanent,  not  reconcilable.
Hauerwas: Legally  or socially?
Tushnet: I  think probably both.  Part of my difficulty  in that response  is
that it's awfully difficult for me to separate those domains. That is,  I suppose,
expressed  by  my criticism  of Justice  O'Connor's  opinion  in Lynch  v.  Don-
nelly,7 in which  she has  a  formulation which  says  "I,  a Christian,  am going
to  look at this  from the point  of view  of reasonable  Jews,"  and  doesn't  do
7.  465 U.S.  668,  685-693  (1984).FAITH IN  THE REPUBLIC
it,  and at some level can't do  it. The social  phenomenon is that she can't do
it.  That  translates  into  the  application  of a legal  formula  that  has  a certain
degree  of attractiveness,  in  an unattractive  way.
Hauerwas: Let  me try  to put the  issue  the way  I  see  it in terms  of the
legal  and  the  social-they  are,  I  admit,  very  hard  to  distinguish-but  how
the  distinction  works  in  a  kind  of  ironical  way.  What  I'm  mad  at  is  not
liberalism  per  se,  or  liberal  political  theory  and/or  jurisprudence,  but  who
I'm mad  at is  Christians.  And  the reason I'm mad  at  them is  because  they
fail to see  that the  very forms  of liberal tolerance they took up,  in trying to
provide  safeguards  to  stop  Christian  envy  against the  Jews  from  becoming
too politically  damaging  for Jews  and other religious  groups  in this country,
ironically undercut the seriousness of Christian convictions that were necessary
to form limited  states to begin  with.  So,  ironically,  you have it  work  out in
all  kinds  of  anomalies  in  the  legal  situation,  like  creches  on  New  England
court  yards.  But  this  is  not  the  legal  system,  per  se;  it's  the  legal  system
reinforced  by  an  increasingly  self-fulfilling  liberal  political  system  that  says
that religion is  what you  do  with your  private time.
As a result Christianity cannot any longer maintain the kinds of disciplined
communities  that are  necessary  to keep  the state  limited.  (I don't  believe  in
constitutions  keeping the state limited.  I think you can do  anything you want
to  with  constitutions.)  As  a  result,  the  political  realities  and  social  realities
are  such that the very means that  we used, that  we invented  in terms  of the
Constitution,  to  try  to  ensure  that  there  would  be  a  so-called  religious
pluralism,  to  protect  religious  pluralism,  in  fact  only  undercuts  the  kind  of
discipline that is necessary for religious  communities to form a people capable
of saying no  to the state. That's how I see the problem and that's the reason
why I  find the situation  unresolved,  given Sandy's  way of putting  it.
Tushnet:  Well,  I  wonder  what  your  response  is  to  the  position  Kent
Greenawalt is attempting to articulate,'  that a disciplined Christian community
could  act  on  its,  or  some  portion  of its,  Christian  commitment.  This  is  a
social  program  of  liberal  Protestantism,  motivated  explicitly  on  religious
grounds,  and  defended  on  religious  grounds,  not  on  utilitarian  grounds  or
anything  like that,  or on general  liberal  grounds,  but on Christian  grounds.
But one  element of the discipline of the community  is  that the remainder of
the  Christian  program-the  specifically  Christian  elements-would  be  ad-
vanced  by means  other than use of state  help.
Hauerwas: Yes,  I'd  be sympathetic  with  that.
Tushnet: So  the  Roman  Catholic  bishops'  pastoral  letter  on  economic
justice9 is,  without  worrying  about  the theological  quibbles  about what  it is,
an okay thing?
Hauerwas: Oh,  of  course.  For  example,  take  the  issue  of the  Roman
Catholic  bishops'  pastoral  letter  on nuclear  weapons.' 0
8.  K.  GREENAWALT,  RELIGIOUS  CONWICnONS  AND  POITICAL  CHOICE (1988).
9.  NATIONAL  CONFERENCE  OF CATHOLIC  BISHOPS,  ECONOMIC  JUSTICE  FOR ALL:  A PASTORAL
LErrER ON  CATHOUC  SocIAL  TEAcaINa  AND  =  U.S.  ECONOMY  (1986).
10.  NATIONAL  CON-ERENCE  OF CATHOLIC  BISHOPS,  THE  CHALLENGE  OF PEAcE:  GOD'S  PROM-
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There they have the  claim,  based  on just-war grounds, that if we are not
moving significantly toward the elimination of nuclear weapons-and it would
be interesting  how they interpret this recent treaty-then the Roman Catholic
faithful cannot any longer have their conscience  ordered by the state, or even
serve  in  the  United  States  military.  That  could  be  very  interesting:  Would
the  United  States  of America,  if the  Roman  Catholic  bishops  came  to  the
empirical  judgment  that  we  are  not  moving  significantly  toward  reduction
and elimination  of nuclear  weapons,  and  so Roman  Catholic  people  can no
longer  serve  in  the  United  States  military,  be  happy with  that  one?  Is  that
going  to  be a  freedom  of religion  issue?  Now  that would  be interesting.  Of
course we  know this  will  not happen. And  the reason  we know this will  not
happen is because  the Roman  Catholic Church  has become Protestantized  in
America.  Catholic people,  because they want to use condoms when they have
sex,  now  will  no  longer  listen to the  bishops tell them  that they cannot  use
atomic  weapons.  The  bishops  lost  the  disciplined  community  over  sex  and
therefore  cannot maintain  it over nuclear  weapons.  I want them to maintain
it  over  both.  Partly this  is  a result  of the  fact  that Roman  Catholics  have
become  good  American  denominationalists,  thinking that  the  church  is  but
another  free  association,  rather than a  called,  disciplined  community.  That's
what  you'd  expect  to  have  happened.  In that  sense,  they  aren't  clearly  on
the  Pope's  side.  I think  that  American  Catholicism  has  been  deeply  out  of
step  with  what  Roman  Catholicism  has been  about.
Tushnet: I wonder if we could use  that example at least to begin  to talk
about  the unattractive  faith-community  problem.
Hauerwas: I'm trying to  make  Roman  Catholicism an unattractive  faith.
Tushnet: Right.  I  understand  that.  Again,  as  I  understand  it,  there  are
quarrels  within  the  Roman  Catholic Church  on this issue.  But let's take  the
positions  about sex that you've  raised as  constitutive  of Roman  Catholicism.
And  let's  take  it  as  a given  that,  independent  of the  association  of those
positions  with  a  faith  community,  they  have  almost  nothing  to  commend
them.  Then  what do  we  do about the faith  community that is unattractive?
Hauerwas: My  response is,  "Who's  we,  white  man?"  I  think this really
goes  to the  heart of the issue.  When  people  read one  of my papers, like the
one on freedom of religion," 1  they say,  "Gee,  even if you are right,  what  are
we  going  to  do?"  I  say  I  don't  have  the slightest  damned  idea.  Why  do  I
have  to  come  up  with  a solution?  I  mean,  I'm just  trying  to survive.  Jeff
[Powell]  made  a nice  point  after  a class  I'm  teaching  in  Christian  Ethics in
America  that  he's been  taking.  He  said,  "Just  to listen  to  how  you  teach
makes  a difference.  It  shows  how  socialized  I  am in the  law,  because in the
law you are always  wanting to know,  'How  can I make it work?'  Of course,
religious  ethicists  were  trained  in  that  way  for  years.  I  always  said  that
basically  what  Christian  social  ethics  tried  to  do  in  this  country  was  to
IsE  AND  OuR RESPONSE:  A  PASTORAL  LESTmR  ON  WAR  AND  PEACE,  Publication No.  863 (Wash-
ington,  D.C.,  1983).
11.  Hauerwas,  Freedom of Religion, supra note 2.FAITH IN  THE REPUBLIC
formulate  a social  ethic that  our  kind of secretary  of state  would  use if we
finally got power.  We can  have a Christian  foreign policy,  and  of course  we
got it  in  Alexander  Haig.  But  I  just don't  think  that  way.  When  you  say
what  do  we do,  I  don't  know who's  "we."  I'm  not trying  to think how to
make it work.
Tushnet: So there are two ways  of formulating the problem.  One is that
we  (that is,  we here) could try to imagine  a situation in  which this-with  all
the  qualifications-this  unattractive  faith  community  is  exercising  coercive
authority.  You  can  say  it's  coercion  and  take  an  anti-coercion  position
generally.  The other position  is the lawyers'  perspective,  the legal academic's
perspective,  translated  into  a  religious  context.  We  are  people  who  attempt
to speak truth to power,  in some sense.  Thefe are people on the margin who,
for whatever reasons,  listen to what legal academics  say and,  on the margins,
can  be  influenced  by their  suggestions.  (Where  the  margin  is,  is  obviously
something  we  can  talk  about.)  But,  from the  point  of view of us,  as  legal
academics,  the  what-do-we-do  question'is:  We're  just  trying  to  survive.  I
mean it, isn't this true of Christians?
Hauerwas: Mark,  you're  still  trying to  form power  in  a  way  that  I'm
not. The law  is much more essentially related  to power  than those of us that
are in the theological business,  working  out of the church,  are-even though
the church would clearly like the power that the law has,  which it traditionally
had,  but which it has now lost.  But now  we try to  piggy-back it  on you as
one way  of doing it,  but it doesn't work  very well  for us.
Let's  do the thing  about  coercion,  though.  I think that the whole  thing
about the Unification  Church is brainwashing.  I was very unsympathetic with
the  argument that the Moonies  were  coercing people.  Indeed,  a lot of what
it sounded like they were doing was like early Christian catechetical  formation
in the Roman Empire.  We were clearly brainwashers  and the Romans would
have clearly seen that. So I regard that allegation  about Moonie brainwashing
as  the  continuing  hegemony  of a  Christian  culture  trying  to resist  a  new
powerful  sect which,  as  a matter of fact,  has  a very interesting counter-story
into  which it initiates people.  Christians  claim Moonies are brainwashing  so
they  do not have to  deal with the  issue of truth.
I  used  to  teach  a marriage  course  at  Notre  Dame,  and  I  would  read
them  a letter in  it that said,  "Gee  our kid was  doing well-gone  to all the
right  schools-had a bright military career-looked  like he  could have done
well  in the political arena.  Then he got involved with  some near-Eastern  sect
and he says he doesn't want anything to do  with us  because we're people of
the world.  He's never going to marry. He's going to be completely subservient
to this sect,  and we don't know what to do. We're  just heartsick."  I asked
who'd write that letter  or what it was  about. Students would say it was from
a  family  writing  about  their  son's  conversion  to  Unification  or  to  Hare
Krishna  or  something  like  that.  It's  the  letter of  a fourth  century  Roman
senator  and his wife about their  son's conversion  to  Christianity.
Levinson: My hunch,  though,  is that most of the  "we"  that comes from
the  liberal  academy  share  that  toleration  toward  the  Unification  Church.
With  the deprogramming  stuff, and  the  cult,  it  came naturally  to  many  of
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us  to  say,  "Well,  they're  just  like  any  other religious  community-another
intense  ideology  in  the  community."  I  don't think  they  are  viewed  as  an
attractive  sect, but I don't think most of us in the academic community  know
enough  about  them,  or  have  enough  experience  with  them,  to  have  views
about  anything  more  than what  is  presumed  to be  a political  agenda of the
Moonies.
I  think  the  best  example  of  an  unattractive  native  American  religious
group,  where  there is  very high  valence,  at  least among  some  of the  people
we  know,  is  the  Mormon  Church,  particularly  that  wing  of unreformed
Mormonism  that  continues  to  believe  in  polygamy and  educates  its  children
to  maintain  this.  I  think  many  of  the  people  we  know  find  that  highly
unattractive,  and  that  has  triggered  a very  interesting  debate  about  whether
you  use  the  power  of  the  state  to  smash  the  unattractive  religious  group.
Certainly  I think  the  whole treatment  of the Mormons  in  American  history
has  been a very interesting  problem  within the Christian  community.  I  don't
know  to  this day how much  Mormons  are viewed  as  Christians  by  orthodox
Christians.  Certainly  the  Mormons  had  to  change  church  doctrine  in  order
to get even liberal tolerance.  What obviously makes the unreformed  Mormons
so  interesting  is that  they reject the validity  of the  antipolygamy  revelation.
Hauerwas: My view  about  the Unificationists  is that  they are  Calvinism
gone  East,  transformed  by  Confucianism,  come  back  to  save  the  West.
Because  of that I  regard  them  as  particularly perverse;  and,  as  Christians,  I
think we ought to  clearly  brand them  for what  they are-heretics-and  have
nothing  to  do  with  them.  I  think  that  Mormons  are  a more  complex  case
insofar  as  they  continue  to  maintain  the  validity  of  the  Christian  scripture
but by deeply  misinterpreting  it.  I  think you  can maintain  a certain  kind  of
discussion  with  them,  but  I  don't  see  why  the  legal  system  should  regard
Mormons  and  Moonies  any  differently  than it regards  Christians.
Levinson: A quick  answer to that is that the unreformed  Mormons  come
into the legal  situation because  they wish  to  violate  laws prohibiting  bigamy.
Hauerwas: We  Christians  do not  live in  a monogamous  culture.  We live
in a  culture  of serial  polygamy.  Contemporary  Christians  do  not  believe  in
monogamy.  What  Christians  believe  in  is  that you  can  be  married  to  more
than  one  person;  you just  need  to do  it  serially.  And  this  is  certainly  not
what the church traditionally meant by "covenant  fidelity in marriage."  How
the  legal  system  reflects  that,  I think, is  a real  issue.  Most  Protestants  don't
even know what marriage is about, since most of them have accepted romantic
conceptions  of what marriage  is  about that are  based upon the false assump-
tions  of  liberalism.  Namely,  that  somehow  or  other,  love  has  to  do  with
marriage  in  an intrinsic way.  I  take it that the church has always  maintained
that  people  should  love  one  another  even  in  marriage,  which  is  a  little
different perspective.  I'm  for that but it puts  a lot  of burden on marriage.
Orthodox  Christian  views  about  marriage  are  so  out  of  sync  with  the
kind of general  cultural  presuppositions,  that Christians think that they hold
on Christian  grounds,  that the  issue  is  very  hard  for them  to  negotiate.  I
cannot  see  any  rationale  for  this  society  to  maintain  strong  views  about
marriage,  anymore  than  I  can  see  why  this  society  should  entertain  strongFAITH IN  THE REPUBLIC
views  about  suicide.  I think  there is  no  reason  at all  that we  should  try to
prevent  suicide,  given  our  natural  presuppositions.
Which  brings  me  back  to  the  hardest  case  of  an  unattractive  religion,
and  that is,  of  course,  Jim  Jones and  what was  going  on in California  with
that kind of extraordinary evangelical  Protestant sectarianism-the  formation
of  those  people  who  ultimately  ended  up  in  Guiana  killing  themselves.  On
the whole,  we gave  them  freedom  of religion.  He  [Jones]  even  was  courted
by  the politicians  of  California  and  various  places.  It was  very  ambiguous,
and  looked  very socially  progressive,  and  that  kind of thing.  I regard  those
people  in  Jonestown  as  victims  to  liberal  tolerance.  We  are  all  ready  to
condemn Jerry Falwell because he appears  intolerant. Liberal Christians  can't
wait to  get  on the  bandwagon  to  condemn  someone  like  Falwell.  But  they
just  stood  back  on  Jones,  not  saying  anything  about  the  extraordinary
perversity  of  what  was  going  on  there,  because,  you  know,  he  was  doing
good  for poor  folks.  I regard  that as  just  perverse.  But  liberal  culture  has
no reason  to  stop  Jones  and  Jonestowns-does  it?  We're  going  to  have to
grant them freedom  of religion.
Tushnet: As  a  matter  of  stated  law,  at  least,  it  is  possible  to  develop
permissible  legal  techniques  of  controlling  what  happened  there;  however,
you want to  categorize  Jonestown,  on the model  of laws  against bigamy,  as
a method  of controlling  the unreformed  Mormon community.  Now,  I  take
it  the problem  with  that is  that  (with  all  sorts of qualifications)  the  liberal
principle  that  authorizes  that  degree  of  intolerance  also  authorizes  more
substantial  degrees  of intolerance  with  respect  to less  unattractive  religions.
The  problem  from  the point  of view  of liberalism  is  not  so  much  that  it
lacks  the  resources  to  authorize  intervention  in a  Jonestown  situation,  but
that the resources  it has also  authorize other,  more problematic interventions.
Hauerwas: You think that there are  legitimate  interventions  that give  us
the right to say that polygamy  is wrong,  that we can intervene in that legally?
Tushnet: As a matter  of stated  law.
Hauerwas: As  a matter  of stated  law,  but  I'm  saying  that that  stated
law  is irrational.
Powell: No,  I  think  it's  perfectly  rational.  We  have  a  problem  about
what we mean about liberalism, but I take it to mean we're describing  current
liberalism,  whatever  it is  that  late 20th-century  liberal  constitutional  lawyers
mean by it, not 19th-century liberalism.  I think it's perfectly rational,  because
one  of the  great  accomplishments  of liberal  constitutionalism  is to  say that
state  power  is to  be invoked  on behalf  of the rights  of individuals;  and  the
rights of individuals viewed from a liberal perspective  in a polygamy situation,
or  in the Jonestown  situation,  are  being  violated,  and  state  power  ought to
be invoked  to  protect them.
Hauerwas: What right of  an individual  is being  violated?
Powell: The right of women not to  be in  subservient kinds  of situations.
I  think that is part of what  liberalism  today means.
Hauerwas: I've read  some  of the  biographies  of those  families,  and  the
women didn't  feel like  they were  in subservient  situations.
Powell: That's not relevant,  Stan.  That's like  asking black people in 1953
if they feel that segregation-if they would say, "Oh,  segregation is oppressing
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me."  That's not, in the end, dispositive. The way  I would answer the question
Stan was  posing is,  "Yes,  it's deeply correct  for the liberal state to intervene
and to  break  up communities  which  are  violating  the  liberal  state's  view  of
how people  ought to  relate."
Levinson: I think what  you've  got,  though,  is  the obvious  contradiction
between  freedom  of contract  notions  and  notions  of false  consciousness  as
preventing true freedom  of contract.  So there is a connection.  I think there's
a linkage  between  contemporary  liberalism  and  old-fashioned  liberalism.  All
of it  is autonomy-based.  I  think  the most  satisfying  defense  of  intervention
is  just the  one you've given,  that the individuals  entering  these contracts  are
[should  be] truly  autonomous.  But  if it  then  is  the  function  of the  liberal
state  to create truly  autonomous  individuals,  who will  we then  allow to enter
into  whatever  contracts  they want?  I  think that  the  problem  is  obvious-in
terms  of who  gets  to define  what counts  as  false  consciousness.
Powell: The  liberal  state.
Hauerwas: And  of course it does that  coercively.
Powell: Yes.
Hauerwas: For  example,  just on these  grounds,  it  seems  to  me  that the
Roman  Catholic  marriage  doctrine  is  deeply  coercive.  It  is  only  false  con-
sciousness  on the part-as  feminists will  tell us-of Roman  Catholic  women
to  believe that they should pledge  themselves  in marriage  for a lifetime. That
is  coercive;  it is  non  autonomous.  They  ought to  be able  to wake up every
morning  and  decide  whether  they  are  going  to  continue  this  bad  marriage.
So,  for  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  to  suggest  that  they  will  only  marry
people that are willing to  enter  into this  covenant  for a lifetime-that  is  the
exact equivalent  to polygamy. And they should not have recognition by public
law  of that.  Right?  Indeed  I  would  think  that women  could  start bringing
wrongful  marriage  suits  against  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  and  get  civil
damages.  Is  that right?
Powell: Well,  there  of  course  the  liberal  state  hasn't  decided  that  it
disagrees  with  lifetime marriage officially.  If you want to  do  it for a lifetime
fine,  if you  don't-it's not like polygamy.
Levinson: But  here  we  get  into  the  metaphysics  of  neutrality.  By  the
state  offering  the  option  and  moving  toward no-fault  divorce  statutes,  and
trying  to  make  it  as  easy  as  possible  for  bad marriages,  as  defined  by  the
parties,  or  indeed  as  defined  by one  party,  to dissolve  as  easily  as  possible,
that,  against  a  background  of critique  of  divorce,  has  to  count  as  relative
approval.
Tushnet: We actually know that Stan's example is right when we examine
the  get cases,  which  do  not  quite  seek  civil  damages  against  a  church  for
maintaining  a  rule  of lifetime  marriage,  but come  quite  close  to that. They
do what they can to undermine, to directly confront, the church's commitment
to lifetime  marriage.
Levinson: For  those  who  aren't  familiar  with  orthodox  Judaism,  you
might explain  the get.
Tushnet: It's  complicated,  but  in  the  context  of a  divorce  in  a  Jewish
family,  the divorce is  permissible. The  former wife is  not allowed to remarryFAITH IN  THE REPUBLIC
unless  the  former  husband  does  something,  which  is  to  provide  a  get,  a
religious  document.  This  has  created  a fair  number  of problems  within  the
Jewish community  in New York. The New York  courts developed a rule that
in effect  coerced  the former  husband  into providing the get.  The New  York
legislature  responded  by imposing  a condition that requires  the performance
of religious  duties  necessary  to dissolve  the  marriage religiously,  so that  the
husband could not obtain the civil divorce, which  quite often he would want,
unless he  agreed to  perform  the religious  ceremony,  which,  for  a variety  of
complicated  reasons,  he might  not want  to do.
Powell: But  that's very close to the model that Stan  was worried  about.
Hauerwas:  My response is to say,  "Don't tell me that the liberal state is
a neutral  state."  I  regard  that-given Jeff's justification-as  a  state  with  a
regnant,  coercive  ideology about what people  ought to be that fundamentally
is  about  the  destruction  of  religious  communities.  Jews  bought  into  that
liberal state  to  keep  Christians  off their  necks,  for  all  good  reasons,  but  it
seems  to  me,  ironically,  that  the liberal  state  is  going  about the  destruction
of the  Jewish community,  along with  the  destruction  of the Christian  com-
munity,  exactly  because  Christians  and  Jews  don't  care  about  autonomy.
And  they  rightly do not.
Tom  and I  had a  colleague  at the  University  of Notre  Dame  one time,
and I  was talking to him  and I  said,  "Isn't  it about time for Sam to be bar-
mitzvahed?"  And  he  said,  "Oh,  I'm  not  going  to  bar-mitzvah  Sam.  I'm
going to  let  him get  older and  make up  his  own  mind."  And  I  said,  "Oh
hell,  raise  him  to  be  an  atheist.  At  least  that  shows  you've  got  some
convictions.  What's  all this autonomy  stuff? Make  up your  own mind! How
in the  hell  can  you  make  up your  mind  to be  a  Jew?  That's  stupid.  Here
you've had  thousands  of ancestors  willing  to  die at the  hands  of  Christian
persecutors  so that  you  as  a  matter of fact  can  continue  to  live  faithful to
the community,  and you're  going  to  let  Sam  make up  his  own  stupid little
mind. That's stupid. If what  I say about the Jews  is true, then,  by God, you
ought to form him  in the  community."
Shaffer: The  next year Sam  had his bar mitzvah.
Hauerwas: Jews,  on  the  whole,  in  America,  have been  able to  survive
on  the  basis  of  Protestant  prejudice.  It's  been  very  useful  in  terms  of
maintaining  intensive  group commitment.  But the question  is  whether  you'll
be able to survive the tolerance sponsored  by the liberal  state, as  it becomes
more  and more the ethic that Jews and  Christians  alike  seize upon.
Tushnet: I  don't  believe  in  autonomy  either,  and  so  I  think  that  the
liberal  formulation is ultimately unsatisfying.  The strategic  question you raise
about what is  the best  way to preserve  our religious  community  is a difficult
one.  But I'm not  sure we're  in  a position  to  say a  whole  lot about that.  I
am  interested  in  the  question  raised  by a  lot  of your formulations.  Those
may be  formulations  designed  for rhetorical  purposes.  In the  formulations,
the terms "truth claims"  and "faith  communities"  or "religious  communities"
have  positive  value,  wherever  they  are  located.  And  I  don't  believe  that.
Indeed  I  would think  that,  with  qualifications  relating  to the nature  of the
scope  of the tradition  within  which the  faith  community  is  located,  people
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in faith communities  couldn't believe that. That is, the adherent to unreformed
Mormonism doesn't accept the proposition that the Moonies are making truth
claims.  They  are  constituting  a  community  around  them,  but  it  is  a  false
community,  because they  are false.
Hauerwas: Right.  So  is  Jones.  Why can't I  say that?
Tushnet:  You  can.  One  of  the  things  that  gives  your  formulations
rhetorical  power  is  that  truth  claims  are  positively  valued.  You  get  the
rhetorical  power  because  it  appears  as  if truth  claims are  positively  valued
wherever they  occur.  And  you don't believe  that.
Hauerwas: That's  right.  I  certainly  don't believe  that.  I  don't  believe  it
descriptively,  obviously.
Tushnet:  Right,  but  you  don't  believe  it-well,  you  can't  believe  it
because,  to you,  I  don't have the  truth. I make  truth  claims  and  I  have  a
community  that it's organized  around,  but they're  wrong.
Hauerwas: My  community  is  wrong?
Tushnet: No,  mine.
Hauerwas: I  believe  that  Israel  is  the  promised  people  of  God  and  as
such  it  is  a  community  of  truth  that  Christians  could  not  do  without.
Therefore,  I would  certainly  validate that, from within  my own  community.
Powell: Talking  about  an orthodox  Christian  view  of Judaism  is  not an
easy  thing  precisely  because,  from  a  Christian  viewpoint,  Judaism  is  not
exactly  like  just  any other  religion.  The  easy  one  is  to  say  that  Buddhism
makes  truth  claims  that are  simply  false...
Hauerwas: Well,  I  don't know.
Powell: ..  .from  our  standpoint.
Hauerwas: I'm  a  nonfoundationalist, 1 2 but  I  regard  nonfoundationalism
as  a necessary  position  of a modernity  that has  primarily  been  the  result of
Descartes.  Rorty  is  only  possible  because  of  Descartes.  The  difficulty  with
Rorty 3 is he  forgot  that there is a good deal  of tradition prior to  Descartes.
So  I'm not going to give up.  I have  strong commitments  to  certain kinds  of
metaphysical  realism  that  are still  part  and  parcel  of scholastic  philosophy,
which  I  think  has  been  deeply  misconstrued  and  misunderstood  since  Des-
cartes.' 4  Because  I  remain  a  nonfoundationalist  within  modernity  doesn't
12.  Foundationalism  usually is identified with the project of Descartes to solve  metaphysical
and epistemological  issues  by finding  a fixed Archimedean  point that  is absolute,  nonrelativistic,
ahistorical,  and  not subject  to  doubt. For  a  good  discussion  of current  debates  about  founda-
tionalism,  see R. BERNSTEIN,  BEYoND  OBEcTIvIM AND  RELATrvisM:  SCIENCE,  HERmENIUrrCS  AND
PRAxis (1983).  See Hauerwas, A  Christian Critique,  supra  note 2. Hauerwas,  Freedom of Religion,
supra note  2,  discusses  Rorty's  The Priority of Democracy to  Philosophy, in  Tir  ViRGINIA
STATUTE  FOR  REmIGIOUS  FREEDoM  (M. Peterson  & R.  Vaughn  eds.  1987).
13.  R.  RORTY,  PHImosopHY  AND  THE  MIRROR  OF  NATURE  (1979);  R. RORTY,  CONSEQUENCES
oF  PRAGMATISM  (1982).  This criticism  of Rorty  first  was  made by  Alasdair  Maclntyre.
14.  For a defense  of the  kind of "realism"  I  am  willing to  defend,  that  is,  a realism  that
requires the acknowledgment that  all  claims of truth are  tradition dependent,  see  A.  MAcINTYRE,
WHOSE  JUSTICE,  WICH  RATnONA=rrY?  (1988).  In particular,  see  Chapter  XVIII.FAITH IN  THE REPUBLIC
mean  I have to give up on truth claims that,  I  can continue to assume,  have
some way of providing  us  with ways  of talking  across  communities.
I  regard  foundationalism  and  liberalism  as  the  result  of Christian  bad
faith.  Christianity  wanted  to  show  itself  to  be  a  universal  religion  and  we
thought  by being  a universal  religion  that meant  that we  had  the truth  that
everyone  really  knew but just  had to be awakened  to.  So  natural  theology 5
became  our mode,  and  when we went  to  other societies  we  assumed that all
we  were  telling  them  was  something  that  they  already  knew  and  therefore
they would  just naturally  respond.  And  when  they didn't  naturally  respond
then we  said  they must  be morally obtuse  and  rationally  unclear  and  so we
could coerce  them since,  as a matter of fact,  this was just the universal truth
we  were  trying to  make  them live  in accordance  with.
What I  say that  does  is  forget  that intrinsic to  the  Christian faith  is  the
assumption  that our truth is a truth that only comes through witness.  People
forget  that  witness  presupposes  that  you  are  telling  people  something  that
they haven't known.  It's not just  confirming  something  they already  know.
Our  truth is something  that they haven't known.  It is primarily  the result of
compellingness  of lives  that  puts  the  world  together  in that  way.  My  sense
of truth is  not one that can  avoid  the necessity  of witness  in that regard,  so
I  have  a  nonfoundationalist  account  which  I  think  is  appropriate  to  the
Christian presumption that witness is the only way that the truth goes forward
in the world.
And  the  witness-because  of the  material  content itself-must  be  non-
coercive.  It's  not because  we  are just good,  tolerant  people.  It's because,  as
a matter  of  fact,  the  very thing  that  you  are  saying  about  God  and  God's
love  as  manifest  in  Jesus  of  Nazareth  means  that  the  only  way  that  one
learns to follow this way of life truthfully is through taking it up as a calling,
not as  something  you  have  been  coerced  into.  But  that is  the  claim  about
the truth  of the way  the world is, that you must  work  in it in that way.
Now  then,  the problem  is  separating  that account  of truth  from liberal
tolerance.  It got confused  with  liberal  tolerance  very  quickly in  this  society
and liberal tolerance turns  out to be very coercive.  So,  yes,  I'm going to talk
about truth,  and  I'll continue  to talk about  it. I  have to.  I take it that  the
difficulty in  America is  that  we want  to  be a society that never  has  to  raise
questions  of truth. 6  I  would like  to  hear  Mark  respond  to  my  account  of
15.  See Hauerwas,  A  Christian Critique, supra note 2.
16.  Hauerwas:  I wondered about Sandy titling the book CoNsTn  ONAL FArm, and whether
that  was  taking  up  a  peculiar  sense  of faith  that  has  been  with us  since  the  19th  century-
namely,  faith is arational-in  the sense  that we  really  can't  show  that faith has  anything  to do
with  the  way things  are.  Faith  is  a  kind 6f  trust, a  fairly  good way to  go about  things,  but it
doesn't  have  any  relationship  to  truth.  Protestants  made  a  lot  of  hay  on  that  sense  of  faith
which  I, myself,  think  is  perverse.  I  don't  want  to  have  that  kind  of  faith.  I  don't  think
Christianity  is a  faith  of that sort.  I think  faith  is  ultimately  rational.  Faith is  knowledge.  It's
just knowledge  of a  different  sort,  namely,  of confidence  in God.  And  so  I was  wondering-
did  you think about what you meant by CONSTrrUioNAL  FAr=?
Levinson:  It  comes  from  a  sociological  tradition  that  discusses  civil  religion,  as  Emile
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truthfulness.  Because  I  don't want to  let  him just get away  with  saying that
it is  rhetorical  power  that's there.  I  want  to  make  you  talk  that  language,
too.
LaRue: Would it be too much to ask you to play that record  again?  The
one  you just went through.  I leaped  along with  every  step  you made.
Hauerwas: With  the  Constantinian  settlement, 7  Christianity  wanted  to
try to  show  that  we  could  be a  civil  religion,  in  a way  that Judaism  could
not, because  we were a universal  faith that could command  the adherence  of
anyone if they just got the right information  and thought hard  enough about
it.  Therefore,  we  sponsored  a  sense  of  "truth"  that  was  a  kind  of  corre-
spondence  theory-that  just  said  that  this  is  the  way  things  are,  and  you
should be able to  come  up with  it pretty quickly.  That was  of course  against
our  own  best  practice,  since  inherent  in  Christianity  is  the  assumption  that
in order  to know the truth you  must be  converted.  Christianity grew,  not by
saying  people  already  believe  what  we  know-we  just  have  to  make  it
explicit-but it grew  by  witness,  and witness  is primarily  the power  of lives.
So I'm saying that the kinds of theories of truth we sponsored had a political
purpose,  namely,  to  underwrite our  attempt  to become  a  civil religion.
The  civil  religion  that  we  created,  coming  primarily  through  western
European  sources,  has now  primarily  been  secularized  into forms  of  "liberal
rationality"  which  no longer have Christian support.  Enlightenment liberalism
took  up the great task of Christian Constantinianism,  to  try to show that we
are  all  rational  people  in  that  way,  and  therefore  that  our  focus  is  to  be
autonomous.  And  now that liberalism  has  created  a new  set of heretics  that
we're beginning  to  see spring up everywhere-people  like Richard  Rorty and
the  deconstructionists,  who  are  calling  into  question  the  rationality  and
presumptiveness  of liberalism and liberal  epistemologies.  I take it the Critical
Legal  Studies  Movement in  some ways  is  delegitimating  liberal  presumptions
in that  way.
It's tempting  for  Christians  to  use  this  dissent  from  the Enlightenment
by saying,  "Aha,  isn't  this wonderful,  this makes way  for faith again.  Since
no  one  knows  what  truth  is,  well,  hell,  you  might  as  well  try  being  a
Christian.  Or  a  Jew.  This  is  wonderful.  We  can  all  get  in  a  ball  and  be
irrational  together."  What  I was  saying  was  that it's a  deep temptation,  and
it's one I think one ought to resist. The fact that Rorty,  et al., are questioning
Durkheim  did.  "Sociology  of  religion,"  as  Jonathan  Smith  suggests,  is  a  study  dominated
primarily by those  who view themselves  as outside religion and  are interested  in how these things
work,  how they function,  what accounts  for the  rise of them,  how you analyze  ideas to see them
as  ideologies,  in  cultural  anthropology  and  sociology.  I  can't  say that  I  reflected  very  deeply
about  it,  but I'm sure  that's  where  it comes  from.  If  people  talk about  civil  religion  from  this
sociological  understanding,  everything  followed  from  that.  I  cannot  imagine writing  something
called  constitutional  truth.
17.  By  "Constantinian  settlement"  I  do  not  mean the  actual  historical  point  when  Con-
stantine  became  a  member  of  the  church,  but  rather  the  tendency,  that  began  well  before
Constantine,  of Christians  to use state  and social power  to enforce  allegiance  to the church. See
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liberal  rationality  doesn't  mean  that  we  should  give  up,  as  Christians,  on
claims  that our convictions  tell  you  the way the world is.  I  certainly  want to
continue  to maintain that.
Reinhold  Niebuhr  was  always  fond  of  saying  that,  according  to  The
London  Times,  the  only  doctrine  of  Christian  faith  that  is  empirically
verifiable is the doctrine of original  sin.  Of course that's false. That is deeply
false.  The  fact that  people  are crappy  is  in  no  way  equivalent  to  the  claim
that  we  find  ourselves,  when  confronted  by  the  Gospel,  to  be  sinners.
Christians  believe  that-I think  they  should  believe,  for  example,  that  you
can only be trained to be a sinner. You must learn to discover to be a sinner.
Indeed,  until  the  Gospel  was  preached  you  couldn't  have  the  knowledge
necessary  to  know  what  it means  to be  a God-hater.  That's  the reason  why
a pagan who has not been preached to is fundamentally,  ontologically different
than  one who  has.  So  that sin  is  an ontological  claim.  It  tells  you  the way
we  are,  but  it  depends  upon  witness,  and  this  is  an  account  of truth  that
doesn't  fit into the presumptiveness  of liberal rationality,  especially  since the
Enlightenment.
But  I  don't  want  to  side  with  the  heretics  within  that  Enlightenment
tradition  of truth  either.  I think that rationality  and  truthfulness  are  always
tradition-dependent.  Descartes  and Rorty don't. And that's where I think the
difficulty  is,  and  I want  to  say that you  have to  display how it is  that  you
think that truth  claims  can work  within a tradition,  and then  how they  can
be displayed  for their  power across traditions.
Tushnet: It seems  to  me one  matter  of concern  which  comes  up  in the
Critical Legal Studies stuff and  in philosophical  discussions  around Rorty,  is
that,  in  these  discussions,  the  term  liberalism  covers  at  least  two  kinds  of
things.  One  is  a  substantive  doctrine  about  the  nature  of the  good  and  a
notion  of rationality.'"  Then there is,  independently,  a political conception  of
liberalism  as  a purely political doctrine.  It seems  to me  that,  conceived  of as
a purely  political  doctrine,  that is,  as  a way of letting  people  survive  in the
world,  liberalism  does not raise the kinds  of problems  for Christian  witness,
or conversion to Judaism,  that would make liberalism  as a political  doctrine
incompatible  with universalist  claims  of Christian  witness.  Although  concep-
tually  these domains,  these forms  of liberalism,  can  be kept apart,  we  know
that historically there was  a dynamic that led  from political  liberalism  to this
more substantive  construction.  The  question  is,  was  that inherent  or can the
distinction  be sustained?
Hauerwas: Right. Would  you tell  me more about what you take political
liberalism  to  be?  Is  it that  we  have  a lot  of these  conspiracies  out there  in
the world today and we've  got to  figure  out some way  of making them  live
together?
Tushnet: Basically,  that's right.
18.  Tushnet:  Presumably  the notion  of rationality could  be separated  out as  well. But  for
our purposes  I guess  all  of the  substantive  commitments  of liberalism  can  be lumped  together.
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Hauerwas: And  therefore  the  Constitution  is  a  kind  of liberal  political
document,  articles  of peace  for how  these people  can live  together?
Tushnet: Yeah.
Hauerwas:  But then,  how do you respond to Jeff's account of autonomy
and  Sandy's  underwriting  it  as  the principle  that's necessary  to  sustain  that
political  compromise?
Tushnet: The argument  is that it's  sustained not by notions of autonomy
but  by concern  for self-defense-community  self-defense,  if you want  to  do
it that way.  That is,  if we  don't  sign this  mutual  nonaggression  agreement,
there  are  more  of  them  than  there  are  of  us,  so  we'll  get  smashed.  And
everybody  can see these alliances as working  out badly, so it's in everybody's
interest-
Hauerwas: How do you  avoid  a kind of majoritarian  coerciveness  when
you  take issues  such  as  abortion,  marriage  laws,  suicide-all those  kinds  of
issues  which  inextricably  call  forward  normative  presuppositions  for  their
resolution  within  any social  polity?  The  problem  is  that  political  liberalism
wants  to  draw  back  from  many  normative  solutions.  So  as  a  result  what
happens  is  you  get  majoritarian  imposition.  Do  you  just  have  to  live  with
that?
Tushnet: It  seems  to  me  that, within the  political  liberal tradition,  there
are  concerted  efforts  to  work  out  restrictions  on  majoritarian  imposition
which  have  not  been  notably  successful.  And it  may  be that  what  you  end
up with is majoritarianism unrestrained by principle, restrained by sociological
stuff-and  also  other  things,  but not  as  a matter  of principle-as  the  best
we can  do.
Hauerwas: So you  should  have supported  Judge  Bork...
Tushnet: Well,  no,  because  he's wrong.
Hauerwas: ..  .because  that's  his  position,  isn't  it?
Tushnet: Yes.
Hauerwas: No  one  knows  the  truth?  We  just  ultimately  have- to  be
majoritarian?
Tushnet: I think it's more complicated than that.  One need not write off
these  efforts  within  political  liberalism  to  define  some  substantive  goals,  as
he  does.  His  defense  of  majoritarianism  ultimately  is  not  that.  If someone
had a principle  of majoritarianism  along  those lines, I'd take it seriously,  but
that wasn't his.
Powell: Mark,  I  want  to  suggest  why  I  think  that  you  end  up  in  the
position  I  was taking  on the liberal state-that it's going to  be intrusive in  a
way that you  seem to be wanting to say  it isn't and isn't committed to being.
One  of the  articles  of peace  that  we  signed  as  political  liberals  is  that  if D
is  beating  up on E,  [then]  A,  B,  and  C will  intervene.  The  liberal state  is  a
police  officer,  and we've got to have some  method of enforcing  order.  Well,
D  rhay  beat  up  on  E  in  ways  other  than  literally  doing  something,  for
example,  by  persuading  her that living  in  a  polygamous  marriage  is  a good
thing,  and  I think the end  result-the logic  of the liberal  position leads  to-
Tushnet: Well,  the difficulty is  that there  are a number  of levels to  this.
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when  D  is  beating up  on E,  [then]  A,  B,  and C  can  come take E's  side as
opposed to  taking D's side.  Maybe the only necessary  article of peace is  that
D and E will  duke it out. And maybe nobody else  will  come in. Maybe.  I'm
not  sure  about  that.  The  second  level  is  the  metaphoric  extension  of this
beating-up-on.  If we  were  thinking about the problem,  and asking,  "Should
we  include  this  beating-up-on  provision  in the  articles  of peace,"  we  might
want  to make it clear  that we intended  no metaphoric  extension  at all.  That
is,  actual physical violence is all that counts, because the metaphoric extensions
undermine-not  individual  autonomy.  They  serve  individual  autonomy  (but
Stan  and I  don't think there is  such a thing  as that)-but they do undermine
the  continuing  existence  of community,  which  is  defined  by the deployment
of  metaphoric  force.  Now  that  I've  said  this,  I  can  go  back  to  the  first.
Maybe  what  I've  been  groping  for  is  the  provision  that  says  we  will  not
extend the notion of force metaphorically. That's the source of the substantive
restrictions  on the scope of state authority  in political  liberalism.
Levinson: It does  seem to  me  that the import  of a lot  of contemporary
philosophies  is just to deconstruct that distinction  between  metaphorical  and
nonmetaphorical  speech,  which in turn relates to the possibility of uncontested
"true"  description.  The  instance  that  comes  to  mind  is  the  surgeon.  It
assumes  a kind  of behavioral  or  physicalist  notion,  that you can  tell what's
happening  simply  from  watching  physical  movements  of people,  and  that,
inevitably,  if  you  try  to  distinguish  what  a  surgeon  does  from  what  a
mutilating  mugger does,  you've got to look  at internal  states of mind,  or  at
consent-at things  like that.  We wouldn't  call  this metaphorical.  We  would
regard  it  as  bizarre  to  say  that  you  could  come  to  a  conclusion  about  a
surgeon  simply  by looking  at  physical  movements.  It  seems that you  would
in fact  be back into all of the problems of consciousness  and false  conscious-
ness,  and then  we would get into  some of the sillier tests that we've  gone to
in  certain  areas  of tort  law,  where  there  would  have  to  be  some  physical
movement to justify looking at consciousness.  Then people would start writing
articles  asking why you need any physical  movement at all,  given  that it's so
clear that this is a survival from an earlier,  highly formalist,  and unsatisfactory
philosophy.  So  I  can  see  people negotiating  the contract  that you're talking
about, but I can also see all of this indicating,  either before or after the fact,
why  it's just hopeless  to try  to draw this  sort of line.
LaRue: But that pushes  in  the direction  of the no-state  solution  to this,
that  is,  the  best  way to  preserve  ourselves  is  not to  have  a  state  at  all.  D
beats  up  on  E  and  whoever  is  stronger  wins  because  the  alternatives  are
unattractive.
Levinson:  It  speaks  to  the  inevitable  inadequacy  or  incompleteness  of
any  solution.  One  thinks  of Woody  Allen:  The  lion  and  the  lamb  will  lie
down  together  but  the  lamb  won't  get  much  sleep.  On  balance  I  think  I
would prefer a state that I am quite suspicious  of, in lots of ways,  as a lesser
evil to  no  state.
Hauerwas: I don't  even  regard that as  a real choice.  I just live  here and
it's  God's  state.  I  don't  know  how  to justify  it theoretically.  I  don't know
how to  understand it.  I  mean that's  just the way it  is,  and  I've  got  to learn
how to  negotiate it.
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Shaffer: It's like the weather.
Hauerwas: It's  like the  weather.  It's just  here.  It seems  to me there  are
a lot  of good  things about  it that are  certainly  preferable  to  living in  South
Africa,  certainly  preferable  to living  in  the Soviet  Union.  But I'm not going
to  generate  ultimate  explanatory  theories  in  order  to  justify  it.  The  big
dilemma for me, in terms  of the way I would put it,  is this: We  were pressing
on whether you can ultimately get away with the distinction between liberalism
as  a  normative  theory  about  the  good  life,  and  liberalism  as  a  political
compromise.  I  clearly prefer the latter,  and  I would  like that, if we  can  pull
it  off;  but  I  am increasingly  suspicious  of  whether  we  can  pull  it  off. My
kind  of  dilemma  is  that  it  seems  to  me  that  what  liberalism  has  tried  to
produce  as a political compromise is a society and a government-democratic
theories,  interestingly enough,  not primarily  a theory about government,  but
a theory  about  society-and  that it  wants  to show  how  you  could  create  a
society and corresponding  state functions that don't need people to be virtuous
in order  to have a good society. We just need them to be self-interested  and
autonomous.  Then you don't need to  know the good.  So  questions  like how
do  you negotiate  questions  of abortion,  etc.,  become  very  difficult,  because
the assumption  is that the state hasn't made any claims  about what  the good
is.  Then  one  of the  anomalies  is  Louis  Hartz's  suggestion 9  that  liberalism
works  because  it continues  to be able  to  draw upon  community  presupposi-
tions and habits  which  it cannot  justify.
Shaffer: In itself it can only negotiate issues  of power-make treaties and
so  on.
Hauerwas: That's right.  Then  one of the things that is happening  is that
it  is  continuing  to  undermine  the  habits  that  it  depended  upon  to  make
liberalism  work,  because  it's  becoming  a  self-fulfilling  prophecy.  The  won-
derful  thing about liberalism  is  that  it always  produces  people who  have too
many  convictions.  As  a  result  of  having  too  many  convictions,  they  can't
make  up their  own  minds  and  they  become  morally  ambiguous.  Now,  this
can  sound  quite bad,  but in  some ways  it's quite  good,  because it results  in
a  society  that has  a  lot  of trouble  going  to  war,  which  should  be  a  good
idea  for us Christians,  to live  in a society that has  a lot of trouble  going to
war.  Ultimately  it's  good  to  be  able  to  live  in  a society  with  a  state  that
knows  that it's not  offering  salvific  solutions  to  people,  because the  church
offers the salvific solutions,  not the state.  So this is good. Liberalism is great.
It produces  people who know that they are fundamentally  self-interested,  not
just descriptively,  but as  what they ought to be;  therefore  they shouldn't  ask
anyone  else to  follow  what they themselves  believe in.  This is  great.
The  problem is  the results.  If you just follow our political  liberalism,  it
looks like what  you'd get is  a society that is humbled.  Instead you get people
who are hungry  for a cause.  My way of putting this is there is nothing wrong
with America for which a good war won't be capable of providing  a solution,
19.  L.  HARTz,  THE  LiBERL  TRADmioN  iN AMERICA  (1955);  L.  HARTz,  Democracy: Image
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because American  people are absolutely desperate to be able to have something
that  will  give  their  lives  a  sense  of worth.  And  that  scares  the  hell  out  of
me.
So,  I don't  know.  We  tried  to produce  a society,  and  tried  to  create  a
society, that prescinds  from having to say,  on a society-wide  basis,  what  we
know in common  as the true and the good. And so we prescind from having
that as  an explicit  question for discussion.  It would  seem  like that would  be
good  for a church  that believes  in a limited state, but in fact I'm not so sure
that's what we've got. I'm not so sure that liberalism  leads to  a limited state,
because  what we get,  as we  break down  societal  habits of community,  is the
increasing  necessity  for the growth of the  huge bureaucratic state,  of which
the  primary  priests  are  lawyers.  The  deep  difficulty  is that  it does  create  a
deep  false  consciousness,  because  supposedly  it  is  a limited  state.  So that's
my  ambiguity,  as  a  Christian  relating  to  this.  I mean  it looks  like  political
liberalism  would be  my  best  way  to  negotiate  a  society.  In  fact,  the  results
are  quite  antithetical  to  that,  particularly  when  you  combine  it  with  the
ideology.
Shaffer: To  bring  that  back  to  something  you  said  before,  the  reason
that the liberal  state is  not limited is  because there isn't  anything to limit  it.
Hauerwas: That's right.
Shaffer: Or  anything anymore.
Hauerwas: Except  the law.  And that  places  too  great  a  burden  on  the
law.  That's the  reason  why  I  have  such a  stake  in having  lawyers  mess  up
the  system.  I  regard  the  law  like  Franklin  Roosevelt  regarded  the  federal
bureaucracy.  Of course he wanted  different agencies  having responsibility  for
exactly  the same sets  of problems,  because  that  creates  a mess.  That's  what
the  federal  government  is  supposed  to  do  is  to  create  a  mess.  The  scariest
thing in the world would be if Washington ever  became efficient.  That would
be  awful.  So  we  want  overlapping  authorities  that  have  to  fight  over  the
same  turf.  So  I  find  myself  in  a  very  ambiguous  position  in  our  current
situation.  I don't know  how to solve it at all.
Tushnet: But there  are a variety of rather local decisions you make about
what you  can  do.
Hauerwas:  That's right.  I care about who's  mayor of Durham.  You can
say,  "Well,  that's a deeply  irresponsible  attitude,  because  you're  not  acting
as a good citizen."  And I say,  "Well,  I don't even know what a good  citizen
is  in  this  society."  I don't  know  what  it  means  to  be  a good  citizen.  It's
very  unclear  to  me.  It  seems  to  me  that  implicit  in  Sandy's  book  is  an
assumption  that  we know  what  a good  citizen  would  look like-or  that we
should be  able to  come  up  with an  account  of good  citizenship,  within  the
society in which  we live,  and we ought to come up with a reasonable  account
of patriotism.  I do  not believe  either  of those.
Indeed,  I think that, ironically,  liberalism cannot give you an account  of
patriotism,  because a genuine  account  of patriotism  is  one that is  dependent
upon an arbitrary history that is associated  with a geographical  area. I know
what  it  means  to  be  a  Texan.  I  do  not  know  what  it  means  to  be  an
American.  Texas  patriotism  makes  sense.  American  patriotism  does  not.
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Because  American  patriotism  always  directs  you  to  a set  of  ideals  that  are
not  geographically  dependent  upon  a  particular  history  and  are  therefore
incoherent,  not  genuinely  patriotic.  That's  an  argument  I  get  from  Mac-
Intyre.
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So you  can  say I'm genuinely  irresponsible.  But  I  don't have an account
of patriotism  or  good  citizenship.  I  don't  think  liberalism  offers  you  one.
Ultimately I  can  say that my  fundamental  membership  is  in the church,  not
in America.  I've  got a deep  problem there  because  I haven't  got much  of a
church either,  because of what liberalism  has done to it.  But  what I do  have
in  the  church  is  a  kind  of  normative  account.  I've  got  enough  shards  of
memory  around  that I  think  I  can almost maintain  some  kind  of claim  that
this is better  than nothing.
I  take  it  from  what  Jeff  earlier  commented  that  you  are  always  trying
to  make  it  work.  What  is  this,  ultimately,  for you,  Mark  and  Sandy?  Do
you stand,  finally, in the legal guild, trying to make it work,  or  do you stand
as  Jews  in  the legal  guild,  using the  legal  guild to try to  protect the  Jewish
community?  The  way  you  are  negotiating  the  situation  doesn't  seem  to  be
too much  different  from  mine.
Tushnet: I  don't think it  is.  I'm not  sure  about Sandy's  position,  but I
don't  really,  substantially,  disagree  with  you  about  the  issue  of negotiation
of state power-negotiating  lives in the context  of state power.  I want to  say
a couple  of things and  then see  if it would  be  productive to turn to the part
about patriotism  and see what  Sandy's  response to your statement  would be.
In  the  context  of  discussions  of  Critical  Legal  Studies,  the  claim  of
irresponsibility  is also made,  and it existentially  doesn't seem right to  me.  So
I  want  to  come  up  with  some  account  of  what  it  is  that  I'm  doing  that
avoids the charge  of irresponsibility.  It's not clear that you  [Stanley]  want to
avoid that charge.  It may not be of interest to  you. It seems  to me that your
description of what you do with your  life is,  in your terms,  a description  of
witnessing.  Although  it's  from  a different  tradition,  it's  sort  of how  I  feel
about  what  I  do,  too.  I  just  do this  stuff.  It's  out  there,  and  people  will
respond to  it, and  whatever.  But I'm  responsible for  it,  I'm responsible  for
the stuff that  I  do,  and  whatever  happens  to  it  and  so  forth.  That's  why  I
have  to  say  the image  of  witnessing  is  powerful  to  me,  notwithstanding  its
location  in another  tradition.
On the issue of patriotism,  let me preface this by saying that I've thought
about  this  a  fair amount  and  I think  that my  primary  identification  is  as  a
Jew.  But  there  is  a  secondary  identification-I  insist  on  using  the  term
"citizen  of the  United  States,"  rather  than  "an  American,"  because  there
are other parts  of America.  I  wonder how  I  would feel,  in terms of my self-
concept,  my self-definition,  if things turned so bad here that I had to relocate
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in  another  country-let  me  say  England,  just  to  make  it  easy,  so  I  don't
have to  raise language  problems.  I  have  a lot of professional  skills  that are
very peculiarly located in the United States.  But I'm not entirely sure.  Maybe
I  could  be  a  tremendous  scholar,  in  England,  of  the  Constitution  of  the
United  States.  I  really  don't  know,  but  I  have  a sense  that  there  is  some
element  that  is  United  States  in  me.  I  think  that's  sort  of  the context  for
talking about patriotism.
One  of  the issues  in Sandy's  loyalty  oath  is  whether  there  are  forms  of
public  action  that have  some  historical  connection  to  an  arbitrarily  defined
geographic  community or  geographical  territory...
Hauerwas: That has  a history.
Tushnet: . . .that has a history. Well,  the history of the world  is contin-
uous,  and  the  only  thing  that's  of  interest  is  how  it  has  been  arbitrarily
divided  up  in  creating  what  are  thought  of  as  independent  histories,  but
aren't. The history of kingship in West Africa in the 17th-century is continuous
with  the history of the United States in the 20th in some rather obvious  ways
that are excluded  from consciousness  by the arbitrary definition.  So the claim
about loyalty  oaths is that we can remind ourselves  of continuities  of history,
within a geographic territory, by overcoming some of our arbitrary exclusions.
How  about that?
Levinson:  There  are  several  different  things.  One  is  that  I  think  the
relationship  between  geography  and  community  is  getting  more  and  more
tenuous.  One  thing  that  I  don't  talk  about  in  this  book  at  all,  but  have
written  about  elsewhere,2'  is  theories of representation.  In  the  initial  notion
of representation,  we assumed that communities  were geographically  located,
so that representation  by the single-member  district was  sensible.  I think that
it is  increasingly  problematic,  which  is  one of the reasons  there is  increasing
interest  in  notions  of  proportional  representation.  Bruce  Ackerman22  has
written some  interesting  stuff on this.  It seems  to me  that what  is key about
the  United  States,  even  though  it  is  located  geographically,  is  that  it  is
ideologically  defined  in very  important  ways;  it  may be  in  that  sense  more
indicative  of the modem  world.
That's  connected  to  witnessing.  Part of the question  is whether  one can
witness  to  constitutional  faith.  Martin  Luther  King  engaged  in  Christian
witness, but he also very  explicitly engaged in American witness,  calling upon
American  traditions.  Michael  Walzer2  has  written  extensively  in  his  recent
work  about the notion  of prophecy,  and critique  from within.  Since  Walzer
is really a political  sociologist,  or cultural anthropologist,  this can be applied
inside:  You  don't  have  to talk  about  Jonah;  you  can  talk  about  Frederick
Douglass.  The question  is whether  we believe there exists  a body of materials
that is  American  or of the United  States-though part of the difficulty  is to
21.  Levinson,  Gerrymandering  and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional  Represen-
tation: Why  It  Won't Go Away,  33  UCLA L.  REv.  257  (1985).
22.  Ackerman,  Beyond Carolene  Products,  98  HAgv.  L.  REv.  713  (1985).
23.  M.  WvA=ZR,  INTERPRETATION  A  SocIAL  CRmcisu (1987).
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have to  talk  about those  materials  that  perceive  the  United  States  as a legal
entity-whether  there is  a body  of materials  that do  constitute  us  in  some
way,  and that  provide a basis  for people  bearing witness.
These  materials  can  be  speeches  but  they  can  also  be  events.  I  think
again  what  Bruce  Ackerman  has  done  with  the  Philadelphia  Convention  is
very interesting. 24 If you  view  Philadelphia  as  separate  in  its meaning  from
the written  work that was  produced  there,  what are the implications?  If that
event  doesn't  in  some  ways  constitute  us  as  members  of the United  States
community,  I  really don't  know what  would.  Maybe  it  doesn't.  That  is  an
acceptable  empirical  answer-that this  is  all  a will-o'-the-wisp.  But there  are
certainly  people who  believe  that we  are constituted  by our stories.  I  assume
all cultures  are story telling.  Certainly  we  can all  reel off standard  American
stories that are supposed  to be exemplary  for our lives.  People  are  supposed
to  emulate them.  Values  are  there to  be emulated.
There  is  a  really  delicious  paradox  in  talking  about  these  things  at
Washington  and  Lee.  The  father  of  our  country  and  a  man  who  may  or
may  not  be  a  traitor.  What  do  you  do  with  that?  First of  all,  do  we  as
individuals  around  this  table  believe  that  any  of  this  material  really  speaks
to  us,  calls  upon us,  constitutes  us  in  certain  ways?  A  separate  question-
though  it's undoubtedly  linked-is,  do  we believe that we as a society  should
do what we  can to make sure that this body of materials  is  being transmitted
to  the  next  generation?  And  that's  where  the  question  of civic  education
comes  up.  One  of  the  things  I've  always  liked,  from  outside,  about  the
Protestant  tradition  is  the  constant  adult  education  that  goes  on,  at  least
among  the  Baptists  I  grew  up  with.  The  Wednesday  meetings  and  the  two
meetings  on  Sunday  and  quite  literally  God  knows  how  much  else  of this.
One  fantasy  of  mine  has  been  a kind  of adult  civic  education.  That  would
be  a  sign  of our  taking  this  stuff  seriously,  after  all  the  talk.  That's  one
reason I  liked  the  Bork hearings.  I  think  that at their  best they turned  into
that sort of thing.
LaRue: The Watergate  hearings  [also]?
Levinson:  You  mention  Watergate  and  that  for  me  triggers  a  free
association of Barbara Jordan and what we do with her comment about faith
in the  Constitution.  Are  we  embarrassed  by  it?  Do we  identify  with  it?  Do
we  say that  it's  the  high  point?  Do  we  say  this  is  just  ridiculous?  Do  we
simply explain that she  is a very cagey politician  who's manipulating rhetoric
that she  didn't believe  a word  of, but that she knew people  out  there would
respond to, that we're  too sophisticated  to  respond  to?
Hauerwas: We  haven't  gotten  to  Protestant-Catholic  interpretation  in
that. We  really want to  do  that.  I think it's very important. I'm really sorry
you  hit  on  David  Tracy2 5  to  read  because  I  think  his  position  is  finally
24.  Ackerman,  The Storrs  Lectures: Discovering  the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.  1013 (1984).
25.  D.  TRAcY,  THE  ANALooIcAL  IMAGINATION:  C.iusriAN  THEOLOGY  AND  THE  CULTuRE  OF
PLURALSM  (1981);  R.  GRANT  & D.  TRAcy,  A  SHORT  HIsToRY  OF  THE  INTERPRETATION  OF  THE
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wrongheaded.  My  kind  of line  is this:  If you  want to  know what  happened
to Protestant liberal theology,  it has died and is in the souls of living Catholic
theologians-and Tracy,  despite some counter  aspects in his work, is  squarely
in  the  liberal  tradition.  For example,  this  is  exemplified  by  his  use  of the
distinction  between  event  and interpretation.
I  don't believe  in Philadelphia.  There  is  a certain sense in which  I want
to  say  yes  to  it.  It  may  make  sense  to  say  that  something  happened  at
Philadelphia that is not equivalent  to the written document, the Constitution,
in  a  way I  do not  believe  it  makes  sense  to  say that  something  happened
when Moses led the Children of Israel out of Egypt, in a way that that event
makes  sense  separate  from the  Book  of Exodus.  I don't  believe that  Moses
knew,  or  the  people  of Israel  knew,  that  they were  engaged  in  an  exodus.
Through the  creation of the people  of Israel  we now know  that that was  an
exodus,  but you can't have the Exodus without the creation of the people of
Israel,  who  give us the Book of Exodus.  So in a certain sense we don't have
Philadelphia  without  the  Constitution-without  the  people of America  who
then  maintained  the interpretive  categories  that  are necessary  for fitting that
within  an ongoing  narrative.
Levinson: We also don't have the Constitution without Philadelphia. The
two are  linked but separable.  They carry  separate messages.
Hauerwas: That's  true.  Of  course  that's  the  reason  why  I'm  not  a
Protestant  liberal.  I really  believe  that  Moses  had  to lead  the  Children  of
Israel  out of Egypt. I'm one of the few Christian theologians left who  believe
that if we  found  documents  clearly showing  that Jesus  was  dragged  kicking
and  screaming  to the  Cross  saying-"I  don't want  to  go,  I  don't want  to
go,  I  just  wanted  to  preach  a  religion  of  love  and  there's  been  a  deep
misunderstanding.  Is  this  really necessary?  Can't  we  sit  down and  come  to
some  understanding  on this?"-if we  really  came  up with  evidence  of that,
we  ought  to give it up. It's just bullshit. You know, it's not true. So I really
want to think that these things  have  to  happen  in some  serious  way that is
not  in  deep  discontinuity  with  our  reports  of them.  But  I  think  that  the
Children  of Israel  didn't  know  that they  were  in an  exodus.  I think,  as  a
matter  of  fact,  that  if  the  Exodus  didn't  happen  in  some  ways  closely
resembling what was going on, then, as a matter of fact,  the God we worship
isn't true. So we're making strong historical  claims about continuity  between
the people  that  were  created  and  what  they  thought  was  happening  in  the
events  of their  creation.
A word  about patriotism in that regard:  I regard the development  of the
modern nation-state as a fiction. It is a fiction, an attempt to create something
that is  determined, primarily  in  the  interest  of peace.  It  was  the  result  of
trying to find a way to stop Protestants and Catholics  from killing themselves
in the  religious  wars  developed  since  the  Reformation.  It  was  Kant's  great
vision to try to create the fiction of a nation, that is a consensual  community,
that is  possible  between  autonomous  individuals  exercising  their  rationality,
to come  to contracts  between one another,  to  create republican governments.
Levinson: I think you are confusing European liberalism  with the partic-
ular  narrative  story  of  this  country.  I  think  that  the  Preamble  to  the
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Constitution  has  almost  nothing to  do  with  Kant,  and  almost nothing to  do
with  this  peace-treaty  notion  of the  liberal  state.  I  think  the  "more  perfect
Union,"  the  "establishment  of justice,"  comes  out  of  communitarian  Cal-
vinism.  It  comes  out  of  secular  utopianism.  It  comes  out  of a  number  of-
things.  I  think  that  the  Preamble  would  be  very,  very  different  if  it  were
peace-treaty  liberalism.
Hauerwas: I think  that's right.
Levinson: King  and others  draw on the American  story.  I think it's also
informative  that constitutional  lawyers  either  have  never  known  what  to  do
with  the Preamble,  or simply and  utterly  have  ruled  it out  as  a source.  We
are  spending  an ungodly amount of time trying to figure  out what the Ninth
Amendment  could  possibly  mean.  Nobody  ever  suggests,  "Well,  just  look
upstairs,  and  say  that  what  gives  this  whole  thing  point  is  a more  perfect
Union, and  establishing justice."  Therefore  the Supreme  Court can  say,  "Go
establish justice."  People  continue  to ignore  that  connection,  but I  think,  in
terms  of  the  story,  in  terms  of  what  explains  what  they  were  doing  in
Philadelphia,  and  the  strength  of that  American  rhetoric,  it  has  meant  in
terms  of the  values  expressed  in the  preamble  that they  are,  "for  better  or
worse,"  part  of the essential  narrative.  And  there  are  times when  I  think  it
is  distinctly  for  the  worse  that  it's not  been  merely  peace-treaty  liberalism,
but it's always  been a notion  that we have an aim quite separate from peace.
Hauerwas: That's  in  some  tension  with  Mark's  political  liberalism.  I
think you're right,  in terms of the historical background behind the Preamble,
but my statement  on that would  say  it doesn't  make  a  bit  of  difference.  In
fact,  political  liberalism  out  of  Kant  has  become the  way  that we  interpret
what  the  "more  perfect  Union"  is going  to  look like. That's  partly  because
what  the  modern  nation-state  has  been  about  is  the  attempt  to  increase
geographic  units  in  the  interests  of  peace,  so  we  don't  get  wars  between
Indiana  and  Ohio  over  the  headwaters  of the  Kankakee.  This  was  a great
achievement  to  be  able  to  do  that.  But  it's an  illusory  achievement  because
the very ideologies  necessary  to produce  those unions  can't give  an account
of why those  geographic  units  aren't  arbitrary.
Germany and France are liberal  societies,  or at least quasi-liberal  societies,
that  don't  want  to  face  up  to  the  arbitrariness  of  their  geographic  units.
That's  one  of  the  things  that  Rawls26  can't  account  for  in  his  theory  of
justice.  It's just an anomaly about what geographic  unit is going to undertake
the  principles  of  justice.  You  can't  come  up  with  an  account  of  what
geographic  units  are  going to  be  doing  that  kind  of  bargaining.  That's  one
of the  illusions  of  liberalism,  that it  is  not  a limited  doctrine  in  that  way,
and that's the reason why it has  to be  inherently  imperialistic,  because it has
to show  that everyone  will  finally  accept the two  principles  of justice.
Levinson: Walzer, 27 though,  tries  to  resolve that.
26.  J.  RAwLS,  A  THEORY  OF  JUSTIcE  (1971).  See G.  GRANT,  ENGUSH-SPEAKING  JUSTICE
(1985)  (developing this  point in a critique  of Rawls).
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Hauerwas: He doesn't  do  it very well.
Levinson:  But  at  least  he  recognizes  it  and  says  that  liberalism  is  our
constitutive  tradition.
Hauerwas: That's my point  about patriotism.  It's always  going to be  an
ideal that says that patriotism is not in principle geographically  limited. Except
Walzer turns  it into a  confessional  faith.  In  principle it  should not be,  a la
Kant, a confessional faith.  That's the reason  why I say that it was  the peace
treaty  that  was  necessary.  Liberalism,  as  the  Enlightenment  ideology,  to
establish  peace in Europe,  became  the  ideology that justified Western  impe-
rialism.  I  think that  was  intrinsic  in  the  logic  of it.  Walzer  is  a  wonderful
example  of someone  who  wants  to  pull back  from  those  ideological  preten-
sions,  and  just  say,  "Whoops,  our  faith  is  within these  geographic  units."
It's very hard  to  keep  it that way.  That's  the reason  why  liberal  patriotism
always  is  imperialistic,  because it wants to say that  everyone  should look this
way, because it doesn't want to believe that its geographic units are arbitrary.
Texans  know  that  our  geographic  unit  is  arbitrary,  because  our  history  is
arbitrary.
Shaffer: Is that why  the early  civic  religion  liked to  claim  that America
was  God's  new  Israel?  To give  it geographical  identification?
Hauerwas: Sure,  and  then  to  give  it  a  sense  of mission  for the  whole
world. Shaffer: So  patriotism is  about land.
Hauerwas:  A land  and a mission.
Richardson:  Can your Texan patriotism have  a strong  critical  element in
it?  If you become  aware of serious social  injustice,  gross  suffering of people,
would you want to do something about that? And if so, how?  Which channels
would  you  use?
Hauerwas: If they are our people;  not  if they  are  Mexicans.  One of the
interesting  things about Texas is that many of the early Texans were Mexicans.
And  people  forget that Seguine  was  at the Alamo,  on the  right side.  Matter
of  fact,  he  got  out.  He  was  one  of the  few  people  who  got  out.  He then
later  became  mayor of  San Antonio.  Then,  when we  decided  that  Mexicans
shouldn't  be mayors  of  San  Antonio,  we  ran  him out  of  Texas.  This  is  all
true.  It  can  contain  some  critical  elements.  Yes,  it  can.  And  has.  I  think
partly  because it  knows  that it's limited.  My  view  is that  it is  ultimately an
insufficient,  limited account.
I  wrote  an  essay  once  called  "On  Being  a  Christian  and  a  Texan,  a
Theological Entertaimnent," ' '  in which I tried to suggest that I wouldn't  ever
have  known  what  it meant  to  be  a Christian  unless  I  had  been  marked by
being a Texan,  because Texans  know that they are a limited community,  that
we just got  stuck with  being  Texans.  We're  awfully  glad that we were,  but,
ultimately,  we  find  that  we  need  another  community,  to  find  our  limits.
That's the way you realize that being  a Christian is a little like being marked
28.  Hauerwas,  A  Tale of Two Stories: On Being a Christian and a Texan: A  Theological
Entertainment, 34 PERms  J.  1 (1981).
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as  being  a  Texan.  Being  a  Texan  gives  you  a  better  critical  hold  on your
Christian  convictions.  I  always  remember  that  when  I  was  a  kid,  growing
up,  I was driving through Greenville,  Texas,  on my way to Mississippi, where
my mother  was  from.  You  drove  under  a sign  on old  U.S.  40,  if you went
into  Greenville,  that  said,  "Greenville,  Texas,  the blackest  land,  the whitest
people."  That's what we grew up with.  That's the way Texans  deal with sin.
We turn  it into  banners  and  claim  it  as  righteousness.  Obviously  it's not  a
very  good critical  principle.  But  I think  it's better than  the United  States  of
America,  in terms  of its liberal  pretensions.
Richardson: But how  do you  go  about  correcting  it,  when you want to
correct it-as a  Texan,  or  as  a  Christian?
Hauerwas: As  a Christian.  You'd do it-you  know,  the way  porcupines
make love-very  carefully.  You take things  on one at a time. You don't  have
big theories  for it.  You take  down that  sign.
Shaffer: Again,  it's like  the weather.
Hauerwas: Like the  weather,  yes.  But in  that way it's  embarrassing  for
me.  I think  one  of the things  one  has  to say  is  that  liberalism  has  done  a
hell  of  a  lot  better  than  Christians  about  locating  injustice,  and  doing
something  about  it.  I'm  quite  willing to  say  that.  Then  you  get  the  other
side of that. The  very grounds on  which  liberalism  has located  the  injustice,
and  done  something  about  it,  ironically,  mean that  we  have  to  be  coercive
against  the Mormons.  I  think we  should allow  them to  have  more than one
wife.
White: May I use that as  an opportunity to return to Jeff Powell's  point
about  Mormon  polygamy,  going  back  especially  to  the  19th-century  case?
There is a crucial problem that arises  with the criterion of subordination that
you  use.  If  that's  examined  in  historical  context,  the  Mormon  argument,
offered  by Mormon  men  and  women,  would have  been that monogamy was
more  oppressive  than  polygamy.  Ironically,  some  contemporary  feminists,
working  with  Mormon  materials,  are  now  arguing  that  there  is  a  real,
legitimate  case  here.  Mormon  polygamous  wives  ran  households  when their
husbands  were  either  away  on missions  or  involved  in other  activities.  They
essentially  ran  the  business.  In  fact,  there  are data  to  suggest that  in  Utah
as  a territory,  throughout  that  period,  women  were  disproportionately  rep-
resented  in  law,  medicine,  and  other  professions.  In  the  context  of  the
Victorian  era,  with  the  rise  of industrialization  and  the  pushing  of women
back into the household,  which monogamy reinforced,  polygamous  wives  had
more  options  than  monogamous  wives.
The  Mormons  bought  into the sexual  stereotype that we talk  about now
as  characteristic  of the  Victorian  era.  They  saw  men  as  sexually  overactive,
and  women  as  uninterested  in  sex.  There  is  even the  argument  that,  having
this  conception  of sexuality,  Mormon  women  were  freed  from  the  sexual
demands  that  monogamy  imposed,  in  a  way  that  other  women  within  the
society  weren't.  Mormon women identified  themselves  as  very adamant  fem-
inists.  There's  a bit  of irony  here,  too,  in  the  sense  that they  had  officialFAITH IN  THE REPUBLIC
support  from  Mormon  leaders,  including  Brigham  Young,  endorsing  the
feminist  movement.  I don't  want  to  overstate  his  sympathies.  Young  had
some  other  good  reasons  to  argue  for  women  having  the  right  to vote.  It
would double the Mormon vote.  He had,  as  well, good  reasons to  argue for
women  having  choices  that  they  were  losing,  or  never  had,  within  the
American  experience,  because  they could then  choose  polygamy,  if the  free
choice issue became a crucial one.  So there was a sort of patriarchal Mormon
self-interest  in the  endorsement  of feminism  at that point.
But  you  can  show  that  there  were  larger  gatherings  among  Mormon
women  in support  of  feminism  than  other  places  in  the  country.  Polygamy
posed a problem for non-Mormon  feminists,  but Mormon  feminists  saw that
as  a  real  misreading  of their  situation.  The  ideology  produced  during  the
period  by Mormons  argued  that women  were  freer in  Utah than  they were
in the society  at large.  If the subordination principle  is the issue,  then you've
got to  determine  what  kind of criteria to use:  Is this  an  empirical  question?
If it's an  empirical  question,  and  the Mormons  are  correct,  then you  might
have  to condemn  monogamy rather than polygamy.
Powell: The late  19th-century liberal state's explanation  of why it's going
to  tromp  the religious community's  views  was  not really subordination,  but,
rather,  the  view  that  these  folks  were  sexually  immoral.  The  state  was
concerned  about the destruction of families.
White: No,  I  think that was  wrong,  too,  as  to why  they acted.
Powell: Okay. But  I was  trying to  come up with what a legitimate  20th-
century  liberal  ought to say.
White: If you  said  that  as  a  late  20th-century  liberal,  what  do  you  do
with the  19th-century  case?
Powell: Everything  you  say  reinforces  a  point I  was  trying  to make  in
response to Mark,  which  is that liberalism  very  definitely has an  account  of
the  good,  which  it  will  enforce  against  communities  that  have  contrary
accounts.  Suppose,  in the  19th-century  case,  they had made the 20th-century
subordination  argument.  And the Mormon  feminists responded,  as you have
said,  with  empirical  data  and  so  on.  I  think  it  is  perfectly  rational  and
consistent,  in the liberal state, to  say, "Too  bad.  We don't care. That's your
account;  our  account  is  the  one  that's  going  to  be  enforced."  I can  agree
with everything  you say,  and  say that the  liberal state  will  not recognize  it,
because  it has  its own account  of the good that must triumph.  In the end it
will use  coercion to enforce  that-stick it down other people's  throats.
White:  Well,  that  certainly  is  what  happened,  but  I  don't  think  it
happened  for those  reasons.  That  is,  I don't think  polygamy  was  the  issue
at all.  The Mormon  denial  of the legitimacy  of the nation-state  is  what was
really crucial.  This empire being set up out West claimed economic autonomy,
and political  autonomy, and so on.  Polygamy became the issue by which you
could mobilize  New England  puritanical  types  against the Mormons.
Powell: But that's once again  saying that the liberal  state  is not going  to
tolerate  any religious  community's  self-definition,  if that  self-definition  con-
tradicts the  liberal state's major  commitments  and  views.
White: You're making that  as an  observation  about the liberal  state.
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Powell: Oh,  yeah.
White:  I  may  have  misread  you.  I  thought  you  were  defending  it,  in
response  to  one  of  Stanley's  points.  Defending  it  in  the  sense  that  you'd
identified  here,  with  the  subordination  of  women  as  a  meaningful  criterion
for the  state's intervention.
Powell: I'm defending it in the sense  of Mark's  attempt  to  say that you
can  keep  a  liberal  account  that  is  not going  to  force  things  down  people's
throats.  I  think the liberal  state is  going  to force its  account  of the good  on
other  people.
Millon: I  think  related  to  that  is  the  fact  that  liberalism  as  a  set  of
principles  pays  lip service to an idea of toleration,  as  one of the central ideas,
but  it  has,  within  this  set  of principles  that  constitute  liberalism,  contrary
principles  that allow intolerance in certain  situations  to be legitimate.  I think
that's  also  the  point  you  are  making.  Not  that  any  particular  doctrinal
argument,  like the one he posited,  is a good one  or not.  Simply that,  within
liberalism,  these  arguments  are  possible,  and  we  have  to  keep  in  mind  that
liberalism-as we talk about this straw person or this ideal-includes  all  these
contrary  features.
White: You chose the Mormon case,  though, to bring up initially, because
of some of the complexities  with that.  Jonestown  is  a little bit  easier  to deal
with.  You could  deal with Brigham Young,  and blood atonement,  and  all  of
these  things,  if you  could  have  documented  them, and  have  a different  kind
of case,  I  think,  from the one you'd  have  in this instance.
Beckley:  Jonestown  is  a tougher case  for Stanley.
Hauerwas: Yeah.
Beckley: Precisely  because  people  were getting  killed.
Hauerwas: Sure.  Right.  It is  a  tough  case.  I  think  that the  liberal  state
did  not  fail  in  Jonestown;  I  believe  the  church  failed.  Those  people  were
martyrs  to  liberalism.  What  I  mean  by  that  is  that  they were  the  kinds  of
people  that liberalism  inherently wants  to create-basically  rootless  people  in
California  who  are  desperate  for  a  sense  of  community.  Jones  gave  it  to
them.  Jones created  a fascist  community  for them  that gave them something
worth  dying  for.  Trained  them  for it.  There  was  a  lot  of admirable  stuff
that  was  going  on  there.  They  cared  for  one  another.  They  were  liberal
martyrs-I  would  rather  say  victims-because  they  had  not  been  schooled
sufficiently  by the  church to give them  a critical  ability to  stand against  that
kind  of community  when  it offered  salvation.  They were  being given  a false
salvation.  One  of the interesting  questions  about  descriptive  claims  is  those
who  killed themselves  said  they were  martyred;  we,  that is,  we  liberals  want
to call it suicide.  My own view is that we are right in imposing our description,
suicide,  as  Christians.  But they were  right to call  it revolutionary  suicide.  Of
course  the  way the liberal  press wants to  do it is  to  say  isn't it terrible  that
Jones  is  able to manipulate  these poor ignorant people into doing this terrible
thing, because,  as a matter of fact,  they should have been good  liberals;  they
should have  understood  that there  is  nothing  worth  dying  for in  this world.
And  of course,  as  a  Christian,  I  want  to  say you  ought  to  be  ready  to  be
martyred.  There's  a lot  worth  dying  for,  and  therefore  we  ought  to  honorFAITH IN THE REPUBLIC
their  assumption  that they  were  revolutionary  martyrs,  the  difficulty  being
that the god that they allowed  themselves  to  be martyred to was a false god.
Therefore their  deaths  are terrible  deaths.
White: Now where  do you go with your  claim then  that we  are justified
in calling that suicide?
Hauerwas: We're  only  justified  in  calling  it  suicide  from  within  the
Christian  community,  because we  are pretty clear  about what  suicide means.
Suicide  is  when  you  allow  your life  to  be taken  from you,  or you do it  by
your  own hand,  in an unjust manner.  What  an unjust manner means  is that
you  rob God  of God's  proper  power  over your  life.
White: What  do you  do  with  Jonestown?  Is it just  a tragedy?
Hauerwas: Yeah.
White: And that's the only thing that can be done?  Or can you intervene?
Hauerwas: I  don't think  liberal society  can intervene.
White:  I  think  it can.  Oh,  sure.  If it can  intervene  in  polygamy  it can
surely  intervene here.
Hauerwas: On what  grounds  would it intervene?
Levinson: A liberal  society  probably wouldn't use  the language of  "false
consciousness;"  it would,  however,  use the language of "brainwashing."  But
intervention  there  would  take  place.  I  think  part  of the  problem  with  the
implications  of liberalism  is  that there  are very,  very  few libertarians  of the
kind  you  are using  as typical  of liberal,  for better  or worse.
Hauerwas: That's right.
Levinson: You  can  find  lots  of  people  who  view  themselves  as  good
liberals  who  will intervene  where  the Hare Krishnas  are  concerned.
Powell: Take your  own  statement,  Stan,  that a good liberal  knows  that
there  is nothing worth  dying for.  Okay, that means that we know that those
people  are  not  making  rational  choices  when they  go  follow  this  guy,  and
that means  that they are not  acting autonomously,  and  that means  that the
liberal  state-which  has  an  admirable,  liberal,  moral  obligation  to  enhance
people's  autonomy-has  to  step in.
Hauerwas:  That  is  the way the logic of the argument  would work.  And
that's  going to  be really very  coercive.
Tushnet: It occurred  to  me,  when  you,  Stan,  were  talking about  Jones-
town and its  relation  to liberalism,  that you want to say that Jonestown was
the product of the success of liberalism  in creating  people  like that, but  also
the  product  of the  failure  of liberalism,  in  refusing  to  intervene  when,  in
other  situations,  liberals  have  not  quarreled  about  whether  intervention  is
appropriate.
Beckley: Who's a liberal? Are the authors  of the Catholic bishops'  letters
liberals?29 William  Galston?30
Hauerwas: I  assume  we  are  all liberals.  I  don't believe  anybody who  is
working  within the American  context  can  avoid the habits  of liberalism.  I'm
trying to  slowly  think my way  out of it.
29.  See supra notes  8-9.
30.  W.  GAStsON,  JUSTICE  AND  =  HumN  GOOD  (1980).
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Beckley:  But  sometimes  you  talk  as  though  the  only  liberals  are  those
who  have  desires,  or self-interests,  without any conception  of the good;  and
sometimes you talk  as  though liberals  had conceptions  of the good.  It seems
to me that liberals  have all different kinds  of conceptions  of the good.  Rawls
is  different  from  Nozick,3'  and  both  of them  have  conceptions  of what  is
good,  and  the  Catholic  bishops  are  different  from that,  and  so on  and  so
forth.
Hauerwas: Well,  as  a  political  theory,  liberalism  at  least  claims  that.
Someone like Rawls,  if you take him as a paradigmatic liberal theorist, wants
to  say that we  can have  a social  agreement  in a way that prescinds  from any
agreed upon  material goods  of what we  want  as  a society.
Beckley:  He  sometimes  says that,  but  that's  not the  way  he  makes  his
moves.  He  does  have  a  commitment  to  equality  and  freedom.  Those  are
goods that he wants to  preserve.
Hauerwas:  Which he  has a lot of trouble giving any substance  to,  exactly
because  he  prescinds  from  any kind  of narrative  construal  necessary  to  give
them substance.  Sandy has a commitment  to  egalitarianism,  too,  but Sandy's
commitment  to  egalitarianism  is  necessary  as  one  of the  preconditions  for
continuing  the  discussion  about  how to  interpret  the  Constitution.  Sandy's
egalitarianism  is  kind of  along the  lines  of A.  D.  Lindsay's  old  argument,32
the  one  that  shows  that  at  least  the  beginnings  of  democracy  come  out  of
the  Puritan  congregation,  insofar  as  what  is  necessary  for  maintaining  the
modern  democratic  state-A.  D.  Lindsay's  modem  democratic  state.  Egali-
tarianism  isn't  an  end  in  itself.  It's  the  precondition  for  maintaining  the
discussion,  for the  community's  discovery  of what  the  goods  are.  I'm  very
sympathetic  with  that point  of view.
I  know  that liberalism  comes  in many  shapes  and sizes.  I tend  to try to
make  it  live  up  to  its most  consistent  expression,  because  I  agree  that most
liberals aren't  consistent.  I  mean  you  are  quite  right,  Sandy.  We  know they
want  to educate  five-year-olds  with  something.  I  think it's quite  unclear that
they  know  what  they're  doing  when they  do that. But,  nonetheless,  I  think
that  we  are  increasingly  becoming  a  consistent  liberal  society,  and  I try  to
figure  out  what  the  implication  of that  is  going  to  be.  I  think  Rawls  is  a
perfect exemplification  of that. Even  the incoherences  within Rawls's  account
help  us  find  this.  The  deepest  incoherence  in  liberalism  is  the  failure  to
recognize that it is  a tradition,  and therefore  has  a  contingent  starting  point
within the Enlightenment.  The  false  consciousness  created  by the  denial that
liberalism  is  a tradition,  I  think,  accounts  for  why  liberal  societies  are  so
violent.  The  irony  is  that  liberalism,  in  the  name  of  being  an  antistate
position,  has  given  us  the  most powerful  bureaucratic  state  that the  world
has ever  seen.
Tushnet: Well,  not quite.
31.  J.  RAwLs,  supra note  26;  R.  Nozim,  ANARCHY,  STATE  AND  UTOPIA  (1974).
32.  A.  D.  LINDSAY,  TI  MODERN  DEMOCRATIC  STATE  (1962).FAITH IN  THE REPUBLIC
Hauerwas: The Soviet Union. I regard  Marxism  as  a form of liberalism.
My  sense  of this, of course,  is  a very global claim,  but I  think that the two
greatest Christian  heresies  we  have  ever  seen are  now  regnant in the world;
one is  called  the U.S.S.R.  and  the  other  is  called the  U.S.A.  And  they are
both fighting over  who's  going to determine  the meaning  of human  history,
in terms  of who's  going to finally  find the  way to unleash  the new  creation
of the  autonomous  human  being.  These  are regnant  things  that are  at war.
And  they are liberal  states.
Tushnet: I  have  a series  of thoughts  that  are  connected  with  Harlan's
concern  that  liberalism  is  being  used  badly  in  this  discussion,  and  also  to
Stanley's juxtaposition of Exodus and Philadelphia.  It seems to me that what
you've  said  so  far  doesn't  take  account  of  the  ongoing,  always  ongoing,
reworking  of the narratives  that constitute the tradition.
As  I  understand  it,  the  current  political theory  is  precisely  to recapture
the understanding  of liberalism  as  a tradition that emerged  in response  to  a
particular  set  of  problems,  and  when  these  people  tell  the  story  about
liberalism  in that way,  they  are  recreating,  transforming  the tradition  within
which they are working,  not simply recapturing something that existed.  When
you say you  want to think  about the most consistent  working  out of liberal
presuppositions,  and  that turns  out  to be  different  from  what  people  who
identify  themselves  as  liberals  today  say  that  they  are  contemplating,  one
possibility  is  that you are  working  out  the  implications  of a set  of presup-
positions  of  a  tradition,  not  a  tradition  to  which  they  don't  adhere,  but
which  they  are transforming.
Hauerwas:  Well, then you just have to say, "Give  me a different account,
and  let's see  how you  justify that  kind of account."  One  thing  we  haven't
mentioned:  We've  been  talking  about  liberalism  primarily  as  a  moral  and
political  theory,  but  of course it's  an  economic  theory.  I  think  that  that's
increasingly becoming worked out, consistently, in terms that we are beginning
to  see.  More  and  more  of our  lives  are  open  to  the market.  I  regard  the
Baby M  case33  as a nice  working out of the moral  implications of capitalism.
The fact that people are shocked by it is odd. Soon we'll  see that there really
isn't  any  reason  to  have  laws  against  prostitution.  There  really  isn't  any
reason to have laws  against suicide.  There are  no economic  grounds  for such
laws.  There  is  not  any  reason,  if someone  wants  to  insure  their  family's
future  by  saying,  "Yes,  I'll  sell  all  five  of  my major  organ  systems,  even
though I'm thirty-five."  There's no reason to  prevent that.
Tushnet: Wouldn't the alternative  say that your perception of the incred-
ible ambivalence about Baby M  as odd-doesn't that perception indicate that
you haven't  described  where  the  liberal  tradition  is  now?  Milton  Friedman
regards the ambivalence  as odd,  but the phenomenon  in the liberal  society is
of  a  great  deal  of  ambivalence  about  this-resistance  to  the  extension  of
market  norms.  Sure  it has  gotten  quite  far,  but there's  some  resistance  to
those-
33.  In re Baby  "M",  217  N.J. Super.  313,  525  A.2d  1128  (N.J.  Sup.  Ct.  1987).
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Hauerwas: On what  grounds  is  the resistance?
Tushnet: Well,  I don't  know.
Hauernvas: That's  what's  interesting.  On  what  possible  grounds  is  the
resistance?
Beckley:  That's  a question that ought  to  make  any liberal  nervous.  But
there  are some  possible  grounds.
Hauenvas:  Well,  give  them  to  me.
Levinson: Well, you're smuggling in a lot of foundationalism here.  You're
asking-
Tushnet: But it's pre-Enlightenment  foundationalism.
Levinson:  Well,  whatever  it  is.  Sometimes  you  appear  to  be  a  non-
foundationalist,  or an  anti foundationalist,  but you  want  liberals to  come up
with the  rock-bottom  foundation,  and if they don't-
Hauerwas:  That's  no reason.
Tushnet: It's their tradition.  It is  their tradition that they have to provide
the reasons,  and Stan's saying you can't operate  within that tradition without
doing  what  he's asking.
Millon: There  are  a  couple  of reasons  within  the  tradition.  One  would
be  that  the  mother  of  Baby  M  was  under  duress  when  she  made  the
agreement-no  freedom  of contract. Another  would be that there is  a certain
category of things to which market concepts don't apply-individual  physical
autonomy  or-I  don't  know  how  you  define  it.  There  are  means  within
liberalism  that you  can  use.
Hauerwas: Of  course  the  former  one  would  mean  that we  have  to  be
more careful about how we draw up the contracts, and under what conditions
they  are  drawn  up, but there's  nothing inherently  wrong  with them.  So that
doesn't  speak  against  surrogate  parenting  at  all.  It just  says  that  you  have
to be better  at it.  The  second  one-then you'd have  to  show if, empirically,
people  really  are  doing  that.  I  mean:  Are  they  subjecting  their  bodies  to
wrong use?  We  allow people  to  sell their  blood.
Millon: But my point is that, within this set of principles we call liberalism,
there  is  room  for  this  kind  of dialogue.  There  is  nothing  necessary  about
liberalism,  as  a core  of principles,  that  dictates  any of  these results.
Beckley:  And  there's  room  for  the  notion  that  there  is  a  public  good
that would  be threatened  if you  allow  certain  kinds  of sales  such  as  blood
transfusions.  I  think a  liberal  can  argue  against  the  public  sale of blood  on
those kinds  of  grounds.
Millon:  The  judge  would  just  say  it's  against  public  policy  and  that
would  be it.
Hauerwas: But then  I  think  that  what  you  are  going  to  get  into  is  the
problem of majoritarianism  and  how you  establish  what  those  public goods
are.  It's just what  the majority agrees  upon.
Beckley: But there  could be evidence  here.  We can see that over the long
run  that  kind  of  market  will  destroy  the  supply of  blood  and  what  that
would  do  to  the  community.  If you  have  a  notion  of  people  being  highly
interdependent...  There are so many forms  of liberalism.  That is  all I  want
to  say.  You  could  include  those  who  determine  the  public good  on majori-FAITH IN  THE REPUBLIC
tarian  grounds  and the  Catholic  bishops  as  well,  or,  say,  John  Ryan,  who
participates  in the American  democratic experiment,  and so on. They are just
quite  different  from  Robert  Nozick.
Hauerwas: Well,  I agree.  The  Catholic  bishops  are  probably  personally
liberals,  but in terms  of Catholic theology and  political theory they certainly
are not liberal-within  their  tradition and  how it is worked out. And  I think
that's  the reason  why they have so much  trouble finding  a voice.  I  do think
that the convoluted  rhetoric  of rights in the economic pastoral  letter is partly
convoluted  because it's so hard to make rights language  work within Catholic
economic  thought.
Shaffer:  Sandy  suggested  four  possible  places  to  begin  this  afternoon.
They  are  civic  education,  patriotism,  Abraham  Lincoln,  and  Sandy's  Prot-
estant-Catholic  analytical  categories 4 I  can't  fit  the  fourth  into  the  other
three,  but  you could  cover  the  other  three with  Abraham  Lincoln,  I  think.
It strikes me  as  an intriguing  place to  begin.
Levinson: One of the things  I have realized  in reading the manuscript  of
Constitutional  Faith for  copy  editing  is  that  Abraham  Lincoln  plays  a key
role throughout the whole  manuscript, and  that Lincoln  is  one of the two  or
three most important single  figures in the American  narrative.  One question
that  I  would  like to throw  out is what  one does with  Lincoln.  That question
in  turn  can  take  a  number  of forms.  One  is  very  personal.  What  do  you
personally  do  with  Lincoln?  Does  the Lincoln  Memorial  resonate  with  you?
Do you view  Lincoln  as  a key figure in  a narrative that is important  to you,
etc.?  If there  is  such  a thing  as  civil  religion,  then  presumably  Lincoln is  a
character  in it,  and  one would assume that he would  resonate  in a way that
James  K.  Polk doesn't.
Other  questions  can  be  less  personal  and  a little bit  more  distant:  How
should Lincoln  be taught?  How  did  he err?  Or should Lincoln  be taught to
the young  as part of civic education?  Why is he on the five-dollar  bill?  Why
do  you have  the  Memorial?  What  makes  him  such  an  important  figure?  Is
that  something  the  young  in  our  society  should  know,  so  that  when  E.B.
Hirsch  gives  the  next  round  of  cultural  literacy  tests  they  would  know
34.  See Constitutional Faith, supra note  2.  In  Constitutional  Faith "'Protestantism'  ...
refers  either  (1)  to an  emphasis  on the  exclusivity  of written  Scripture  or  text  as  the basis  of
doctrine,  or  (2) to  the legitimacy  of individual (or  at least  relatively  non-hierarchical  communi-
tarian)  interpretation  as  against  the  claims  of  a  specific,  hierarchically  organized,  institution.
'Catholicism'  ...  refers  either (1) to the legitimacy of unwritten tradition in addition to Scripture,
or  (2)  to  the  authority  of  a  particular  institution,  hierarchically  organized,  to  give  binding
interpretations  of disputed aspects  of relevant materials."
Regarding  the Constitution:  "As  to source  of doctrine,  the protestarit  position  is that it is
the  constitutional  text alone,  while the catholic position  is that the source of doctrine is the  text
of the  Constitution plus  unwritten  tradition.  As to the ultimate  authority to interpret the  source
of doctrine,  the protestant position  is based  on the legitimacy of individualized  (or at least non-
hierarchical  communal)  interpretation,  while the  catholic  position is  that  the  Supreme  Court  is
the  dispenser  of ultimate  interpretation."
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something  about Lincoln-more  than that  he was  a president at  some  time.
And then if the young should know something about Lincoln,  what is it they
should know?  Should he  be taught  as  a great constitutionalist,  and indeed  as
a preserver  of the  Constitution,  or  should  he be taught  as  Father  Abraham
in a quite different sense  of smashing the idols,  and knowing when to  let the
1787  constitution go and  engage in quite  ruthless behavior  to organize a new
covenant  and  a new  understanding?
Among the frightening  possibilities  is what he himself suggested in a well
known  speech  in  1838  about  lions and  eagles,  and this  is  what  he  said:  Let
respect  for law be the political religion of our nation. Part of what was going
on  was  hi  trying  to  come  to  terms  with  the  Founders  who  did  not  have
respect  for  law,  and  he was  very  well  aware  that  to  emulate  the  Founders
could  be to  disrespect  law  and to  engage  in a refounding.  One  of the things
that  makes  Lincoln  of  such  interest  to  the  Straussians,  among  other  com-
munities  of students,  is that he  has claimed  to be a genuine  founder  himself,
by  engaging  in  transgression.  So:  Do  we  build  a  monument  to  him  as  a
transgressor  carrying  the message that we too can transgress,  so that there is
a  line  from  Lincoln  to  Martin  Luther  King?  You  could  have  much  less
attractive  bloodlines  than  from  Lincoln  to  Martin  Luther  King.  Or  do  we
teach  him  as  a  man  who  preached  reverence  for  the  law?  And  that's  what
the young  should  know,  that's the part  of Lincoln they  should emulate?
LaRue: I  can talk about that because I  do teach Lincoln in constitutional
law.  I'm one  of the  few  people  in  constitutional  law  who  teaches  the Dred
Scott 5  case.  I  spend  several  days  on  it.  I  teach  Taney's  majority  opinion,
Curtis's  dissent,  and  what  I  call  Lincoln's  dissent,  that  is,  his  speech  at
Springfield that kicks off the Lincoln-Douglas  debates.  I think that his speech
at Springfield  is  the  most important  opinion  in constitutional  law,  which  is
why  I  teach  it.  Taney  and  Curtis  debated  the  question  of  the  historical
understanding  of citizenship  and  all of those sorts  of things,  and  Lincoln  in
that  speech  at  Springfield,  and  in  the  rest  of the  Lincoln-Douglas  debates,
trumped the  Constitution  with the Declaration.  That  was the  move.  He said
the Constitution  is  the  document  of  1776.  When  he  said  "four  score  and
seven  years  ago"  he was  dating  from  the  Declaration,  and  that  was  not  a
clich6  as  it  is  today,  to  date  the  country  from  the  Declaration.  It  was  a
contested  question  of what  is  the  founding  document  of the  country,  what
is the date.
Now,  Lincoln  says-he  didn't  put  it  this  way,  but  from  the  point  of
view  of a constitutional  lawyer  you can  say-the Constitution  itself is  a set
of compromises.  Anybody that says anything  about the  Constitution  and its
drafting  and  its  history  knows  that.  So  what's  fundamental?  Is  it  slavery
that's  fundamental,  and  we've  made  a  compromise  with  freedom,  or  is  it
equality that's  fundamental,  and  we've made  a necessary  pragmatic compro-
mise  with  slavery?  What's  fundamental?  His  position  was  that  it  was  the
Declaration  that was  the trump.
35.  Dred  Scott v.  Sandford,  60 U.S.  (19  How.)  393  (1857).FAITH IN  THE REPUBLIC
So  at  Gettysburg,  when  he  declares  the  nation  to  be  dedicated  to  the
proposition  that all are  created  equal,  he is  repeating then,  in the context  of
the  war,  the  proposition  that  he  had  advanced  throughout  the  Lincoln-
Douglas debates,  and since that speech at Springfield.  And I think he's right.
That  is to  say that  if you  are  to  explain  the  positive  law  of constitutional
law  you  cannot  do  so  on  the  grounds  that  the  document  of  1787  with  its
amendments,  including  the Civil  War  amendments,  is  the Constitution.  You
can't explain Brown  v.  Board6 on that ground.  You can't  explain Baker v.
Carr1 7  You  can't explain Roe v.  Wade. 38  You cannot  explain what  defeated
Bork,  because if  you  think  the  document  of  1787,  with  its  amendments  of
1789  and  1867,  is the  Constitution,  Bork  is  right;  but  Bork  is  wrong,  and
Lincoln is  right.
Hauerwas: Do you  take  that to  be  a Protestant  or  a Catholic  interpre-
tation?
LaRue: Actually  I  think it's a Talmudic  one.  I think  when  Sandy states
his position at the end of that section of his book,  combining the Protestant
and  Catholic  interpretation,  and  said this  combination  is  the  position I  rest
on,  he in fact  asserts the  Talmudic  position.
Levinson:  That's  clearly  correct.  Protestant-Catholic  is  used  for  two
reasons,  one of which is simply that I assume that my audience  will be much,
much more familiar  with  the gross categories  Protestantism  and  Catholicism
than  with  any  other  gross  categories  one  would  use.  The  second  answer  is
very,  very  appropriate to Stanley's  point this  morning,  and that is that,  as  a
Jew  raised  in  Western  North  Carolina,  I  know  more  about  Christianity  in
some  ways than I do about  Judaism,  because my  friends included  a Baptist,
a Methodist, a Presbyterian,  a Catholic,  and  an Episcopalian,  and we  would
argue  endlessly.  So,  unlike  most  of  my  own  students  today,  I  have  some
sense  of the difference  between  a Baptist  and a  Presbyterian.  I do  not have
a nuanced  sense.  I must  confess  to you  and to  others that  I've never  really
understood  what Methodists  are about.
And  it  is  in  fact  that  only  over  the  last  five  or  six  years  that  I  have
begun studying  in  any serious  sense  Jewish materials.  What  I find attractive
in what I call the Protestant argument is also in the dominant Jewish tradition:
only  minimal  institutional  authority  to  speak  of, plus  multiple  sources  for
doctrine.
Hauerwas: Yes,  multiple  sources  but  yet  still a  continuation  of a com-
munity  of testing,  which  always  is  going to say  that the  interpretation  must
do  justice to at least some classical  document,  the Torah.
Levinson: Yes,  but there  are  no criteria  at  all of what  counts  as  doing
justice, and  remarkable  things  have been  done  in the name of fidelity.
Hauerwas: But  why should  they continue  to assume  that the Torah has
overriding  status?
36.  Brown v. Board of Education,  347  U.S.  483  (1954).
37.  Baker  v.  Carr, 369  U.S.  186  (1962).
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1988]WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW  REVIEW  [Vol.  45:467
LaRue: Because  of its  continuous  revelation.
Levinson: Let me read one other paragraph  that's  been added to the text
since the version you got because it's  clearly relevant:  "One  recent  writer has
described  rabbinic  authority  as  including  the  creative  ability to  'reshape  the
Torah,  to  determine  its official meaning,  and to  set  aside  even  explicit  rules
as  the  interpreters  see  fit.'  "  Interestingly  enough,  in  light  of our  earlier
discussion of Lincoln and  other founders,  what  legitimizes rabbinic  creativity
seems  to  be a matter  more of  character than  of following  any specific  rules
of interpretation.  If a creative  act  "is  carried  out by  one  whose  intention  is
to establish  his  own  systemic  primacy  over  that  even of the Torah,"  the act
is  illegitimate.  "If,  however,  the  action  is  motivated  by  a  real  concern  for
the preservation of the primacy of the Torah itself within the halachic  system,
and  if the  situation  is  such  that this  preservation  can  be  accomplished  best
through  the  abrogation  of  one  of its  dictates,  the  action  is  legal.  In  other
words,  the assurance  that rabbinic  legislation  abrogating the Torah is  second-
ary,  not  primary,  is  dependent  upon  the  personal  virtues  required  of  the
authorities  of the system."
'39
I  am  trying  explicitly  to  tie  this  with  Lincoln.  There  are  no  formal
arguments  that  can  say  Lincoln  was  an  interpreter  rather  than  an  inventor.
Ultimately  you  have  to  decide  what  you  think  of  his  character,  what  you
think  of  the  values  to  which  he  was  committed.  But  abstract  rules  of
interpretation are  almost no help in coming to terms with Lincoln,  or coming
to terms  with the great rabbis,  or  presumably  great  religious  leaders in  other
traditions,  and  they  all  become  essentially  contested figures  for that  reason.
I  guess  part  of  what  I  am  curious  about  is  whether  Lincoln  is  essentially
contested,  or whether people don't think of him much one way or the  other,
that he is  treated  as  merely  the guy on the  five-dollar  bill.
Hauerwas:  In terms of your original  questions, apart from the interpretive
thing, when  I go back to  Washington,  D.C.,  I  go to two  places.  I always  go
to  the Lincoln  Memorial  and  I  go  to  the  Vietnam  Memorial.  I  regard  the
Vietnam  Memorial  as  our  great piece of  national sculpture,  and I  go  to the
Lincoln  Memorial  to  read  the  Second  Inaugural.  And  I  read  the  Second
Inaugural  as  a Southerner,  because  I think that it articulates  well  the South's
tragic  sense of the war.  I  always  pray that somehow that might become  part
of our national  consciousness,  which  it is  not. The  way  that Lincoln  is read
is  not in  light of the  Second Inaugural,  nor  even  in the options that you lay
out in the book in terms of overriding  habeas corpus, or what Lash  [LaRue]
has  suggested in terms  of Lincoln's making  the Declaration  of Independence
the primary  text.  Lincoln  is  read primarily  within the American  context  as a
winner, because the story that is told about Lincoln is this grim determination
to  win the war.  He did win  the war,  and that's  what we  believe  Americans
are about-winning  through  determination  and  power  on the  side  of  right-
eousness  and  good.
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As a result,  we lose entirely the sensitivity that Lincoln himself had about
the tragic  character  of the war,  and why  it was a genuine  struggle,  and why
he  knew that the decisions  he was  having  to make at that time were matters
of judgment which were  creating something new, that was absolutely necessary
in order to preserve the Union.  So I value Lincoln deeply, but I value Lincoln
primarily  because  I  think  he was  an  extraordinary  person.  I  think  he  was
one  of  America's  great  theologians,  but  he  has  been  misread  so  deeply  it
only confirms my view that America doesn't have the kind of ethos sufficient
to  sustain the reality  of what  Lincoln  was  and  what he was  about.
Levinson: I  find  it  a  little bit  surprising  that  you  value  him  so  much
because preserving the Union can easily be put within a framework of idolatry.
Hauerwas: Oh,  absolutely.
Levinson: He  "shot"  certainly  as  much  as  anybody at Fort  Sumter and
some  would  say  more.  He  chose  to  go  to  war.  There  is  no  portrayal  of
Lincoln  which  makes  him a plausible  pacifist.
Hauerwas: Oh,  he's not that at all.  I think one  of the difficulties  about
being  a pacifist  is  you  are  always  put in  such  a minority position  that you
think that  everyone else's willingness  to go to war is because they are morally
perverse.  I do  not think that people go to war and participate in war because
they  are morally perverse.  I think most people  never even  have the choice to
think about it.  I  don't think  Lincoln  ever seriously considered  what it  might
mean to have a nonviolent alternative. Pacifists care more about conscientious
participation  than those  in the war do.  You get so few people conscientiously
participating.
The  reason  why  I  value  Lincoln,  as  I  said,  is  because  I  think  that  he
articulated  a public sense  of the tragedy  of the war,  in the Second  Inaugural
and many other places, that could really help  us as  a people if we could own
that  history.  To  appreciate  what  it  means  for  a  mature  polity  to  have  a
discourse that  associates  its  history in  a way that its citizens  can be working
on  a  common  project  without  it  turning  into  idolatry.  For  example,  how
does  Lincoln  mean  for  us  to  handle  the  continuing  problem  of blacks  in
America?  Supposedly they've  got civil  rights,  so now we try to deal  with the
continuing  problem of  how to  remember  we  were  a slave  nation by  saying,
What's  a  little  slavery  between  friends?  I  mean,  you,  too,  have  the  same
rights that we do-have two cars,  live in a nice suburb,  three TVs,  and worry
about Jews  moving in.  Blacks  now get  to  have  the same  disadvantages  that
we  currently  have  in terms  of what  makes our  lives  seemingly  worthy.
So  I find  Lincoln's  sensitivities  on these points to be quite  important,  if
we could  own them.  I don't  say it would be  great.  My problem  is that even
if we  could  recover  some  sense  of  "civic  republicanism"  within  the  liberal
democratic  system it would  still be armed.  So  even if America  could become
a virtuous  polity  I  would  still  be  worried.  But  Lincoln's  sense  of virtue  in
this  tragic  sense-I  think  that  is  a  sign  of a  mature  polity  that  would  be
better  than  the narrative  that we  place  him  in, namely  the narrative  of our
ongoing victory,  where slavery  is no problem anymore: We got rid of slavery;
we fought this terrible  war;  we  got rid of the final products of discrimination
that  was  part of slavery,  supposedly,  so  we  are on our  way to being  a just
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society.  I think that  is just  all  false.  That is the history that we read  Lincoln
in.
LaRue:  I  still don't  understand  your total  response  to Sandy's  point  in
terms of your  reference  to your  saying,  "It  would  still be  armed."
Hauerwas: Republican  virtues  are always  armed.  They are  armed virtues.
Courage  is  armed.
LaRue: I  mean,  you're  not going to  be able to claim  Lincoln  as  an ally
with that.  You  can't do  it with the Second  Inaugural.
Hauerwas: No,  no,  that's  quite  right.  I  think  that  the  virtues,  when
they're  armed,  if they're  coupled  with  the  kind  of  sense  of  ambiguity  and
tragedy that you find  in the  Second Inaugural-at  least they don't  kill quite
so  readily.
LaRue: Well,  I'm still going to  fight with  you that the  Second Inaugural
is  an  account  of  ambiguity  and  tragedy.  The  statement  that's  made  in the
Second  Inaugural  is  that if  for  every  drop  of blood  shed  by the  lash there
must  be another life  lost, then  we must recognize  that the judgments  of the
Lord  are righteous.
Hauerwas: That's  right.
LaRue: Now,  what  I want  to say is  that the thing that's attractive to  me
about  Lincoln is  the Old Testament  sense  of that.
Hauerwas: Right.  Your  reading  is  probably  more  closely  correct  than
mine.  Boys  in gray  pray,  boys  in blue pray.  They pray to the same  God.
LaRue: Yes,  pray to the same God and the same  God is punishing  both.
Hauerwas: Right.
LaRue: And his  judgments  are  righteous  and we  cannot complain  about
this.  I think he's  right. And,  second,  on this peaceful  alternative,  I  think it's
positively  silly to  say that  there was  a peaceful  alternative.
Hauerwas: I  agree.  That's  what  I  said.  I  don't  think  there  was.  And
that's the tragedy.
LaRue: And to  take  up another  of your  comments  before.  If there  are
things worth dying  for-I do  also  think there are  things  worth  killing for.
Hauerwas: Well,  the  reason  why I  think Christians  turn out to  be such
enthusiastic  killers  is  because  originally  they  were  such  enthusiastic  diers.
That's exactly the move that  I think is  natural and  wrong. The  fact  of your
willingness  to  die  doesn't translate  into  willingness  to kill,  but you  are  quite
right in the moral  logic of that. But I do think that the more serious question
is,  even if Sandy is  right in terms  of how  Lincoln is  being interpreted,  that's
not how Lincoln works  in the main story of America,  if we're  going to locate
verities.  I mean  it works primarily  as  we won;  we were  successful.
Shaffer: It  was  a cause  worth  dying  for.
Hauerwas:  And it was  a cause worth dying for-right-and worth  killing
for.  That  sense  of judgment  that you  see  in  the Second  Inaugural  we  just
don't have,  because we won. It would be nice if we could get Sandy's Lincoln
into the  story. I'm not so happy with  getting the other part that you suggest
in the story,  namely that the Declaration  of Independence  is the real Consti-
tution.  Because  I  don't  like  the  Declaration  of Independence.  I  always  say
that America  is the only country that has the disadvantage  of being  foundedFAITH IN THE REPUBLIC
on  a philosophical  mistake,  namely the notion of inalienable  rights.
Levinson: From another  perspective,  Gary Wills  doesn't  like the  Gettys-
burg  Address  because  it's  propositional  and,  if that's  the  proposition,  then
we  get  in very quick  fashion  to  loyalty  oaths  again,  or a test of attachment
to  the  Constitution,  with  the  notion  that  we  know  what  that  means,  so,
"Here's  a proposition:  yea  or nay."
LaRue: Again, Lincoln gives you a reading of the Declaration,  one which
Gary Wills  happens  not to  like but  one  which  I think  is  a  very  good  one.
On the thesis,  he says that the proposition  of the Declaration  is equality, but
he also says that people aren't equal in everything.  In the Springfield address
he specifies what people  are not equal in; they are not equal in, among other
things,  as  he says-a surprising proposition-their  moral worth.  He says they
are equal in  the rights  to  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of happiness.  That is
the  way that you  found a polity of a certain  sort which,  by the way,  seems
to me a rather better way to have found it than the particular  history  or the
particular  geography.
Then I'll have to go to something  else.  Another  piece of history I heard
asserted today  is  one  that  seems to  me absolutely  astonishing.  That  is  that
the  Puritan  imaginations  of  equality,  and  the  Calvinist  thing,  and  all  like
that, were part of the fundamental  founding of America. I think, historically,
it  is  almost easy to  establish  that the  Puritan communities  of New  England
were atypical  for the American colonies. Most of the American colonies  were
more like the English  homelands.  Puritan New  England  was  self-consciously
and  substantively  different,  and  it's  a  further  fact  that  New  England  is
marginal  to  American  politics  until  1830.  It's  no  accident  that  we  had  a
stream of Virginia presidents; it's no accident that certain places  were chosen
as  central  locations-Philadelphia  and  New  York,  and  then  later  the  banks
of the  Potomac.  The  political  and  moral  center  of  gravity  of the  United
States is  in the Chesapeake  area,  and the  Chesapeake  area generally  runs the
country  for its  first  four  decades  or  so.  And that's  a group  of people who
are not Puritans. If you look at the iconography  of the early republic it's all
classical  emphasis  with very little of Calvinist  concepts.
Hauerwas: You  don't think  that  Sandy's  construal  of the  Preamble  is
correct.
LaRue:  I  don't  think  it's  a  Calvinist  proposition.  I  don't  think  it  has
anything  to  do with Calvinism.  The only way you can  do  that is to read the
intellectual  hegemony  and  moral  hegemony  of  New  England,  circa  1835,
backwards,  and  say it  was  always  that  way.  The  point  is  that the  United
States from  1776 to, say,  1836, has its intellectual  and moral center of gravity
well  south of New  England.  The reason people  write  histories that start off
with and pay so much attention  to New England is because  it's the only part
of colonial America you can write a history about  and not talk about slavery,
and  so you write histories  that shove  all of that under  the water.
Hauerwas: That's interesting. I've never thought of that; it's fascinating.
LaRue: Well,  it's  of course  a  fact  that  the  histories  that  were  written
were  generally  written  at  Harvard  and Yale.  The  great  historians  that  start
us  off,  say  1835  and  forward,  are  New  Englanders,  in  the  New  England
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universities.  There's  no  doubt  that  New  England  establishes  its  intellectual
and  moral  hegemony  in  the  nation,  but  it  does  so  I  think  way  too  late  in
the  game to  identify it with  a  founding  document.  One  of the  things that's
interesting  about  Lincoln  is  that  he's  one  of  the  guys  that  makes  the
assimilation.  He's the guy  that somehow  manages  to  combine  Jefferson  and
Emerson  in a  dazzling  tour de force, and  thus in that sense  he's a  founder.
Tushnet:  This  last  discussion  suggested  to  me how  to  get  a  handle  on
why I  don't find Lincoln a particularly  interesting figure in my narrative.  Let
me start by picking up on Lash's observation  that he's  one of the few people
who  teach  Lincoln  in  constitutional  law.  What  that says  to  me  is  not that
there  is  a  standard  story  of  Lincoln,  but  in  the  legal  tradition  he  is  just
absent.  It seems  to  me  no  accident  that Sandy,  with  his  interest  in  Lincoln,
has  a Ph.D.  in  political  science,  because  the  political  scientists  appear to  be
interested  in Lincoln.  But not  lawyers,  in  general.
Levinson: Just American-thought  buffs  and  the political  scientists.
Tushnet:  Let  me  sort  of translate  this  a  little.  The  narrative  about  the
Constitution  shared  by  the  legal  profession  in  general,  as  educated  by  legal
academics  who don't  have  Lincoln  as  part  of their  universe  of  discourse,  is
yet  again  different  from  the  different  ones  that  are  being  articulated  here.
Then  what  I  am  led  to  think-but  I'm  not  sure  what  you,  Stanley,  would
say  about  it-is  that  it's  wrong,  incomplete  or  something,  to  identify  a
narrative that  constitutes  the community.  It  seems  to  me  then there  are  two
obvious  routes-maybe  more-but  two  obvious  ones.  The  community  is
constituted  by  multiple  narratives,  which  are  drawn  upon  in  shifting  ways,
and  it would  be  interesting  to  think  about  why  they were  drawn  upon  and
under  what  circumstances,  and  so  forth.  Or,  alternatively,  each  of  these
narratives  constitutes  a  different  community,  and  each  one  is,  in  its  imagi-
nation,  imperialistic  with  respect  to  the other.
Levinson:  One  reason  Lash  may  be  one  of  the  few  people  teaching
Lincoln  is because  he doesn't appear or didn't appear  in any of the standard
casebooks.  If you  assume  that most  people  who  teach  are  by  and  large  at
the mercy of what's  handed them, part of what's interesting is what we hand
them.  Both Mark  and  I  are  involved  with  casebooks. 4 0  Mark's  has  become,
I think, the most widely accepted and most important one.  Now yours,  Mark,
is historically oriented  as casebooks  go,  particularly because of Cass Sunstein,
and  I  think  what's  interesting  about  Cass  is that  he's up to  his  neck  in  the
Federalist  Papers,  and  a  certain version  of the republican  tradition-but  my
impression  is that Lincoln  doesn't play  any role in your book.
Tushnet: Well,  we  have the statement about the Dred Scott decision,  but
that's  all.
Levinson: But in the next edition  of ours,  Lincoln  is going  to be a main
character  by anybody's  criterion.  And I  remain  relatively uninterested  in  The
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Federalist  Papers.  I read some of them on occasion,  but I have never brought
myself to  get  all  that involved  with  The Federalist  Papers. I  don't  see  them
as  a  particularly  privileged  kind  of wisdom.  Whether it's  conscious  picking
and  choosing  within the narrative,  or it's just  worked  out that way,  that we
are  looking  at different  people,  and those  people  who  choose  either  of our
books will find themselves  perhaps teaching  more history than they had been
doing  before,  if  they  had  used  Gunther's  book.41  But  they'll  be  teaching
decidedly  different  histories.
Hauerwas: I  think that Mark's  point, though,  is  well taken  for those of
us trained  in  Christian  ethics.  For  a long time  the assumption  was  that you
were being  trained  in  something like American  studies  at the same time.  We
were  all  brought  up  on  Perry Miller 4 2 and  Ahlstrom 3  and  all  that  kind  of
thing.  That  was  part  and  parcel  of my  training,  and  it  was  part  of  my
training  because  the  assumption  was,  as  I  have  said  time  and  time  again,
that the subject  of Christian  ethics in America has  always been America.  We
thought  we  were  theologians  in  order  to  make  America  coherent,  to make
America  work.  That's what  Christian  theology was  about.
You were  interested  in social ethics.  So Lincoln  became part,  at least,  of
my  discourse.  He  probably  forms  a different  story  than  he  does  in  consti-
tutional law,  and plays a still different story within some aspects of American
political  science.  What  we  have  here  is  a  melding  of  different  academic
cultures.  I  don't  teach  Lincoln  anymore.  And  I  don't  have  my students  do
much American  studies  either,  except  as  a negative case.  So  it does  denote  a
difference  of  academic  cultures  now,  and  what  that  means  then  for  com-
munities-I don't think communities  have to have one story, but I think they
have  to  have  a  shared  sense  of  what  stories  are  important,  that  will  give
them  the  kinds  of lively  arguments  that  are  necessary  for  them  to  remain
coherent.
That's  MacIntyre's  account  of tradition,  namely,  tradition  is that  which
will give you a recognizable argument across generations.  Obviously MacIntyre
is thinking of two things-really three  things.  I think  he thinks that the only
communities  which  exemplify  that  account  of  tradition  are  Judaism,  the
development  of the doctrine  of Christianity  (which  includes  Plato and  Aris-
totle),  and  science.  I  think  he  thinks  contemporary  science  is  still  a  lively
traditional  activity.  I  don't  think  MacIntyre  would regard the  United  States
of  America,  for  example,  as  a  community  in  any  interesting  sense.  And
exactly  for that  reason MacIntyre  doesn't  think  that you've  got  much  of a
stake  in  saving  it,  one  way  or  the other.  All  you've  got  is  fragments;  you
don't have  anything enough.  I  expect  that people in constitutional  law  react
negatively against that because,  on the whole, you think you're telling a story.
It's like Talmud.  You  go  ahead  and  spell  out the different  meanings  of this
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within  that. That's  one of the  reasons  why  I  think  the law  has  been  trying
to  protect  itself against  other  disciplines  informing what  you do,  because  as
long  as you're a lawyer you  can  tell  such  a coherent  story. You  start mixing
it up with political theory  and  economic  analysis  and it becomes a good deal
messier,  and  you can't  preserve  the law  as  that kind  of coherent  story.
Shaffer: You're using MacIntyre to make that point. It may be significant.
What  do  you  do  with  the  simple  fact  that  these  patriotic  liturgies-and
Lincoln  has  often  been  a  part  of  them-move  Americans.  You  watch  a
baseball  game start with  The Star Spangled Banner, and  they all stand  there,
and if a couple  of the players  talk to  one another during  The Star Spangled
Banner, we  disapprove  of  it.  And  we  say  the  Pledge  of Allegiance.  When
you go to  public meetings,  Stanley,  do you  say the Pledge  of Allegiance?
Hauerwas: No  I  don't.  Nor do  I  sing  The Star Spangled Banner.
Shaffer: You stand  up though.
Hauerwas: I  do stand up.
Tushnet: Why?  Let  me  not make  this  about  you.  Direct it towards  me,
and just let me give my example,  which is going to the university  convocation
services,  which  are religious  services.
Hauerwas: I  wouldn't  kneel  if I were  you.
Tushnet: No,  I  don't  kneel.  There's  no  kneeling.  But  there's  a portion
where  the standing  is a part  of the service,  and  I  do it.
Hauerwas: I  do  it  because,  one,  I  want  to  honor  the  people  there.  I
respect the people who  are doing the singing,  and I don't want to show them
disrespect.  Also,  if I  thought  it was  important to  make  a significant  protest
gesture in those contexts,  I might  well  do  so,  but I  don't  see any reason that
that would  be  necessary.  So  those  would  be the  only  two  reasons  that  I  do
stand,  and  also  you  don't want  to  call  too  much  attention  to  yourself.  Let
me  say  that  Jeff  Stout  argues  in  his  book, After  Babel,"  that  we've  got
practices around that we  can still sustain as ethics  of the virtues,  that we can
maintain a kind of moderate  liberalism,  and one of the practices that he likes
very much  is baseball.  He  doesn't think it has  yet been corrupted  thoroughly
by the institution.  I'm  a big baseball  fan,  too.  Indeed,  I  say that today the
only  kind  of  working  criteria  I  can  give  to  someone  who  might  make  me
think  it  might  be  worthy  to  engage  in  some  kind  of  defensive  strategy  to
save  America  is  if  you  can  show  me  how  there  is  a necessary  relationship
between  saving  America  and  keeping  Carolina  League  Class  A  ball  going.
I've  given  up  on the  major  leagues,  but  I  don't  want  to  lose  the  Durham
Bulls.  When  people  ask  me,  "What  will  happen  if  the  Communists  take
over"  my answer  is,  "Well,  will they make it impossible  for us to  play Class
A  ball  in  Durham?"  If  they  don't,  I  think  saving America  is  still  a  viable
possibility.  I think this  is  a narrative that  I'm interested  in  saving.
Levinson: Let  me  raise  a  hypothetical  that  I  mentioned  to  Tom  as  we
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were  walking  back  over here.  What if it were  proposed  to  drop  the  consti-
tutional  oath that  lawyers  need  to take?  I  assume  that each  of us  who  is  a
lawyer has  signed this loyalty oath if he is a member of the Bar. It's  a stance
pretty much that tracks the presidential oath; it's not a "I'm not a Communist
and  I  will never  be  one,"  but it  simply says  I  promise  I'll support,  protect,
and  defend the  Constitution  of the United States-and  of California  in  my
case.  You're probably  committed  to the  Indiana Constitution.  Is that right?
Shaffer: Yes,  and  to never  refusing  a case for filthy  lucre's sake.
Levinson: What if someone  said this  is either  silly or offensive  and  let's
rationalize  our practices  and  drop the  oath. Would  you as  a member  of the
laity,  in this context-would  you  applaud  us for  doing that?
Hauerwas: Yes,  I would.  I think it would be great.
Tushnet: Is that because you, in this present context,  agree with MacIntyre
that there is no viable constitutional  tradition sufficient to support the dialogue
across generations?
Hauerwas: Yes.  I don't believe  that we  are a viable  political  society.
Shaffer: Would  you  go  to a mechanic  to get  your car  fixed  who  didn't
adhere to sound  principles  of internal combustion?
Hauerwas:  I might well  do it, not knowing any better,  I mean from what
I  know about  a car.
Shaffer: Or  a doctor  who didn't  believe  in scientific  medicine?  It  seems
to me there  is a connection there to lawyers making some sort of commitment
to the stuff that they deal  with, which you're buying  from them.
Hauerwas: Well,  I assume that that's done within  the profession.
LaRue: I don't  know what that has to  do with an  oath.
Levinson: Let me offer  a solution.  I  think we  can,  and  many of us  not
only  can but  do,  treat the  lawyer  as  a  rhetorician,  in  a  platonic  sense.  We
are  skilled  in  manufacturing  arguments,  and  we're  trained  to  know  how
arguments  work,  and  just  as  I  want  somebody  who  knows  how  internal
combustion  engines  work  to  fix  my  car,  I  want  to  go  to  a  lawyer  who
graduated  magna from an institute of rhetoric to manufacture arguments that
will  help  me prevail.  But  this  has  almost  literally  nothing  to  do  with  sup-
porting, protecting,  and defending the Constitution  of the United States.  The
question  is  to  what  extent  the  role of a  lawyer  in  some  significant  sense  is
linked  to membership  in  a constitutional  community,  where  one  asks  about
the implications  of one's  actions  in terms  of that constitutional  community,
as  opposed to being  a good neutral  technician  for sale to the highest  bidder.
I don't think getting rid of the oath  would in the least require us to shut
down the  law  schools  we  now teach  in.  Presumably  one  of the  arguments
for getting  rid of the  oath  is  that it  would  simply  bring  our  practices  and
our  theory  closer  together,  because  we  make  no  real  effort to  discuss  with
our students what it means seriously to commit yourself to a life of supporting,
protecting,  and  defending  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  That's
certainly not  what  goes on in most constitutional  law  courses,  including  my
own. It certainly doesn't go on in the general curriculum,  where constitutional
law gets fewer hours than commercial law, for example, which is the important
stuff of the  law  school.
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Hauerwas: I think  that's  right.  I just  don't  see  how a drop  in  the oath
would  make all that  much  difference.
Powell: Not  everybody looks  at teaching  constitutional  law  that way,  of
course,  Sandy.  There  are  naive believers  among us.
Levinson: I  wouldn't  say  that  no one  does.  I'm  simply  saying that as  a
descriptive  practice  I  don't  think  that  the  constitutional  law  course  elicits
from students,  or forces  upon students,  which  may  also  be the  right word,
serious  reflection  about  whether  you  want  to  get  married  to  the  law  in
essence-the  old  clich6 from the Harvard  Law School  of law  being  a jealous
mistress,  and the idea that the oath is transformative  in some sense,  and that
you  do  take on  real  responsibilities.  If you teach  this,  more  power  to  you.
We don't have an argument. But I'm simply asserting as a matter of sociology
that  this isn't  the subject  matter of most constitutional  law  courses.
Shaffer: I think that's because constitutional  law  is too  frail a subject  to
bear  it.  I  think  if that  subject  is  talked  about  at  all  in  legal  education  it's
talked  about  in ethics.
Powell: Or contracts.  I  talk  about it-I teach  contracts,  and  that's  one
of the things I talk about. We were talking about it at breakfast,  the question
about  how  much  one  can  succeed  in  doing  this,  but  one  of  the  things  I
conceive  myself to  be doing  is  getting  my students  to  understand  what  it is,
and  whether  they  want  to  be  what  it  is,  that  a  commercial  lawyer  is.  You
may  be  right  as  a descriptive  matter,  although  I  think  that is  an  empirical
assertion.
Shaffer: I  think that's  true for a very important  reason,  and that is  that
those subjects  cannot  avoid  dealing  with  relationships.
LaRue: I  think you  also  have to  recognize  part of this in terms  of what
the  oaths  would  stand  for  and  not  stand  for are  the  discontinuities  within
the profession itself. It's fairly routine to say, and I think reasonably accurate
to  say,  that there  is  not  a  single  esprit de corps, a single  group  of  people
you  call  lawyers,  nor  is  there  a  single  activity  that  you  can  call  lawyering.
Sandy mentioned the  making  of arguments  of the  rhetorician.  We spend  an
enormous amount of time  on that  in law  school, but it's not that big.  I  was
a litigator;  that  was  the  heart  of my  practice  when  I  was  practicing,  so  of
course  I  did  spend  a lot  of time  doing  that.  But  even  as  a  litigator  this
particular  function  was  not the  main function.  Negotiating  settlements,  par-
ticularly  since  I was  a  criminal lawyer,  and  most of my clients  were  guilty-
it was of course the proper thing that one did. That's not making arguments;
of course,  in  negotiation  you  argue,  but  not  in the  sense  in which  Sandy  I
think  was alluding to. The  subject  of rhetoric  is  one of the things which one
does teach in law  school.  But once you move  over into the commercial world,
the making  of arguments,  I  think,  is a smaller part.  Drafting is  a huge part;
counseling  is a huge  part.  As Tom says,  you  are dealing  with relations  here;
you are structuring  these  other things.  There is  not a single  thing.
Levinson:  But  the  oath-it's  not  a  Hippocratic  Oath  that  we  take.  I
mean  one  can imagine  a lawyer's  version  of the  Hippocratic  Oath,  in which
we  promise  to  be  of  service  to  our  clients,  and  never  inflict  unjustified
suffering  on  adversaries,  and  to negotiate  fairly-FAITH IN  THE REPUBLIC
Powell: North  Carolina lawyers take such an  oath.
Levinson: They  do?
Powell: I  pledged  myself truly and  honestly  to  practice  the law,  to the
best  of my  knowledge  and  ability.
Levinson: But  there  is  a  separate  oath to  support,  protect,  and  defend
the Constitution. It's very different from promising to be a competent lawyer.
I  think  it  is  a  political  statement,  so  we  can  now  get  into  two  different
conversations.  One  is  whether  it would  be  a  good  idea  for the  A.B.A.  to
work  up  a version of the North  Carolina  oath,  or something  else,  a Hippo-
cratic  Oath for the modem lawyer.  And then the second  question would  still
be  what  to  do  with  this  specific  oath  of constitutional fidelity.  Keep  it  or
drop  it?  And  if we  keep  it,  why?
Tushnet: When Jeff was talking about the naive  people like him who  do
teach  this,  and  about  your  ambivalence,  but  nonetheless,  it  seems  to  me,
commitment in the  book to the idea that there is  something to  the oath-
Levinson: There's  a  "there"  there.
Tushnet: There's  a "there"  there,  right.  I have to  say I recoil  from that,
because  there's  a level at which I want to  say you can't seriously want people
to  commit their  moral  being  to that, where  that refers  to  the body  of stuff
that  is  the constitutional  tradition.
Powell: Of  course.  You've  just  reformulated  in  significantly  different
terminology  what  everyone  else  is  saying.  And, yes,  if I  let you  reformulate
it, I'll say  no  I won't;  no,  I  can't seriously want  to  do  that.
Tushnet: So  what is the  key reformulation  that  I  did?  Committing  your
moral being?
Shaffer: Yes,  spell  that out a little  bit.
Tushnet: I  take  taking  an  oath  to  mean  assimilating  a commitment  to
that  thing  to  which  you  are  taking  an  oath  into  your  sense  of your  own
being. It's not the  only thing,  it's not the  only commitment.
Shaffer:  And  if  that's  what  you  mean  by  the  Constitution,  you  mean
something  more than the text.
Tushnet: What I  mean  is all of that stuff. And  all  of that stuff,  on the
whole, strikes me as not terribly attractive.  If it is an oath to support,  defend,
and  protect the  good  things  about the world,  I'll take that,  but to  call  that
the Constitution,  or to  call the  Constitution that,  seems to me  overreaching.
Powell: Why?  How?
Tushnet: There  are  two  versions  of it.  One  is  that the  Constitution  as
tradition  is  much  more  than  that and,  therefore,  much  less  attractive  than
all the good things in the world.  Or,  alternatively,  which  is I think why  I tie
this initially  to  Stanley's mention  of MacIntyre,  there  is  no  viable  constitu-
tional tradition,  and  so  the  oath  is the  form  of assimilating  something  into
one's  being without  the reality.
Powell: But  Mark,  you've  clearly  got,  I  think,  an implicit  notion about
what  is  and  is  not  within  the  constitutional  tradition.  You  just  said  that
doesn't exist. You were  implying an aspirational view-what the Constitution
is at heart is the Declaration of Independence or some other set of aspirations,
the  Preamble  or whatever,  and  you  wanted to say  that it is  overreaching  to
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define  it  that  way.  And  then  to  accept  that  as  a  moral  value  would  be
overreaching.  And  that  is  because  you  have  an  implicit  notion  of  what  lies
in and out of the tradition. If not,  I don't know how you make the judgment.
Tushnet:  That's  fair  enough.  And,  as  I  said,  these  were  alternatives.
Either it  is a  tradition that has  some  stuff  inside  and some  stuff outside it,
that's unattractive;  or it isn't, in  which  case  it's a fiction.
Powell: Or,  as Barber  would  say,45 no,  there  is a third  possibility.  There
is  a tradition,  and the truest training of tradition  is in the aspirational  things
that are  attractive.  The other stuff  is  deviations,  values-
Levinson: That's  what  I  call  the happy  ending  view.  That,  it  seems  to
me,  is  to  remove  all the  elements  of tragedy  and get  rid  of the notion of a
tradition  and  the  burdens  of a  tradition,  because  by  definition it  becomes
only  that  which you like  for extrinsic  reasons.  But  one can  imagine  playing
with different  forms of oaths, and it is obvious that this is something  I enjoy
doing.  I  often  ask  my  students who  take umbrage  at  my  attack  on judicial
supremacy,  "Okay,  you  don't  like  my  notions,  and  think  that  the  Court
really  is something  special,  how about amending  the Constitution to have the
president  say  'I  promise to  support,  protect,  and  defend the Constitution,  as
interpreted  by the Supreme  Court,'  "  and  quite  amazingly almost  no student
has  ever  endorsed  that  amendment.  Some  will  say  that's  kind  of  what  it
means already,  and there's  no  need to  spell it out, but there's also something
that suddenly bothers  them about  going that route.
But  one  can  imagine  the  standard  oath  and  then  a  clause  limited  only
by  overriding  moral  precepts,  so  this  saves  you  from  what  I  think  we  all
agree  is the fatal problem of committing your  soul to an enterprise that could
lead you  down an immoral path.  But that could, if you take oaths seriously,
still  have  real  bite  for  lawyers-in  terms  of  simply  selling  your  rhetorical
services  to  the  highest  bidder,  or a  number  of other  things  that  mean  you
still  might  be  constrained  in the performance  of your  role.  Or some  people
might think  that you  would  be constrained  in the performance  of your  role
in  a way  that  you  wouldn't  be if  you  simply promised  to  help  your  clients
get whatever  they  wanted and  to treat  them  with  compassion,  and  stuff like
that.  Would that satisfy  your  concerns  about oath  taking?  I would  like that
kind  of  oath  because  it  would  force  you  to  grapple  with  serious  moral
questions.  A double  oath to  two  important  things would be even better than
a single oath to  one important thing,  if you believe oaths  are  at all  desirable,
ever.
Tushnet: I  guess I'm hesitant  here because  I  see problems in each of the
alternatives  that  I  identified  before.  I  would  not  want  to  take  an  oath
formulated  so  as  to  define  important  overriding  moral  concerns  as  outside
the Constitution.  That's  at least something that  ought to  be contested  within
the framework  of the  Constitution.  And,  on  the  other  alternative  there's  no
tradition,  so that taking  an  oath  is  not  a coherent  thing  to  do.  I  guess  I'd
be  inclined  to  think  that,  when formulated  as  "overriding  moral  concerns,"
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there's  probably  no tradition there,  either,  as  we  haven't  added  anything  to
it. You have  nothing to  begin with, and  you haven't added  anything.  I take
it  that  Stanley  would  say that  if the second  clause  were  "support,  defend,
and protect  the Constitution  subject  to  Christian  ethics"  that would  at least
bring  it  into  the  framework  of  an  intelligible  thing  to  do.  The  first  part
would be meaningless, but at least the second part would have some meaning,
and you  could  do something  about that.
Shaffer: It would make it  unnecessary,  though.  Why would  you have to
take an  oath  like that?
Tushnet: Indeed,  you can't take an oath  like that. You can just live  like
that.
Hauerwas: Let  me  make  a more  general  kind  of  comment  about  this
discussion.  I told  Jeff-when  I read  Sandy's  book,  and  I  know that  Sandy
meant  this,  probably-that  I  got  the  distinct  impression  that  these  are  the
issues  we  used  to  debate  in  theology  and  still  do.  They  don't  make  any
difference  now in the seminaries-but  now the law schools  have  become the
place  where the more important theological  issues in society are thought out.
In the nineteenth century, in the Anglican  Church, there was  a famous  debate
over  whether  one  had  to  agree  to  all  thirty-nine  Articles  in  order  to  be
ordained.  No one would think about getting that serious today, I don't think,
within  the  Church,  because  we're  just happy to  get  somebody  that  will  still
hang around.  I wonder if all the questions about oath taking-the seriousness,
apart from the issues  of whether  there is  coherent  constitutional  tradition-
really  have  to  do  with  maintaining  the  integrity  and  importance  of the  law
for our society,  as a place where the serious matters of the society get debated
out. Why it  is  so important,  for example,  that  law schools  today still  seem
to  offer  moral  formation  of the  students,  whether  negatively  or  positively,
but it's  still  some  kind  of moral  formation.  So  the  question of oath-taking
is  really  a  kind  of  religious  question  and  not  just  a  question  within  the
constitutional  law  about oath-taking.
Shaffer: I  think that's  absolutely right.  I've found in the things  that my
ethics  students  wrote  recently  a number  of students who  said that  a lawyer
should  never  disobey the  law.  And  I  got  tired  of  writing  in  the  margin,
"Nobody  with  a conscience  would  ever  say that."
Hauerwas: The  law  becomes  the  new  Bible.  And  Sandy's  quite  right:
You've got your  fundamentalists  within  the law and  you've got your liberals
within  the  law.  You  are recapitulating  what  people  used to  think  were  our
significant  debates.
Tushnet: Although there  are a couple  of things that occur to me.  One is
that if your proposition  about law schools  as  a locus  for moral  formation is
right,  then the  oath  is just a metaphor  for legal  education  as  a whole.
Hauerwas: That's right. That's what I'm  suggesting.  And the preserving
of legal  education  is a way of having integrity,  significance,  and importance.
I  interpret  the  rise  of  legal  positivists,  where  you want  to  separate  the  law
and  the meaning  of the law from any determinative  moral community,  to be
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a  response  to  the  moral  anarchy  of  our  world  and  a  way  to  secure  the
continued  moral  coherence  of the  law.  So  the  law  has  a  kind  of logic  in
itself, that  gives  us  a sense  of  how  to  go  on.  Sandy's  book  tells  a  story of
how these kinds  of arguments  within the law  give us a narrative that  is much
more coherent  than  we  have  as the narrative  of wider society.  You've  got  a
community that you can debate.  That's what  you don't have  if you  step out
into  any  of the  other  academic  disciplines  within the  university  today.  The
law  is surprisingly,  wonderfully  coherent,  and  legal  positivism  saves  it.
Tushnet: I  think you've  said  things  like that before,  and  I  think  maybe
that's the  way  it  looks  from  the  outside,  from  somebody  whose  discipline
used to have that, who is nostalgically  longing for that again, looking  around.
But from  the inside  of the law  school...
Hauerwas: It doesn't  feel  that way.
Tushnet:  . . .it doesn't  feel  like  that.  That's  putting  it  a  little  more
strongly  than  it  should  be  put,  but,  given  my  identification  with  Critical
Legal  Studies,  what  I  can  say  is,  whether  or  not  people  have  bought  the
Critical  Legal  Studies  line  on  this  stuff,  it  has  shaken  a  lot  of  people  up.
The  sense  that  they  have  been  confronted  with  powerful  arguments  from
within, that the coherence  that they thought was there isn't there. That's part
of the  reaction  to  it.  Now  my  view  is  that  it's  just  not  there,  that  these
critical arguments  are  correct.
Levinson: I  think you  are  also right  that  the oath  argument  is  a  proxy
for an argument  about legal  education.  I think  a recurrent  argument  in law
schools  is  education  for  "citizenship,"  to  what  degree  that is  part  of what
law  school  ought  to  be  about.  One  of the  things  we  were  talking  about  at
lunch  was the  fact that  Washington  and  Lee has  just made  a course  in civil
liberties  required.  I  assume  that the  rationale  is  because  you  want  to train
citizens.  I assume that most of your students are relatively unlikely to practice
civil liberties  law.
LaRue: A reasonable  prediction.
Levinson:  It's  not  valuable  skills  training  that  you're  after.  This  is  a
debate at our  law  school  which  I  must say  I've lost.  I  would like to  require
not  only  civil liberties  but  also criminal  procedure,  which  is,  at  our  school,
not a requirement.  You  take  either  criminal  law  or  criminal  procedure,  but
you  don't  have  to take  both.  It seems  to  me  scandalous  that  a lot  of our
students graduate knowing nothing about the actual operations of the criminal
justice  system.  I  don't  think  you  pick  it  up  by  studying  criminal  law.  But
the debate  is very clearly a debate between citizen education and skills training.
The  empirically  correct  argument  directed  against  me  is  that  our  students
aren't  going  to  practice  criminal  law.  Those  who  will  practice  criminal  law
take the criminal justice courses the same way that those who  want to practice
tax  take tax  courses.  It  also  goes  back  to  what  we  were  talking  about  this
morning-the willingness to intervene and impose substantive values on people
who would  choose  otherwise.
LaRue: Did  you  debate  the  issue  of requiring  a  civil  liberties  course  at
any length,  or was  it simply  something  that  the community  spoke  on  with
one voice?  Ann,  weren't you  involved here  at Washington  and Lee?FAITH IN  THE REPUBLIC
Massie: What  did  we  debate?  I  think  it  kind  of started  before  I  even
came.  I  remember  someone  quoted  me  in-a  faculty  meeting  for my  phrase
"legal  literacy."  Because I guess I have  a sense that there is a coherent story,
perhaps-although  you say  you  don't think  so.  I  thought  it was  important
that that be passed on.  There was some  debate,  but I don't  recall very much
of a  position  to  the  notion.  I  think  there  was  a  kind  of  sense  that  it  is
deplorable that the students haven't acted to  acquire this for themselves,  and,
since they haven't,  we  think-
Levinson: We're distinctly  more libertarian  in Texas.
LaRue:  My  memory  is  as  yours,  Ann.  The  historical  detail  is  that  we
had  a constitutional  law course  in the first year that taught structural  parts,
and  then  a  civil-liberties,  upper-class  course  and  it  was  elective.  And  we
changed  the focus  of the  first-year  course  and  we  increased  the number  of
hours in  the second-year  course,  and  made it required,  so  that now  there is
a  package  of  about  seven  hours  of  required  public  law  offerings,  as  the
package is  described.
Levinson: We've  got a package  of six.  And  the first term  is  structure-
commerce  clause and  stuff  like that-and  then  students  get  to  choose  what
their  advanced  constitutional  law course  will  be. I just finished  teaching  one
on equality.  Doug  Laycock  will be offering  one next  semester,  on a  survey
of  civil  liberties.  But  what  this  means,  among  other  things,  is  that  a  very
significant  percentage  of our  students  will  graduate  knowing  nothing  about
either the  race  narrative  or  the  civil-liberties  narrative,  as  conventionally
defined,  because we  don't require  it.
Shaffer: Does it  add  anything to  your  notion,  that that sort  of thing is
education for citizenship,  to  say that this is not just any citizen?  It seems to
me  the notion  of the  "republican"  vision  that's  behind  that is  the  special-
citizen  notion:  The lawyer  takes  on the burdens  of leadership  in the society,
rather  more than other  people.
Levinson: It's not  "republican,"  because  I  don't  applaud  the  fact  that
lawyers  take on  these roles;  but I  think as  an empirical  matter they do.  And
we  ought to  be responsible  for that foreknowledge-that  for better or worse
our graduates  are not a random group,  and they are likely to be in leadership
positions.  The  "republican"  vision  saw  this  as  a terrific  thing,  and  I  don't
want  to  affiliate with that  strand of republicanism.
Hauerwas:  This helps me say why I think that the constitutional  tradition
is  finally  not  coherent.  It's  not  that I  think  it's not  coherent  within  itself,
because  I think there's a lot of coherence within it-in how the law developed,
in terms  of the conversation,  from one set of cases  to another. It  strikes  me
as  extremely  odd to  say the law  school  is  a place where  you  train  people  in
citizenship,  just as it's just  as odd,  but is also  the case,  that divinity schools
have  increasingly  become  places  where  we  train  people  to  be  Christians.
Supposedly  we  train  people  to  be  ministers,  presupposing  the  vitality  and
viability  of  the  church.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact,  since  we  can  no  longer
presuppose  that  vitality,  in  effect  many  of  our  students  come  trying  to
discover  not  whether  they  are  going  to  be  ministers,  but  whether  they  are
going  to  be  Christians.  They  in  the  process  oftentimes  decide  both  to  be
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Christians  and  ministers,  but  these  are  not  necessarily  related.  Sometimes
they decide  not to  be Christians  but to  be ministers  anyway.  Literally,  there
are  four  possibilities.
I'm very serious.  It's a very odd situation, which  connotes that seminary
education  has  become  problematic  exactly  because  we  cannot  any  longer
presuppose  the  kinds  of practices  that  make  it  intelligible  for  people  to  be
called  into  the  ministry  to  begin  with.  After  all,  the  fact  of  a  profession
being  coherent  means  that  it  must  be  how  people  are  called  out  to  be
specialized,  in  a  way  that the  community  understands,  that  these  are  goods
that it's important to have  people specialized  in. Now,  the law,  I take it, has
those  kinds  of goods,  too.  They  depend upon being  able to  depend  upon a
civic  republic  of some  kind or  the other.  That gives  the  law coherence.  It's
just about  as absurd  to say  the law  schools  today are  about  training people
in  citizenship  as  it  is  to  say  that  seminaries  are  training  people  to  be
Christians-or  Jews.  I  would  think  Judaism  is  in  no better  shape  than  we
are  on  some  of  this.  Therefore,  the  incoherence  is  that  the  constitutional
tradition  isn't  any longer  recognized  as  dealing  with matters  that matter for
the general public,  in a way that they see it as really their goods  are involved.
That's the  reason  lawyers  today have  become  esoteric,  just  like theologians
are esoteric,  or physicians  are  esoteric.
Shaffer:  No,  I  would  say  the  opposite.  I  would  say  that  lawyers  have
become  esoteric  because of a failure of  training  in citizenship.  I  don't think
Sandy  can avoid  the republican tradition that  says  that it's training  not just
for citizenship  but for  leadership.  I  just don't  see  how  you can  avoid  that.
What you  can say is that you don't like it. Maybe there  is an analogy  there,
but I don't think you have quite described  it. In the Roman  Catholic tradition
the training  of the clergy involves the notion of formation,  and  I take it that
the notion of formation  was  to  produce  a model believer.
Hauerwas: No,  I  don't  think  that's  right.  It's  a  little  like  saying  to
someone,  "You're  going to  be set aside to do nothing but spend all your  life
being around sick people."  That's a very dangerous thing to do to somebody,
because sick  people are really rather disgusting to be  around all your life.  To
always be about helping  people will  really screw you up.  I mean  the ministry
is  involved  in  this  kind  of thing,  too.  And  so  you  need  to  give  physicians
special  moral  training,  to be  able to stand the demands  of being  so  screwed
up, in  terms  of having  such  a narrow  range  of  things  to  do.  The  same  is
true of a professor.  I'm set  aside,  supposedly,  because  the  community  says
that  we value the fact that  I will  spend  my life studying  and trying to  know
better  what  our  culture  has  thought  about  the  good,  the  true,  and  the
beautiful,  so it wants  me to spend most of my life reading  books.  Well,  that
will  screw  you  up.  You'll  need  special  formation  to  be half-way  decent  at
having that vocation.  I  take it that the  same is true of the law.  Namely,  the
law  sets  aside  people  to  do  very  specific  things  for  a  lifetime.  You  need
special  formation.
Shaffer: In  "constitutional  faith."
Hauerwas: And  in  the  practices  that  are  associated  with  that,  and  the
ministry  is  the  same  way.  The  Catholic  priest  was  the  same  way.  It  wasn'tFAITH IN  THE REPUBLIC
just  the  kind of  formation  that is  true  of every  Christian;  it's  the kind  of
formation  that's true  of those  people you  set  aside  specially  to  do  nothing
but study  scripture,  serve  the  sacraments,  etc,  And the  Catholics were  quite
right to have  done that.  It  is very hard  for us anymore  to  say  anything like
that, since no one believes in the kind  of calling that is associated with  being
so specialized.  The goods  that  the different  professions  are to  serve  are  no
longer agreed upon within the general culture,  and that makes the very notion
of profession  unintelligible.
Richardson: Presumably  the  Christians  who  arrive  at  seminary  should
have learned  their  Christianity in the  church.  What  would be  the equivalent
institution  for teaching  good  citizenship  before  law school?
Massie: The schools.  The schools,  I should think. But I  remember  when
I first went to law school I was continually struck  by the notion that everyone
that got a good and  decent education  ought to learn  these things in order to
be  a  responsible  citizen.  I  really  kept  thinking  that,  and  I  thought  it's  a
tragedy that they  don't, and  I  still  do.
Levinson:  If  I  could  push  that  point  back  to  the  beginning  of  this
particular  conversation:  What  would  you  want  your  kids  to  learn  about
Lincoln,  if anything  at all?
Hauerwas: Lash,  what  would you give as  an answer?  That he reasserted
the  significance  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  as  the  constitutional
interpretation?
LaRue: Well,  that's  in fact what  I've been  teaching,  so  I  have  a vested
interest in it.
Levinson:  Let's  assume  right  now  that  we  are  talking  about  a  ninth
grader  taking a  standard U.S.  history  course.
LaRue:  I  guess  if I  were  doing  it  I  think  I  would  want  them to  read
some  of  the  things  that  you  might  describe  as  "the  collected  works  of
Abraham Lincoln,"  certain of the speeches.  And  the reason  that I  would do
so is  that  I  would  hope that  the student  would  assimilate,  unconsciously  or
consciously,  enough  of that  rhetoric  so  that  it  could  become  formative  of
the way  that  the  person looked  at the  world,  That  is,  it  would  change the
eyeglasses,  to use that metaphor,  about what  you would  see.  It would  alter
the imagination.
Levinson: Would  you want them to read the habeas corpus letter"  where
Lincoln asks  why should  one  law  be obeyed  when all  the others  aren't?
Shaffer: That's  the  problem  with  Lash's  answer.  They  can  handle that
if  they  first  learn  about  Lincoln  as  a  virtuous  person.  In  fact,  what  my
generation  of Americans  heard  about  Lincoln  was that  he walked  ten  miles
to  take the  change  back  when  he  was  given  too  much  money.  Stories  like
that,  which it seems to me every  culture has,  which fit in with Sandy's  saying
Lincoln  is  a  rabbi  in  the  constitutional  tradition,  and  that  the  rabbi  is
respected  because of his  character.  First of all,  I  know,  somehow  or other  I
know,  that Rabbi Joshua  was  a person of virtue,  and  then  I respect  him  as
46.  IV Tim CoumcTED  WoRKS OF AA  n,  LNcoL-  1860-1861  (R. Basler  ed.  1953).
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a  teacher.  My  kid  can  handle  the  habeas corpus cases  if  he  first  knows  of
Lincoln  as a virtuous  person.
Levinson: Including  walking through  the snow.
Shaffer:  All  the  little  stories-I  just  buy  it.  I  go  down  to  the  public
library and  get  the book,  "Lincoln  for Seven-Year-Olds,"  or  whatever.
Levinson: So  the  question  has  to  begin  not  with  what  do  you  do  with
the  ninth grader,  but  what  do  you do  with  the  first  grader  and the  second
grader.  And you tell those stories.  George  Washington chopping  down cherry
trees,  and  all that kind of stuff.
Shaffer: True stories,  though.
Hauerwas: Well,  better  they  be  true.  And  then  by the  ninth  grade  one
would  hope that they  are  ready to  understand  why  that  person  would  take
that view of-
Levinson: Right.  And  why it would be all right for that person  to break
the  law,  though not  for  Colonel  North,  say,  or Jeff  Davis.
Hauerwas: Surely it's break  a law,  not the law.
Levinson: A nice  distinction.
Richardson: Well, what  about  when the  citizenship taught  in the  schools
is bad?
Massie: Bad in  what sense?
Richardson: Like  it  is in  South Africa.  When they  push a set  of values
down  the kids'  throats and  you  know the whole  thing  is  morally rotten.  It's
racist.
Levinson: I think that's what makes most people  fearful about the notion
of citizen  education  and  it's  scarcely  the  case  that  citizenship  education  in
the United States would be without corruption. I think that most of us would
be very fearful.  It's like  sex education  in a  real way.  We  are not likely to  be
in control of the curriculum,  and many of us would  make a pragmatic choice
that it is better  not to teach this at all,  because  there is  a sweetness-and-light
aspect  to  it.  Presumably  the  kind  of  citizenship  education  I  have  in  mind
would in  fact go  at  least  through Martin  Luther  King  and  that would  be  a
very,  very  different  model  of citizenship  from  the  one  most  likely  to  be
accepted.  But  there  I  think,  do  you  get  into  incessant  struggles  on  the
curriculum,  in  which  you  are  constantly  fighting  over  what  is  going  to  be
taught in history  courses,  because you  recognize  this  as  absolutely central  to
the  formation  of the culture  and  to its  perpetuation?  As  Stanley might  say,
and  for all  I  know  might  have  actually  said,  "He  who  controls  the  stories
controls  the  culture."  Or  do  you  try  to  construct  the  notion  of  education
that Mark may be alluding  to,  where the  schools really  don't do very much,
and  it  becomes  a lesser  evil  sort  of thing.  It's just  better  that  they  not  say
anything  at  all  about  citizenship  than  that  we  take  a  risk  of  losing  the
struggle. 47
47.  Hauerwas: Mark,  do you support  public  education?
Tushnet: Yeah.
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LaRue.  I would  say,  to  return to  the Lincoln  question,  I  think the  one
way not to  do that is exactly  that which  has been  proposed,  which  is to tell
the silly little stories  about walking  ten  miles in the snow  and so forth.  That
really  seems  to me  an appalling  way to  educate.  If that's what you  mean  by
character,  and  what  you  think  about  teaching  Lincoln's  character,  then  I
either don't  agree with you  about character, or I don't agree  with you about
teaching.  This seems  to  me  a wrong way to  go.
Levinson:  What  do  you  do  if  a  student  says,  after  you  have  given
whatever  Lincoln materials you have given,  if you don't include  the ten-mile
walk  or something similar  to that,  the student says,  "Gee,  Professor LaRue,
this sounds just like  Oliver North. Now,  I  heard you denounce  Oliver North.
Aren't these  really  the same?"  Can  you really choose  between  them  on any
grounds  other  than  you like  Lincoln's  values  and  you  don't  like  North's?
Would you  even talk about the character of the two  men as relevant  to your
assessment?
LaRue:  I  guess  again  it  goes  to  what  you  mean  by  character.  But  it
seems  to  me that  Lincoln  is  distinguishable  from  North  on  character,  but
he's not distinguishable  from North on character  because he walked ten miles
through the snow to return a dime,  because we  know  that that's  exactly the
sort of act that a North will  do.  You've picked  out the ludicrous  part of the
Lincoln  story  to  say  that  that's  what  you  mean  by character  and  so  you
wind  up with  character  defined  in  a Norman Rockwell  sense,  which  I think
is really corrupting.  Character  is  displayed in these  circumstances  by various
public performances  and the public performances  had to  do  with the humor,
the link between  the humor and the intelligence,  the way those  are displayed
Tushnet: Because  it's the  great melting  pot. All that sort of stuff.
Levinson: That is, the kids sit next to one another.  But how about in terms of the substantive
materials.
Tushnet: Oh,  well,  you know-part  of my  response is-it's like the weather.
Hauerwas:  I  really believe  that we are  coming  to the point that public education  is over  in
America  and  people are going to have  to face  that. How  are you  going  to adjudicate  questions
about public  education in America,  where  some people  are saying  you can't read  "The  Wizard
of Oz"  because it's got good witches in it, and other people are saying you can't read  "Macbeth,"
because  it is an  inherently patriarchal  narrative  that is  destructive  of women?  How  in the world
are  you  going  to  negotiate  that  kind  of issue  for  American  public  education?  As  a  result,
American  public  education  is going to become increasingly  bland and  distorting to any  sense of
classics.  Wouldn't  we be  better off saying,  "Okay,  let's  give  up  on  public education,  and  let's
start  moving  into  different  dissenting  academies,  or  you  won't  even  have  anything  to  dissent
from; they'll just be different,  and  we'll let you  use your  tax  chits to buy the kind of education
you  want your kids  to have"?
Tushnet: I  don't  have  strong  views  on this,  one  way  or the  other.  I  guess  I  do  have  a
historian's  qualms  about  saying  "increasingly  bland,"  and  so  forth.  That is, my hunch  is  that
if you  look at the universe  of nine-year-olds  in  1910,  and the universe of nine-year-olds  in  1987,
you're not  going to  find  a  higher  concentration  of blandness  today than  in the  past.  It's just
that  the  kids  who  were in schools  in  1910  were  a  smaller  proportion  than  the  kids  who  are in
schools  now.  So,  overall,  I'm not  sure there's  been  this sort  of decline  in whatever  it  is that's
happened.
Hauerwas: You may  be right.  It's an empirical  question,  but it does  seem to me it's going
to be  very hard  to maintain  coherent  public  education  in this country.
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in  certain  forms  of  texts,  the  way  they  lead  to  certain  judgments,  and  so
forth. Now it seems to me, if you are talking about a character worth teaching
and  worth  emulating,  one  of the  things  you  can  say  is  look,  Ollie  North
never  wrote anything that looks like the Springfield  speech, or the Gettysburg
Address,  or the Second  Inaugural.  And  why not?  The reason  is that mind  is
not separate  from character,  and it is not separate  from emotion.  You  don't
want  to,  I  think,  start  a  ground  of  educational  pedagogy  that  sees  those
things  as separate.  And  I don't think that the reason that Lincoln's  argument
about  suspending habeas  corpus,  or those  kinds of things-whatever  he  had
to  do-is  because  there  is  something  separate  that  we  call  character,  and
we're  happy  about  that,  so  therefore  we  trust  this  other  act.  I  know  my
judgment  of  Lincoln  is  not  based  on  that  kind  of  dichotomizing.  And  I
certainly don't  want to teach  it that way,  I  don't want  to  create  a  Norman
Rockwell  Lincoln  that  we  then  suddenly  spring  the  Second  Inaugural  on.
That  seems  to  me an implausible  notion.
Shaffer: Right.  But the way  you  know  character  is  in small  things.  The
fact  that  you  can't  distinguish  North  and  Lincoln  because  of  small  acts  of
honesty that would be told about them doesn't mean they are not distinguish-
able.  It just means you've got to distinguish  them some other way.  Think  of
the  ordinary  stories.  How  do you know  people  in the story  are  admirable?
It's because  the writer  shows you  those  people doing small  things  well,
LaRue:  No,  I  think  in  Lincoln's  case  you'd  see  him  doing  big  things
well.
Levinson: You'd look at humor, and virtually none of the humor involves
anything great.  It's in pulling the leg of someone at the cabinet meeting.  The
cabinet  meeting  may  be great;  the joke  was  probably  small  and  sort of off-
color.  And  I  agree  with  you  on  the influence  of the  humor  as  one side  of
the complexity of the man; it's very important,  but you are going to illustrate
it by  small  stories.
LaRue: It  gets  very  sentimental  at that point  and, therefore,  false.
Hauervas: I  think  character  education  is  done  primarily through  exam-
ples,  and  of  course  the  examples  depend  a lot  on the  teacher  who's  doing
the examples,  I think-in terms of character education, rather than just about
Lincoln.
I  want to ask Mark a question,  as someone who  has been identified with
the Crits.  Take the analysis of the problem  of education and  citizenship  that
we confront  today,  and  its possible  implications  for the ability to sustain the
law  as an enterprise that can really help us as a people.  As  Sandy says,  "The
model  of  Protestant  interpretation  that  I  have  in  mind  is  not  to  isolate
individuals  joined  in anguished  communication  with their  personal  God  but
rather the  community joined  together,  basically  in  egalitarian  discussion  of
the meaning  of man's relevant  material."  If you  want to make that  sense  of
the law normative,  as something very important for us to do,  and increasingly
hard to  do,  given  our  very  difficult  problems  sustaining  civic education  and
civic  virtue-as a  Crit, how  do  you feel  about that?  Is that good or  bad?FAITH IN  THE REPUBLIC
Tushnet: At least the  first cut at it is  that it's not bad to show  that the
resources of the legal conversation can't sustain that kind of dialogue  at that
point. For me the  reason is  that that way of talking about  law glosses  over
the lies,  obscures  from view its association  with  coercion,  and  its core form.
We talked  earlier about metaphoric  extensions.  Metaphoric  extensions  of the
idea of coercion  indicate  that things  outside  the  core  are  also  problematic.
But you  don't  have  to  do  any of the  extensions  to take  as  the  model  of a
conversation  about  law  a  Supreme  Court  decision that  ends  up saying  it's
okay  to  kill you.  Now,  I have some  ambivalence  about  the  death  penalty.
But  it's real  hard  to  keep  up  the image  of law  as  a conversation  when  it
ends with  somebody being  killed  as a result. And  I just can't get away  from
that.  So  that  showing  that  the  conversatioii  within  law  can't  be  sustained
seems  to me a good thing to do.
Shaffer:  You make  it  sound  like  a  theological  debate  in  The Name of
the Rose. If you  lose the  argument,  you lose your head.
Tushnet: Well, somebody does. For me, that has to be the core of talking
about  law,  that  when  the  conversation  ends,  somebody  walks  away  and
somebody is  left on the ground.
Hauerwas: Do  you  then  have  a  stake  in  maintaining  something  called
the legal  enterprise?
Tushnet: I don't think I  have a normative  stake in maintaining  the legal
enterprise.  Now  of course  there  is  all of this  stuff about  how I have  these
specialized  skills that would be very difficult to redeploy in  some other field,
and  in that sense  I have  a  stake,  which  I  alluded  to  earlier  when  I talked
about  moving to England.  To  that extent,  yes,  I  have a  stake,  but  I don't
think it is a normative  stake.  At least I don't feel it. I don't think  I  feel it.
That gets  back to my concern  about the oath.
Let  me  repeat  this  so  that  there'll  be  some  publication  in  which  this
occurs  because  I liked  it and it  never  did  appear.  In  Sandy's  work  he has
this  "do  you  sign  the  Constitution?"  article  which  he  did  last  year.4m  He
asked  me  how  I  would  respond  to  the  question,  "Would  you  sign  the
Constitution?"  when it was  presented  as the  scroll that they were  displaying
in Philadelphia,  that people were asked to sign. My first reaction was,  "Well,
I  don't know.  Probably not."  But then I  thought  about it  and  it  occurred
to  me that  I  could,  because  the  Constitution  doesn't  really  mean  anything,
or  it  means  whatever  I  want  it to mean.  It  occurred  to  me  that that  was
even  more  dramatically  driven  home  by the fact that  I was  being  asked to
sign a blank piece of paper.  The thing  that was  going to be put in front  of
me  was  a  blank  piece  of paper:  So,  sure,  I'll  sign  that.  Now,  it's  in that
sense  that  I'd say  I  don't  have that  kind  of  stake  in  the  enterprise.  It  is
partly because  I don't think there is  an enterprise.  This  is  the second  of my
alternatives:  There  is no coherent,  viable tradition that is  sufficient to sustain
the conversation  across  generations.
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Hauerwas: How  do you  respond  to that, Sandy?
Levinson:  I  certainly  think  that  might  be  the  case.  And  I  certainly
disbelieve  in  what  appear  to  be  the  standard  ways  of  talking  about  a
constitutional tradition-that  is,  Supreme Court cases as the sacred repository.
I  think  the  central  difference  between  Mark  and  me  may  be  more  simply
personal:  I feel  myself caught up in this question in a way that I don't think
Mark  is.  I'm not being critical.  I think it's a statement simply of the different
biographies  of  the two  of us.  I  am  driven  by  certain  questions  and  one  of
them is how  I stand in relation to this stuff and what the consequences  would
be of really and truly coming to agree  with Mark that there is no there there.
I  certainly teach that as  a very strong possibility, and I  am certainly  skeptical
of the  various  moves  offered  by the  people  who  are confident  that there  is
a  there there.  That  is,  they  say,  "Just  read  it,  or  find  out  what  James
Madison  said,"  or  use  the  variety  of  standard  approaches  that  I  know  I
don't  believe  in.  Then  the  question  is  how  do  you  construct  something  out
of everything  else,  including  what's written  down,  and  what  James  Madison
said,  and lots of other stuff besides.  Does that end up as anything more than
highly partial,  highly idiosyncratic?  If it's  not  a  completely  individual  read-
ing-I  don't believe  in  individual  readings-is  it a  reading  confined  to  my
little subcommunity  but in  no  plausible  way a narrative that would  speak  to
anybody outside  of that  tiny  subcommunity?
I  got  originally  interested  in  all  of this  at the  time  of Watergate,  quite
specifically  as  a result  of Barbara Jordan's comment,  and not knowing  what
to  do  with  it,  not knowing  what  to  do  with  all  the  articles  written  by  very
eminent  liberals  on  the  rule  of law,  knowing  that  there  was  a discontinuity
between the kind of legal realism that I was educated in as a graduate student.
Not in law school,  but at Harvard  as a graduate  student-not taking the rule
of law  very seriously  as  an operational  ideal,  being much  too sophisticated  a
political scientist to believe in it-and then suddenly there was this outpouring
of articles.  I have  always  remembered  one,  Arthur  Schlesinger writing  some-
where-The  New  York  Times,  The  Wall Street Journal, it  doesn't  matter;
Sam  Ervin emerging  as  a constitutional  hero;  and then  Barbara Jordan  with
her  faith  in the  Constitution,  and  I trying  to  figure out  for myself  what  to
do  with  this  stuff.  I  certainly  approved  of bashing  Richard  Nixon,  but  I
wasn't  sure  I  approved  the  argument  by  which  he  was  bashed,  because  he
or  James  St.  Clair  was  smart  enough  to  evoke  the  Lincoln  analogy.  And
nobody took it seriously.  Rightly  or wrongly,  nobody  took  it seriously.
LaRue: There's  a chapter  in  my forthcoming  book49 about  not taking  it
seriously.
Levinson: It's not  that  nobody took  it  seriously,  in  the  sense  that they
said,  "Yes,  Nixon,  you're right,"  but I  didn't even  see any discussion  about
it,  and  that was  really the  beginning  of  this  whole  enterprise.  One  question
I  continue  to  have is  how  idiosyncratic  this  feeling is,  of being  caught  up  in
this problem.  I'm sure I'm not unique,  because I don't believe  in uniqueness,
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but is this  really a very  small  subgroup,  or will this in  fact speak  to  a wider
audience  who  will say,  "Yeah,  you  know I find myself thinking about  these
things too;  you  have made  certain  inchoate  thoughts  choate"?  Or  will they
say,  "Why  are  you  interested  in this?  Grow up"?
Tushnet: In your  enumeration  of  ways  out  of the problem,  I think  it's
important to include the sort of aspirational  constitution which Barber alludes
to50 and why that's not a solution to these difficulties.  What is your response
to  someone  who  says,  "Wait  a  minute.  Of  course  you  could  have  an
unambiguous  commitment  to  the  aspirational  constitution.  There's  nothing
to  be  ambiguous  about there"?  What  do you say?
Levinson: Well,  I'd say  two things,  one  of which  is  shockingly  textual,
and  that's  simply  that  the  aspirational  constitution  has  problems  with  the
1808  clause,  and  whether  a conscientious  lawyer  could believe  that Congress
could  stop  the international  slave  trade prior  to  1808.  It seems  to  me  that,
in terms  of any sort of orthodox  legal  analysis,  we can  make  certain  moves
that would  present  an  argument.  But  I  think  orthodox  legal  analysis  would
say  that  it  would  be  unconstitutional  to  do  so.  So  that  aspiration  has  its
limits  at that point. That's  where  tragedy  would enter.
Tushnet: Wait a minute.  I  think the response  to that is the  aspirational
constitution means the best that can be done at any particular time,  so that-
Levinson: The view I'm trying to present  is the most respect-worthy view
of the  Constitution  you  can  come  up  with,  recognizing  there's  always  the
possibility  that  even the  best  you  can  do  is  going to  leave  you  gasping for
breath  and  wanting  to  move  to  something  else.  That  is the  view  that  I've
ended  up taking.  If I am  asked how do  I view  the  constitutional  enterprise,
that is  the way  I  view  it.  Now  the obvious  problem  with  that second  point
is  the  pluralism  of values.  My  aspirational  constitution  would  so  clearly  be
different  from  other people's  aspirational  constitutions.  This  simply  gets  us
back to old debates that we all participated  in, and many of us may be bored
with by now,  which is, who gets to win when there are competing aspirational
visions?  What's  the  basis  of the  aspiration?  What  do  you  do if  somebody
says,  "Well,  I look to the Declaration,"  or,  "I  look to the I  Have a Dream
speech,"  or  whatever,  as a more authentic  source of constitutional  law?  We
all know those debates.  So the aspirational constitution can serve  as a method
of sorts,  for a given  interpreter,  but it  seems  to  me  wildly  unlikely to  serve
as  the  source  of  social  cohesion  that  some  people  are  looking  for  out  of
constitutional  theory.
Tushnet: For individuals,  the aspirational  orientation  can be achieved  by
a whole slew of things other than calling it an aspirational constitution.  Walt
Whitman  and  I  don't  know  who-Jane  Austen-other  people-would  be
sources  of those  kinds of aspirations.
LaRue: Walt Whitman  wrote,  by the  way,  that the Declaration  was  the
Constitution.
50.  S. BARBER,  supra note 45.
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Hauerwas:  Let  me put  a problem  to you  both in  terms  of my  situation
today and  how it relates to  your context.  I think it's  different from  both of
you.  I  teach  in  a  divinity  school  that  is  training  people  for the  Methodist
ministry,  to  serve  a  church  that  I  think  basically  is  dead,  or  will  soon  be
dead,  and  probably  should  be  dead.  The  Methodist  bishops,  for  example,
recently  drafted  a pastoral  on nuclear  war in  defense  of creation,  and  said
the  reason  why  we  have  to  do  away  with  nuclear  weapons  is  because  they
threaten  to destroy God's  creation.  Paul  Ramsey and  I  pointed  out to them
that this was  not theologically  a possibility,  that you might  destroy the world
but  you  could  not  destroy  God's  creation  because  then  you  would  destroy
God.
5'  But our  bishops,  not  being  subtle,  did  not get  the point.
One can  have a lot of despair about that, but I  am sustained by the  fact
that  I  can  hope that  God  is  going  to  do  something  with  that  church,  and
God  knows  I  continue  to  teach  and train  people  for the  Methodist  ministry
even  though  I  have a lot of empirical  evidence  that  it won't  mean  much.  I
mean  that,  after  twenty  years  at  Duke,  if  I  have  half  of  the  Methodist
ministers  in North  Carolina  feeling  guilty for not serving  the  eucharist  every
Sunday-I  know they won't be doing it, but I want them to  feel guilty about
it-well, that's the height of my ambition.  This is what  I want to have  done.
That's what I'm about. At least I have  a basis  for hope in that.  What keeps
you  going,  training  people  in the law school?
Shaffer: Could  I  ask you  a question  about  yours,  before  you switch  us
to  ours?  How  can  you think of that in institutional  terms?
Hauerwas: Like  what?
Shaffer: My answer about lawyers is I don't train people to keep America
going.  I  train people to  help  people.
Hauerwas: Because the ministry isn't about helping  people.  The ministry
primarily  helps  people  through  preaching  the  word,  serving  the sacraments,
building  up  the  Christian  community  for  moral  good  and  sanctification.
That's  the  reason  why  you  can  still  be  shy  and  be  in  the  ministry.  This  is
good.  It refers  to a task that you've been  given to a specifiable  institution.
Shaffer: That seems  to me  a betrayal  of the  New Testament.
Hauerwas: I  appreciate  that.  I  think  there's  something  to  that.  If the
church  doesn't  have  empirical  form  it  ain't  nothing,  though,  Tom.  Your
answer  is,  "Well,  real people  helping  real people  is the empirical  form,"  but
nonetheless  the ministry isn't a general  helping  profession. Neither  is the law.
You are going to help  people  in very specifiable  ways.  The ministry is meant
to  do  that.  The  institution  that  gives  structure  to  how  you  help  people  in
various specifiable  ways isn't a very viable institution.  I just wonder how you
sustain the activity  of training people in the law.  What keeps  you going doing
that?
Tushnet: Let me answer that with a series of observations in a descending.
order  of  importance  to  me  personally.  I  say  that  because  I  want  to  stress
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that  it may  not  sound  serious  when  I begin,  but  it really  is  serious  at  the
beginning  point.  The  first  three  things  go  together,  which  are  that  I've
invested  a lot in gaining  a certain kind of skill,  and I'm very good at it,  and
it's fun.  I  like doing  this stuff.
Massie: Why did you make the investment?
Tushnet: Well,  it  could  have  been  a  mistake.  I'm  willing  to  say that
twenty  years  ago I  made a mistake,  but this is where  I am now.
Massie: Why did you make the investment  when you  made it?
Tushnet: Because  I  didn't  understand  that  there  was  no  there there.  I
thought there was a there there. I found out, over the course of twenty years'
thinking  about  it, that  there  isn't.  That's  an  overly  strong characterization,
both  of my  present  position,  and  of why  I got  into  it;  but  I'm  willing  to
accept the  proposition that it  was  a mistake  at the outset.  But  it's built up,
and  it's fun.  I  think  less  important  is  Tom's  proposition  that  some  of the
people, a very small portion of the people who I teach, will help other people
in a better kind of way  for my teaching them than for somebody else teaching
them,  But the reasons  I start with  are it's  fun, and  I've got this  investment
in it.  I  don't think  that if I took  the marginal  influence that  I have  on this
very small margin of students-I think of it as two or three students  a year-
I  would  find  it difficult  to  make that  the  basis  for what  I was  doing.  You
were  shaking your  head.  I don't know whether that's skepticism  or what.
Hauerwas: Well,  I think fun is  a lot. I particularly like my own work.  I
tell graduate  students any  time  what  you're  doing  ceases  being fun-quit.  I
love  my  work  and  what  I  do  because  I  think  ultimately  it's  part  of  the
conversation  that's necessary  for Christian people  to  know how to live more
faithfully.  It's very important for me to feel  like that's part  of my vocation
and  that I  have real people who say this helps.  It's very important that Tom
Shaffer thinks,  every  once in  a while,  that something  that I  do  helps him  in
that regard,  I couldn't  go on, I don't think, if it were just fun. So the reason
I  was  shaking  my head  is that I  was marveling  at your ability to do it.
Tushnet: The second  part of the last part now doesn't  sound that much
different to me from your presentation, because teaching some people so that
they  will be better at  helping other people  in sustaining  a morally  attractive
form  of  life,  not  connected  to  the  Christian  tradition,  or  to  the  Jewish
tradition,  but morally-
Hauerwas: I  suspect  it's  attracted  to  the  Jewish  tradition  in  the  sense
that it's wonderful to  knock the big guys  down some.
Tushnet: Okay.  I'll accept that. That's fair, and I think that's right. That
is,  the way I  formulate it is that I'm  only interested in  providing  a resource
to  resist the drift to the right in law schools,  on behalf of a few students on
the margin  who my presence  will help resist  the drift.
Powell: Mark,  where  does your scholarship fit in?  Is it solely under  "it's
fun"  or does  it come under the  second  alternative?
Tushnet: Oh, I  don't know.  I guess  there's something that I  didn't  say
in the other things  because when  I think about  teaching,  I'm not  sure  that
it's motivating.  The scholarship  is  saying true things and that seems  to me a
worthy  thing to do.
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Shaffer: With  considerable  influence  on people who  read  it.
Tushnet: I  could psychologize  about myself,  and when  I  do that I  don't
think  the influence  is  important  because,  when  I  do  the  psychologizing  on
myself,  I  don't  think  that  I'm  influential.  Deep  down,  I  don't think  that.
Superficially,  I think  it, but deep  down  I  don't.
Hauerwas: People  call  me  one of the more influential  Christian  ethicists
in America and  I say that that's a little bit like  being the  best two-bit whore
in  a Saturday  niiht  whorehouse.  It  doesn't  amount to  much.
Tushnet: My  position  is  that  any  sense  I  have  of being  influential-I
mean,  your  characterization  is,  "Yeah,  in  an  unattractive  setting  it's  influ-
ential,"  but  my characterization  is  that it is  an illusion that I'm influential.
Powell: But  even  if  you  decided  that you  weren't,  the  fact  that  you're
saying  truth is  itself-
Tushnet: Yes,  that's  right.
Hauerwas: Is  that  an aesthetic  category,  "saying  truth"?
Tushnet: Oh,  God,  I  don't  know. It's the kind of thing you just like to
look  at,  because  it's beautiful  and  it's  self-satisfying.  I don't  know.  I  don't
know.  I think  it's more than that. I  think there's  something  true about truth,
rather  than,  in  addition  to,  the merely attractive.
Levinson: You're  a closet  realist,  capital  R.
Tushnet: Yeah,  well,  there  is  that.
Hauerwas: How  about you,  Sandy?
Levinson: I  tried to cover  my own  approach  to teaching  in Chapter  Five
of  Constitutional  Faith. I  think  that Mark  and  I  have  fairly  similar  stories
to tell,  though mine is complicated  by the fact that  I went to graduate school
first  and  took  a  Ph.D.  in  political  science  at  Harvard.  (My  dissertation,
though,  was  on Holmes  and  Frankfurter.)  I  began  teaching  political  science
at  Ohio State in  1968  and  quickly realized  that  I had no  desire  (and perhaps
no  ability)  to  be  a  mainstream  political  scientist.  Like  many  people  at that
time,  I  was  also greatly  upset by what  I  saw in the university  in general  and
seriously  doubted  that  I wanted  to  be  an academic.  Thus  I  decided to  go to
the Stanford  Law School,  helped along  by a fellowship from the Russell  Sage
Foundation.  I should admit,  though, that I probably assumed that law school
would  be  an  exit from  political  science  and  maybe  even  from  the  academy
as  well.  (Had that in  fact happened,  I  hope that  I  would  have  felt  under  an
ethical  obligation to return to  the  Foundation the money  they gave  me to  go
to  law  school.)
After  graduating  from  Stanford,  I  clerked  for  a  federal  district  judge
and,  unlike  Mark  I  believe,  ventured  into  legal  practice,  working  for  the
Children's  Defense Fund. Whatever  my initial intentions, though, that practice
lasted  less  than  a  year,  and  I  went  to  Princeton  to  teach  in  the  Politics
department  there  for  four  years  before  moving  to  the  University  of  Texas
Law  School in  1980.  I  have,  in  fact,  thought  a  lot  about why  I teach  in  a
law  school  instead of in  a politics  department,  because  there  are  aspects  of
educating  students  to  be professional  lawyers  that I  find  disturbing.  I  don't
know  that  I  have  any very  good  answers  as  to  why  I  teach  law  instead  of
politics.  (Some would say that I do not in fact teach "law  instead of politics,"FAITH IN  THE REPUBLIC
but instead teach  politics  at a law school,  but that is  another matter.) Before
going  on to  those  answers,  I  do  want  to  mention  one  point simply  because
it would  be gross bad faith  to  ignore it,  and  that's the  fact that law  schools
pay much more than do departments  of political  science.  In addition,  no  one
who  has  taught  in  the  regular  university  can  ever  fail  to  be  less  than
overwhelmed by the sheer level of assistance available  at a law school,  ranging
from  computer  facilities to travel  budgets.
I  would  like to  think  that more  than income maximization  explains  my
remaining at law school,  though. What I focus on to justify my teaching law
students rather than graduate students is my ability to participate in a complex
process  of  citizenship  formation  being  undergone  by  law  students,  who  I
assume  will  be playing  a variety  of  leadership roles  in their  post-law  school
lives.  I want  them  to think about  certain things  that I  am  firmly  convinced
they would not be called  upon to think about if they were  taught by  some-
not necessarily  all, but at least some-of my colleagues.  I think it's politically
important,  so  I  view  the  teaching  as  a  form  of  political  activity.  More  so
than teaching  undergraduates,  even though many of them would be going on
to  become  lawyers.  Certainly  teaching  graduate  students  would  take  a very
different  form,  because  their interests  are presumably a much more  abstract,
"disinterested"  approach to  the material,  and undergraduates  are somewhere
in between.  But that is the way,  by and large,  I  try to justify staying  within
a law  school  context.
But  I  think that it  is very problematic  to train lawyers.  There's  a great
deal of tension in that course,  invariably,  because  this brings us also  back to
Paul  Carrington. 5 2  I  cannot  come  in and  make  a very  wholehearted  presen-
tation on behalf of the legal  profession.  It's morally  perilous.  I  spend a lot
of time looking at perils. Now I don't think that it must be morally corrupting.
I think if one did have that view of lawyering then there would be no defense
for staying  with  the  enterprise.  You  ought  to blow  it up.  So,  for  whatever
reason,  including  simply  serving  to  justify  my  staying  around  and  enjoying
the  salary,  I  think  that  it  is  possible,  though  not  inevitable,  that  a  good
person  can be a good lawyer  and vice  versa.
Hauerwas: How  do  you  feel-how  does  Tom,  for  example-when  the
law,  as  Jeff  was  reminding  us  earlier,  is  inherently  coercive  and  deals  with
really  putting  people  under  very  extreme  violence  for  political  and  legal
purpose?  I mean,  isn't your view that you are training  people to  help people
through that law,  through that mechanism,  too simple?
Shaffer:  It  seems  to  me  most  of  what  lawyers  do  every  day  doesn't
involve coercion that clearly.  Most of what  lawyers do every day  is  fix things
for people,  with a  certain  craftsmanship.  One of the things that none of us
said  anything  about-there  are  some  other  law  teachers  here,  maybe  one  of
them  would  have-is  that craftsmanship,  that whole  idea  of craftsmanship,
might itself be,  as MacIntyre  said,  a source of internal  good. A 16t of it has
to do  with that and that probably  covers  most of what's done in law classes,
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and  it  probably  is  one  of the  things  that  keeps  our  gaze  averted  from  the
violence.  I  find the violence  quite disturbing,  as  a matter  of fact.  Even most
of litigation  is  simply getting  something  settled  so  people  can  quit  fighting
about it;  most of what litigation  does is  not litigation.  All  kinds of lawsuits
covering the whole spectrum-ninety-five  per cent of them-are settled. That's
what  litigators  do  most of the time...
LaRue: They  make deals.
Shaffer:  ..  .they make  deals,  and  there  are  some  good  deals  and  some
bad  deals,  and there  are  some  deals where  the balance of power  is very one-
sided,  and  so the  coercion  and  violence  is  there,  but,  by  and large,  I  think
it probably  is  a good thing  to make  deals  for people.
Levinson: I  think it does  matter  what  one teaches.  The  substantive  area
of constitutional  law  is  a  curious  part  of the curriculum,  for a  number  of
the reasons  we've talked about. Most of our students  aren't  going to  practice
it.  I'd be  curious-I don't think  anybody's  done  any  empirical  study  to  see
if constitutional  law  cases  are  settled at the same  rate as  contracts  cases.  My
hunch is no,  but I don't know what the data would show. This also dovetails
with  the  required-course  question.  It  is  hard  to  know  what  to  do  with
constitutional  law  in the curriculum.  It  doesn't  fit very  well  in  the function
of law school,  of lawyering  as you're  describing it.  I  know that Langdell,  in
the  1870 curriculum,  didn't include constitutional  law.  I think you could take
constitutional  law in your  second or third year,  but it wasn't one  of the great
subjects  that you needed to learn the  first year.  I  would  feel  quite  scared,  I
think,  if I  thought  that my  students  might  actually  go out  and  practice  this
discrete body  of law  with a living  human being  instead  of a class  action.
Hauerwas: So you've  remained  an academic.
Levinson: Oh,  in that sense,  sure.
Hauerwas: You  really  don't want  to change  your  students'  lives?
Levinson: In what  sense?
Hauerwas: Oh,  I mean  when  I teach  students  I don't want them to  ever
be  the  same  again.  I  want  them  to  be  thoroughly  messed  up  from  one  of
my courses,  in a way that I've changed  their  questions,  how they think about
Christianity,  what  their ministry's going  to be  about.  I  want to change  them.
I  want to  decisively  change  them.
White: It sounds to me-as if Sandy's marginalities  still give  him a certain
sense  of  calling  that  has  that  emphasis  on  change,  unless  I'm  not  reading
him correctly.  Do you  feel  a sense  of mission?
Levinson: "Mission"  is  a bit too grandiose.  I  would like to  believe  that
this  is the way  I remain  faithful to  certain visions of the  1960s,  so that I am
not  merely  an  academic  in  the  pejorative  sense  that  led  me  to  go  to  law
school  in  1969,  thinking that  I was  leaving  the academy.  But  "mission"?  I
would  feel  queasy using  that word.
White: Prophet?
Levinson: No.
White: But  you're  a  critic?
Levinson: Oh,  yeah.  And  I  certainly want  students  to think  about things
in a way  that I suspect  they haven't thought before. The  difficulty  is I  reallyFAITH IN  THE REPUBLIC
don't know  what  I want  to happen  as  a result  of this.  The  problem is that
I don't  have a program to sell them.
Tushnet: But Stanley's  said this several  times  now.  He  starts and  maybe
he ends  with  saying  he  wants  to  leave  them  messed  up.  That  is,  he's  not
troubled  by not having a program.  He just wants  them  messed  up.
Hauerwas: I  want them  to be like me.
Levinson: The  image that often comes  to mind  is this:  Would  I  like my
students to  end up  like me,  or to have a Woody Allen  notion,  to end up  as
neurotic  Jewish  intellectuals,  but not looking  for anything  at all?
Hauerwas: It's too liberal.  I don't  like that.
Levinson: Well,  that  is right.  My liberalism  would  show itself.  I  can lay
out  a  variety  of  problems,  and  I  might  suggest  at  times  certain  paths  we
shouldn't go,  but I'm not very confident in the path they should go.  In part
because  I think  there  is  an  ethical  question.  If  I  advise  them  to go  certain
paths  that I  haven't gone-I  mean,  if I think  practicing  legal  aid  law  is  so
terrific,  why  am  I not  doing  it?  This  is  the  objection  I  have  when  Duncan
Kennedy53 promotes the notion that practicing law can be fun. Now,  Duncan
simply doesn't practice  law  and-
Shaffer: Never  has?
LaRue: He  actually  has.
Tushnet: Well,  sort of-
Levinson: With  an asterisk.
Powell: But in  fact he  didn't.
Hauerwas: I  don't want  him as  my lawyer.
Levinson: That  is  not  to defeat  my  objection.  The  fact  is  I  am  a very
well  paid,  very  secure  legal  academic,  and  so  this  is  where  I feel  very,  very
queasy  telling  people  how  they  should  lead  their  lives,  because  I  also  am
certainly  liberal  enough to  believe that  I  have a variety of ways that I  could
lead my life,  if I  wanted to.  I  suspect I could be  hired by a number  of legal
aid  clinics  tomorrow.  That's why I feel these tensions.  It's a combination  of
a lack of a systematic program and  simply knowing  the way I'm leading my
life.
Hauerwas: Right. I'm  a Christian,  and  I get  paid pretty  well,  too,  even
in  seminary.  Let me  ask you another  question.  It's interesting  that we're  all
about the  same  age,  all  came  out  of the  1960s,  all  came  through  some  of
the  same  philosophical  developments.  We  may  all  have  been  influenced  by
antifoundationist  arguments,  may all  be different,  qualified  forms of realists.
All of us have  been influenced  by a lot of the same  kind of political  theory,
I think.  And  we  all,  on  the  whole,  don't have  a lot that's  constructive  to
say to anyone,  It's mainly a critique.  Is there  something we're  missing about
what has made us this way?  Are there arguments that we should be attending
to  more  closely,  that  might provide  an  important  critique  of us,  that would
provide  a  more  positive  stance?  I  think  it's  not  unimportant  that  you  are
both  Jews,  and  that somehow  I found  my way into  a rather different  form
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of  Christianity  than  what  I  came  out  of  educationally.  I'm  part  of  the
Protestant  mainstream.  I've  found myself  associated  with  much more  deter-
minative  communitarian  forms of Christianity  than  I came  from,  and  I  just
wonder:  How  do you  account  for these  kinds of developments that  are going
on?  We  may just be  a blip on the screen.
Beckley:  I want  to ask  you  something about  your own  self-assessment.  I
thought you said  you didn't have  a positive constructive  position.
Hauerwas: Well,  I  do.  I  do, very  strongly,  theologically.
Beckley:  I  think  I  can  tell you  what  it is.
Hauerwas: The  reason  why  you  and  Gustafson 4  keep  calling  me  a
sectarian  is  I  don't have  a  very strong  positive  account  of what  I  want  the
church to  do  in the world.
Beckley:  No,  but  you  have  a  positive  account  of  what  you  want  the
church to  do.
Hauerwas: That's right,  that's  right.
Beckley:  You  want  it  to  form  character,  so  that  we  will  be  disciples  of
Jesus  Christ.
Hauerwas: And  I  even  think  that would  be  important  politically,  if we
could  get  it going.  I  think  all that's  true.  But nonetheless  that's  still  pretty
general.  I  think  I  can  say  more  to  that community  than  I  think  Mark  in
particular  can  say.  And  Sandy says  a little more.  Right.  I think that's true,
and  I  think  I'm saying  more  than  they can  say  on that,  and  that's  because
I've got  a community  I think  I  can  address.  But  nonetheless  I just  wonder:
How do you account for this, this kind of development?  How do you account
for the Crits,  the kinds of developments  in philosophy  represented by Rorty?
MacIntyre  is certainly  counter-cultural  to the mainstream,  though he  is  quite
different than Rorty. In some ways he's  much more conservative than Rorty,
socially and  politically.  I just  wonder:  Do you  have  any hunches  about  how
to  account  for it.  Is it the  1960s?
Tushnet:  Well,  I  think  that  is  part  of  it.  There  was  a  moment  of
communitarian  vision  that opened  up,  which  we  all sort of recollect  in some
curious  kind  of way,  and,  yeah,  we  can  put all  sorts  of qualifications  on  it
and  so on, but  it's part  of our common  experience.
Hauerwas: I  have  a  thesis  about  the  Vietnamese  War.  If  it  hadn't
happened  we  would  have  had  to  invent it,  because  the sense  of  community
that many  people had  discovered,  which they had  never  had before,  through
the civil  rights  campaign-  Once you had  almost  achieved  what you  wanted
to,  you  could  no  longer  sustain  a sense  of  community,  because  you'd  won,
and  you  were  to  disperse,  and  instead  what  you  discovered  was  that  you
could  fight the  war.  You  could  keep that  sense  of community  going  in that
way.
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It's  very  interesting to  watch  Hayden and  Davis.  They  shifted from  civil
rights  into the antiwar movement.  I'm not in any way denying that they were
equally  committed  and serious  about each,  but what was  important  was  that
this  allowed  them to  maintain that sense of community that they discovered
through the  civil rights campaign.
Tushnet: I think that's right.  Although  there's a curious  problem of the
relation of whites  to the  civil  rights movement...
Hauerwas: Yes.  Oh,  no  question.
Tushnet:.  . .which Freedom Summer 5 sort of nurtured.  But I also think,
apart  from the  location  in the history  of politics,  there  is  also  a location  in
the  history  of  thought.  These  kinds  of  statements  always  make  me  very
uncomfortable  because I'm certainly not qualified  to defend them;  but it sure
looks to me as if, in all sorts of areas, the Enlightenment project of rationality
played itself out.  It doesn't work  on its  own  terms. It's been  pursued on its
own terms  and  found inadequate.  And  that's on an intellectual  level,  on this
account,  why all this  stuff is bubbling  up in  all  these  other areas.  And  why
in  some  ways  there  can't  be  anything  we're  overlooking.  What  we'd  be
overlooking  would  be  some  account  of  rationality  on  which  the  inductive
evidence isn't available.  But, that's a real  global claim,  about different areas.
You  say MacIntyre  says  Judaism is a coherent project. What was  the second
project?
Powell: Science.
Hauerwas: Yeah.  Judaism,  Christian  theology,  and  science.
Tushnet:  Judaism,  Christian  theology,  and  science.  My  own  hunch  is
that science  is  out,  too.
Hauerwas: It  certainly  has  maintained  itself in a more  morally  coherent
fashion  in  the  contemporary  university  than the  humanities  have.  They .still
know how to  initiate students within a tradition  in a way that those of us  in
the humanities  do  not.
Tushnet: Only because they haven't appreciated  what the philosophers  of
science  have said  about their  enterprise.
Hauerwas: Well,  they don't  need  to,  because  they exemplify  in  practice
what  the philosophers  of science  say  you  ought  to  be  doing.  Scientists  are
notoriously  bad  at  describing  what  it  is  they  do,  and  so  in  effect  they  in
many  ways  display  tradition-bound  forms  of  a  rational  mode  that  they
articulate through  foundationalist  epistemological  schemes.
Tushnet: Okay.  I think that's  right.
Hauerwas: You got  any hunches,  Sandy?
Levinson: I  think that  we would be the worst people in the world to ask
what  we ought to  be listening to,  because if we  knew we'd be listening to it.
One of the other  ways  in which I betray my liberalism,  or pluralism,  is that
I  think  it  is  important  to  have  multiple  voices  to  push  people  to  listen  to
things  they'd  just  as  soon  not  be  aware  of.  I  think  people  listen  to those
voices they think at any given time are worth listening  to,  and we don't read
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the horoscopes,  or any  of the other things  that we think are  nonsense.
Hauerwas: They don't listen to the Ayatollah Khomeini very much either.
Levinson: Right.
Hauerwas:  Mark,  you  don't  agree  with  that,  do  you?  What  Sandy just
said?
Tushnet: I'm  willing  to  listen,  but  you  can  tell from  my  tone  of voice
that  I'm skeptical.
Hauerwas:  I mean you're not for multiple  conversation  partners,  per  se.
Tushnet: Not  per  se.  I  lack  sufficient  self-confidence  to  believe  that  it
will never be the case that somebody  will come up with something that would
refute  all these positions I've taken,  but I  am skeptical  about it. Because  I'm
not so  self-confident,  I'll  listen.  There's  also  a strategic reason  for listening
and  entertaining  these  things.  I  lack  social  power.  I  know  these  things  are
going  to  be  said,  and  there'll  be  other  people  who'll  be  listening  to  them,
and  I  ought to  be  in a position  to start  explaining  why they're  wrong,  as  I
presume they  will be. So it's important  for me to entertain,  to participate  in,
the  dialogue-both  because-who  knows?-it  might  turn  out  to  be  right;
and,  even  if it  doesn't  turn  out to  be right,  it's  strategically  important  for
me to  get it.
Levinson: It's  very  clear  to  me,  in  reading  your  work  over  the  years,
that,  whether  you  would  say  you're  doing  it  strategically  or otherwise,  you
are considerably  more  willing to  defend liberalism  than would have been  the
case  six  or  seven  years  ago.  I  think  you  are  turning  slowly  but surely-or
not that  slowly  but certainly  surely-into  a very  important  critic  of republi-
canism.  And  one of the things that  is important  about that is that it's some
of our  mutual  friends  who  are the republicans.  I  think  that  five years  ago,
if people  had  been asked  to  predict  where  Tushnet would  line up,  it  would
have  been  with the republicans,  and so  you  in fact listened to-
Tushnet: But I can identify that with being Jewish. That's pretty straight-
forward.
Levinson:  I  realize  that.  But  that  too  is  a  part  of  yourself  that  you
weren't  expressing...
Tushnet: That's right.  That's  right.
Levinson: ...  six  or  seven  years  ago.  So  in  fact,  simply  because  we  do
live in a kind of pluralist universe,  whatever  our ideal political  theories might
be,  lots  of communication  does  take  place,  and,  even  if we  assume  that  a
lot  of stuff  isn't going  to  be  very  enlightening,  we  find  ourselves  shifting
views and  taking  certain things  seriously  that we would not have  anticipated
taking  seriously.  I  also  agree  with Mark  that a lot of stuff that  we  expected
to be worthless  is.
Hauerwas: But  in  fact  you  two  still  represent  very  much  a  minority
within the legal profession,  in terms of academics,  don't you? And  I certainly
represent a very small  way  of viewing  how  one does  theology.
Shaffer: But  you're  influential.
Hauerwas: I  do  like  to think that  influence  is not that  you have people
agree  with  you.  It's  that  you  can  set  the  terms  of the  debate,  and  I'm
beginning  to  do that.FAITH IN  THE REPUBLIC
Tushnet: In your  case,  that's  not easy.
Hauerwas:  But I mean you all are still  very much a small minority within
the-
Tushnet: I  think that's right.
Hauerwas: That's because  the law  is such a powerful  establishment  tool.
Tushnet" Before going  further,  I want  to say that  "minority"'  is  true.  I
understand  the  tension  between  my saying  that and  what  appear  to  be the
epistemological  positions that I am otherwise  committed to.  I understand the
tension,  but  I  don't  quite  know  what  to  do about  it.  But  at least  I  know
there  is  a difficulty.  I start by saying that,  so  it doesn't  matter.
So we're a minority.  So  what?  Having  said  that,  it is,  I  think,  the case
that in the law  a lot depends  on,  at some  level,  what  happens  in politics,  in
the next election,  to put it in the crudest terms. At the moment  the struggle
for defining  the terms of the debate  is basically  between  the right-wing,  law
and  economics  people  and  the  left-wing,  Critical  Legal  Studies  people,  and
because  of politics,  and  the  relationship  between  law  and  politics,  a lot  has
happened.  The  structure  of the debate  has been defined  over the past decade
largely  by right-wing  law  and  economics.  But I  don't think  that's inevitable.
I  think the votes  are  still out.
Hauerwas: Even if the Democrats  win,  I  don't think  you're going to be
appointed  attorney general.
Tushnet: But I think the issue will then  be what do  left-liberals,  the Yale
Law  School  folks,  do?  How  did  they  respond  to  their  being  in  bad  faith
about their commitment to the law? And they can move either way. Currently
at Yale,  they're  moving to  the right,  but  they don't  really want  to  do that,
deep down, because of their political commitment. If the political space opens
up for them to  start exercising  the kind of power  they want to exercise,  they
may  resolve  the problem of bad faith  by  moving to  the left, which  is where
our stuff  is  defining  the  issues.  That's  a very  rosy  scenario  and  I  want  to
emphasize  that the more important  thing is  the first.
Levinson:  The  only  thing  I  would  add  is  that  it's  a  strange  sort  of
minority,  because  in  fact  it  is  very,  very  well  represented  at  several  of the
elite schools.  Stanford...
Tushnet: Two  out of the four.
Levinson: ... has  a  dean  now-Paul  Brest-which  among  other things
also  disconfirms  the  proposition  of  the  Harvard  Law  School  that  having
Critical Legal Studies  people  on the faculty inevitably  leads  to chaos.  I  think
that's the statement  of the  Harvard Law  School.  Be that  as it may,  that's a
separate  argument.
I  think  it  is  significant  that  Mark's  casebook  has  become  the  leading
one.  It's not  a Crit casebook.  On the other hand,  it certainly  presents  more
of that perspective  than Gunther,56  so  a lot  of people  who  don't identify  at
all  with  Critical  Legal  Studies,  or  are  not  identified-maybe  they  secretly
identify without being  identified  by others-for  some reason  are  choosing to
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expose  their  students  to,  and  themselves  to  start learning  this  stuff,  about
republicanism-what  you  have  plugged  into-and  it's  also  coupled  with  the
fact that  some  people  have  not gotten  jobs because  they  are  identified  with
Critical  Legal  Studies.  Where  do  you  have  much more  of a classic  majority
oppression  of  minorities?  But  it  doesn't  fit  your  classic  definition  of  a
minority.
Hauerwas: One  of  the  things  that  I  picked  up  from  what  you  were
saying,  about what  sustains  the business,  is  that you  still  have a very strong
sense  about what it means  to  have the vocation  of the intellectual,  and  how
that gives you  a certain sense  of vocation-that you are going to go forward,
irrespective  of influence  or success.
Tushnet: I think that's right.  I don't often think of myself in those terms,
but I think it is true that the best description of me would be as an intellectual.